Practical Reason, Misc

This chapter presents the Layered Model of Agency as a semiotic framework for the study of collective agency. The model identifies six distinct types of agencies: operative, reflective, joint, material-mediated, sign-mediated, and symbolic. Each level is examined in detail to elucidate the semiotic mechanisms and the cognitive architecture underlying the emergence of collective agencies. The model conceptualizes collective agency as an enhanced capability for action, incorporating artifacts to constitute sociotechnical systems. Within this framework, both institutional and non-institutional forms of collective (...) agency are explored. In contrast to institutions, the collective agency of non-institutionalized social organizations generates dense networks of interaction within horizontal structures, facilitating the convergence between shared norms and individual values. This bottom-up view on agency recognizes individuals as agents of change and their crucial role in collective agency. Consequently, I underscore the importance of examining the interactions between individual and collective agency, proposing the Layered Model of Agency as a relevant tool for investigating these issues. (shrink)

In 2017, Matti Eklund coined the term "ardent realism" to denote normative realist theories that assert the existence of objective normative facts that serve as the measure of all normative judgments. Ardent realists emphasize that the normative difference between someone who acts badly for bad reasons and someone who acts well for good reasons is not merely a difference in attitudes or emotions. Instead, they argue that this distinction is primarily grounded in objective normative facts. To date, the debate around (...) ardent realism has focused mainly on the metasemantic issues raised by Eklund, leaving its metaphysical foundations insufficiently addressed. In this paper, I aim to define the key terms involved in discussions of ardent realism and clarify the commitments of what I refer to as “metaphysically well-grounded ardent realism” by distinguishing it from possible forms of “non-ardent realism.” I conclude that there are three interlinked metaphysical conditions for ardent realism: (1) Normative facts are stance-independent truth-makers of our normative assertions. (2) Deeply stance-independent normative facts hold authority over all other facts in determining what ought to be done. (3) This sum of deeply stance-independent normative facts is consistent. Therefore, a theory that fails to meet these three conditions cannot be considered ardently realist. (shrink)

Traducción al español del capítulo “What is it to be a rational agent?” de Ruth Chang perteneciente al volumen The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason (2021) editado por Ruth Chang y Kurt Sylvan (ISBN: 978-1-138-19592-9 | 978-0-429-26676-8), impreso por Routledge, imprenta de Taylor & Francis Group. El copyright de los capítulos pertenece a cada contribuidor. La presente traducción ha sido autorizada por la profesora Chang junto a Adam Johnson (Routledge) vía correspondencia personal.

The paper advances a contestable and case-assessable claim: reliance across an institutional transition is not transferred automatically, but is preserved to the extent that recognition criteria, operational capacities, and credible continuity guarantees survive the transition. It distinguishes local presumptions, institutional reliance, and the minimum conditions of causal verifiability, indexing dependencies also to the agent’s source of reasons—direct observation, testimony, or expertise. Its defeasible criterion has explicit priorities: unresolved relevant defeaters block ordinary reliance; stakes and reversibility determine the support required; and (...) the default planning horizon is limited by the available track record, unless independent structural guarantees justify extension. The transition to the euro illustrates how continuity can be preserved without assuming absolute institutional identity. The claim is contestable: if criteria, capacities, and guarantees are preserved, formal discontinuity alone does not defeat warrant; if they fail, the successor authority’s decision alone cannot sustain it. (shrink)

Non-naturalists claim that normative properties are sui generis, attitude-independent, and irreducible to natural properties. A common objection is that although we shape our lives around normative properties, non-naturalism rules out any plausible explanation of how this is possible. Non-naturalism seems to imply that we are hopelessly alienated from the normative. Our goal here is to better understand this worry and use constitutivist resources to develop a novel response. The basic thought is that we are constituted—as deeply social agents—to be gripped (...) by normative properties. So while our constitution does not ground normativity, it grounds our non-alienation from it. (shrink)

Although communication scholars have extensively documented how populist actors engage in deceitful forms of speech, it remains unclear why populists so blatantly disregard truth. This article addresses that question by drawing on the works of Laclau and Mouffe to develop a normative theory of populist communication. This theory posits that, to successfully achieve their goal of uniting ‘the people’ against ‘the elite,’ populist actors should produce three distinct kinds of discourse: agonistic, articulating, and mobilizing. Against this theoretical backdrop, the article (...) advances three claims that shed light on the relationship between populism and deception. First, while populist speech is indifferent to truth, it need not involve lies, as its functions can be fulfilled by non-lying strategies such as cherry-picking and the avoidance of falsifiable statements. Second, due to its indifference to truth, populist speech is nonetheless prone to containing lies, which are likely to increase in number as populist actors gain popularity. Third, populist speech can be conceptualized as a specific variant of what Harry Frankfurt defined as ‘bullshit,’ which I refer to as ‘populist bullshit’. The article thus bridges political theory and empirical research, provides a novel theoretical framework for understanding populist communication, and poses a direct challenge to the acceptability of populism as a political strategy. (shrink)

Derek Parfit famously argues that the best versions of (rule) consequentialism and non-consequentialism converge – roughly, that impersonally optimific moral principles are uniquely universally willable and alternatives to them reasonably rejectable. An important part of making this case is arguing that the key nonconsequentialist distinction between harming as a means and harming as a side effect lacks an adequate rationale. Building on work by Frances Kamm and Stephen Darwall, I argue that there is such a rationale in terms of differential (...) impact on relational equality between the victim and the beneficiary. Roughly, because non-consensually harming A as a means of benefiting B subordinates A’s good to B’s good and harming as a side effect doesn’t do so, A has a stronger reason to reject principles that allow harming as a means. The problem isn’t e.g. being forced to serve the agent’s goals, but rather being forced to serve others, which isn’t the case when one is harmed as a side effect. The legitimacy of such complaints is grounded in our authority to demand being treated as an equal rather than in the badness of harm. They are thus fundamentally second-personal. The broader lesson is that the fundamental disagreement between moral theories derives from their conception of the sources of reasons, which renders convergence unlikely. (shrink)

This paper develops Finite Integrationism as a philosophical framework for understanding judgment, evaluation, revision, responsibility, and practical orientation under conditions of epistemic finitude. Finite cognitive agents do not encounter the world from a position of complete information. They distinguish objects by drawing boundaries and make judgments under limited information, conditions, and evaluative criteria. Such judgments function as revisable stopping points: present determinations that enable cognition or action to proceed without being treated as final or unrevisable. -/- The paper traces a (...) continuous structure from epistemic finitude and boundary-drawing through judgment, prediction, consequence, evaluation, revision, responsibility, and subsequent judgment. It distinguishes judgments from their consequences, evaluations from the objects they evaluate, and responsibility from the person to whom it is attributed. These distinctions do not imply the severance of relations between them. “Integration” refers to treating differentiated objects in relation to one another while preserving their differences. In this sense, the paper formulates the claim: “Boundaries exist. However, the world is not thereby divided.” -/- The paper further distinguishes descriptive structure from normative commitment. Epistemic finitude alone does not logically entail that agents must revise their judgments, continue inquiry, or assume responsibility, nor does it establish a single ethical stance that all agents must adopt. However, agents who adopt values such as accuracy, corrigibility, examination of the relation between judgment and consequence, future use of information gained from consequences, and preservation of distinctions among evaluative objects may have defeasible practical reasons to adopt corresponding elements of the practical stance developed here. -/- The author adopts those values and presents this stance as the practical stance within the broader framework of Finite Integrationism: to judge without treating judgment as final, to draw boundaries without severing relations, to evaluate without permanently fixing the object of evaluation, to acknowledge error without thereby determining the person as a whole, and to carry information obtained from consequences into subsequent judgments. (shrink)

Democratic deliberation presupposes citizens who can treat their judgement as entitled to enter public reasoning as the judgement of an equal. This paper asks whether evidentialism, or anti-pragmatism about reasons for belief more broadly, can account for that requirement. Consider a woman deliberating in a sexist environment. Her evidence may suggest that speaking will be costly and that deference is relatively safer. Yet sustaining belief in her entitlement to judge may partly constitute the civic self-trust needed to participate as an (...) equal. Post hoc usefulness is not enough, since it can amount to a rationalisation of favourable outcomes. The paper asks whether practical considerations can count ex ante as reasons for belief, by reference to the role of agential standing-beliefs in keeping agency available under disempowering conditions. Building on Fricker’s (2007) account of epistemic injustice and Li’s (2025) account of doxastic injustice, the paper treats epistemic empowerment as one species of doxastic empowerment. A subject may understand her situation accurately while still losing the standing-beliefs through which agency remains available. I argue that at least some empowerment-based considerations have normative weight as reasons for politically relevant standing-beliefs. This claim is selective. I call the corresponding disposition EMPOWER, a form of doxastic faith in oneself that can make belief virtuous where the evidence is permissive. The relevant belief must still empower in the right way, i.e. by supporting agency without gradually eroding the agent’s capacities or flourishing. A further issue concerns beliefs that empower one agent by undermining the standing of others. In democratic deliberation, the anti-disempowerment constraint is internal to the kind of standing at issue. A standing-belief counts as democratically empowering only if it preserves the equal standing of other participants. Beliefs that make one’s standing depend on superior status therefore fall outside the scope of civic self-trust. The result is a more discriminating form of pragmatism, limited to empowerment-based reasons for politically relevant standing-beliefs. (shrink)

It is a prominent idea in the theory of action that if an action is intentional, the agent knows the reason why they’re acting. This idea gets often ascribed to G.E.M. Anscombe and is defended by her contemporary followers. In this essay, I discuss a challenge to this doctrine. Some of our intentional actions are done whilst we’re uncertain about why we’re acting. We can be genuinely agnostic or ignorant of our reasons and yet act intentionally. I discuss various ways (...) of resolving this challenge. I argue they all fail. This shows that we can act intentionally without knowing why we’re acting. Put differently, we can act for reasons we don’t know about. (shrink)

G. E. M. Anscombe famously argues that our self-knowledge of intentional action (“practical knowledge”) is both non-observational and yet concerns happenings in objective reality. This combination seems to present a strong tension. Recently, Adrian Haddock offered a novel account of the role of observation in practical knowledge, claiming that such knowledge is a unity of self-knowledge (non-observational) and other-knowledge (observational), both of which are indispensable. Yet Haddock’s view faces several problems. This paper suggests that Sartre’s phenomenology resonates deeply with Haddock’s (...) account and provides a rich resource for addressing his problems. Through Sartre’s discussions of self-consciousness, intentionality, and perception-action unity, we gain a deeper understanding of how observation functions within practical knowledge. This account shows that observation is not merely an aid (as Anscombe suggests) but a constitutive part of practical knowledge. (shrink)

There is a widespread intuition that we have prudential reason to discount the value of an event when it is past compared to equidistant in the future, even holding fixed various factors that might be thought to ground our having such reasons, such as the probability, (dis)utility, and so on, of that event conditional on it being past compared to future. It is also usually assumed that if, holding fixed such factors, we retain such a preference, then that preference is (...) genuinely time-biased: it is sensitive to the temporal location, per se, of the event, rather than to factors (like probability or utility) that are contingently associated with temporal location. However, there is significant dispute about whether temporal location per se is normatively relevant, and hence whether it can ground there being prudential reason to have such preferences. Since empirical research suggests that we retain these preferences under these circumstances, there is a question about whether our actual preferences are prudentially reasonable. In this paper I argue that we can understand our actual preferences not as genuinely time-biased, but as apparently time-biased preferences that are sensitive to the degree to which the personal-identity relation obtains between person-stages. Since degree of personal-identity is normatively relevant, a stage has prudential reason to be apparently time-biased when the personal-identity relation holds more strongly towards the future than the past. I argue that this is, quite plausibly, sometimes the case. To show this I employ a degree-theoretic conativist view of personal-identity on which, (a) which relation realises the personal-identity relation relative to a stage is determined by certain conative attitudes of that stage, and hence can vary from stage to stage, and (b) what realises the personal-identity relation, relative to a stage, holds as a matter of degree and (c) the degree to which the personal-identity relation holds between stages is non-symmetric and (d) some affective relations that plausibly are among those that jointly realise personal-identity for some stages are temporally asymmetric: they hold more strongly towards the future than the past. (shrink)

The work of Joseph Raz has exerted an undoubted influence on discussions in the field of the philosophy of law in recent decades. One of the points of particular influence is his position regarding the philosophy of law as a branch of practical philosophy, alongside moral philosophy and political philosophy, and therefore necessarily focused on the analysis of the practical reasoning of the addressees of legal norms. In this short contribution, I will show the originality and depth of the Razian (...) work in the framework of legal philosophy by focusing on two points: the idea of legal norms as protected reasons for action and the Razian concept of legitimate authority. I will also show how these theses can be understood as the product of a conceptually and chronologically concatenated elaboration in response to one of the greatest challenges concerning law and authority: the so-called anarchist challenge – that is, the idea that it is impossible to find compatibility between authority and autonomy, and between authority and rationality. (shrink)

What is it to think a generic normative thought of the form ‘Human beings should exercise regularly’ or ‘Human beings must keep promises’? I argue that although such thoughts resemble, in different respects, intentions and evaluative beliefs, they are not, first and foremost, either of those types of states. They instead have a different temporal profile of a settled disposition of the will which grounds specific intentions to acts and specific evaluative beliefs when the subject is in the relevant circumstances (...) for either. Such states provide for a distinct type of practical irrationality, which explains the resemblance to intentions. We also can form evaluative beliefs through reflection on those settled dispositions, which explains how they are the basis for types of a distinct type of evaluative belief. (shrink)

I defend pluralist metaethical constitutivism: practical norms governing an agent are grounded in her kind of rational agency. Kinds of rational agency are defined in terms of reasons explanations: to be a given kind of rational agent is for one’s actions to admit of certain forms of reasons explanation. Unlike extant, ‘monist’ constitutivists, pluralists need not say that there are constitutive standards of rational agency as such—just that there are constitutive standards of our kind of agency. They can thus admit (...) the possibility of ‘minimal’ agents whose agency cannot ground any practical norms, retaining the virtues of monist constitutivism without its costs. (shrink)

In the last decades, the global relevance of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) has been steadily rising, through both the widespread global adoption of the WADA Code by sport organizations and public authorities and its role in establishing of adjudicatory mechanisms for decisions in individual cases. Prima facie, it seems that in this scenario there are some notes or features that could be considered as authoritative; WADA’s specific characteristics, however, seem to make it difficult to claim that it is a (...) (typical practical) authority. Does this suggest that WADA is not an authority —or something else? Here, we will argue that our theoretical frameworks might not be enough to account for cases as WADA —that is, cases of global (practical) authority. First, we will start by offering a starting theoretical framework for the analysis of authority (Section II). Then, we will consider Himma’s recent proposal related to the nature of practical authority as an example of contemporary theoretical framework, giving particular attention to the “existence conditions of practical authority” and the concomitant “Sanctions Thesis” (Section III). Second, we will test how this framework fares when applied in a transnational/global setting. We will analyze, in such settings, why —and to which extent— it is still preferable to talk about authority instead of governance (Section IV). Finally, we will consider the case of WADA as a case of what we call “global (practical) authority”, and how this analysis reveals some limitations of Himma’s framework to deal with —or to downright consider— such cases (Section V). (shrink)

What makes an action right? This paper develops a structural answer: an action is optimally right if and only if it minimizes aggregate loss among viable options, and permissible if it remains within the best attainable severity class. The framework takes loss—the diminution of action-capacity within responsibility structures—as its foundational primitive, drawing on an independently developed ontology of loss as temporal foreclosure. From this foundation, the paper derives: (1) a three-level verdict structure (optimal, permissible, wrong) grounded in severity thresholds, (2) (...) lexicographic severity aggregation that captures categorical priorities without abandoning outcome-sensitivity, (3) a viability constraint that blocks demandingness objections by treating agency-destruction as catastrophic loss internal to the framework, and (4) a counterfactual structure of wrongness that explains why unavoidable harm is not wrong while easily avoidable harm is worse. The resulting view is a structurally constrained consequentialism that explains why deontological prohibitions have force, why special obligations emerge from relationships, and why predatory structures fail to qualify as moral systems. The framework preserves consequentialist outcome-sensitivity while explaining the categorical priorities emphasized by deontological theories in terms of the structure of loss. (shrink)

This paper develops structural loss-minimization ethics, a unified moral framework built from a single primitive: loss. The framework provides: (1) a first-order theory of right action (right action minimizes aggregate loss among viable options), (2) a theory of moral character (good character is a robust policy of loss-minimization across situations), (3) a theory of moral appraisal (attribution is inference about character from observed behavior under discriminating conditions), and (4) a deflationary account of moral worth as a dispositional property (policy robustness) (...) whose social function is to support coordination under uncertainty. The framework dissolves traditional puzzles about the relationship between motives and outcomes, explains why moral luck is troubling, grounds the importance of counterfactuals, and unifies questions that the philosophical literature has treated as separate research programs. Unlike classical utilitarianism, the framework operates on loss rather than utility, reads loss off situational structure rather than calculating hedonic sums, and reframes several standard objections by restricting evaluation to viable continuations of agency and by using lexicographic severity aggregation. The resulting view is best understood as a structurally constrained consequentialism with a policy-inference account of moral worth. (shrink)

Contemporary relationships increasingly exhibit patterns of superficiality and premature termination despite human capacity for deep, enduring connection. This philosophical treatise extends the Value-Lifespan Equilibrium (VLE) framework from economic markets to human relationships, examining how temporal investment theory illuminates fundamental questions about human connection, commitment, and interpersonal flourishing. Drawing from Aristotelian virtue ethics, Levinas's ethics of the Other, and contemporary attachment theory, I develop the Relational Investment Equilibrium (RIE) framework—a philosophical model that treats relationships as temporal investments generating value through duration, (...) depth, and mutual recognition. The framework demonstrates how modern social structures incentivize "relational obsolescence"—the systematic devaluation of long-term connection in favor of disposable relationships. Through examination of commitment phobia, digital superficiality, and the commodification of human connection, this work argues that genuine human flourishing requires institutional and cultural transformation toward what I term "sustainable relationality." The philosophical contribution lies in reconceptualizing relationships not as static states but as dynamic temporal processes requiring investment, maintenance, and mutual commitment to generate their full value across the human lifespan. Building on my previous work establishing the VLE framework for material goods, this treatise reveals how the same temporal dynamics that govern product value apply to human relationships, while acknowledging the unique dimensions of understanding and being understood that distinguish human connection from economic exchange. (shrink)

Plato’s Republic, sometimes translated as The State, is among the most enduring works of philosophy. Although composed in the fourth century BCE, its central insights continue to resonate across millennia. At its heart lies an analogy between the soul of the individual and the structure of the political community: the state is the soul writ large. For Plato, harmony within the self produces harmony within society, while disorder in the soul inevitably echoes outward into civic conflict, corruption, and tyranny. The (...) crises of the state, in other words, are always rooted in the crises of the human person. This insight has lost none of its relevance. The twenty-first century is marked by acute social polarization, widening inequality, rampant consumerism, and declining trust in institutions. These problems are often described in purely political or economic terms, but Plato’s perspective reminds us that they are also psychological and moral. They arise when reason is displaced by appetite, when spirit is distorted into anger or resentment, and when the inner life of citizens falls into imbalance. In this sense, the state is a mirror: the disquiet of the individual soul is projected onto the structures of government and society. Yet our present moment also requires an expansion of Plato’s framework. For while he emphasized the correspondence between inner and outer life, modern history shows that the environment, the material conditions of land, water, air, and resources, cannot be separated from the equation. Environmental stress magnifies inner frustration. Periods of famine, climate disruption, or ecological collapse have historically given rise to social unrest, mass migration, and even civilizational decline. When the natural world fails to sustain human needs, the tension between reason, spirit, and appetite becomes sharper, often erupting in destructive forms. (shrink)

In recent decades, the concept of authority has been treated and discussed almost exclusively as a concept based on reasons of some kind within a broader theoretical framework that views legal philosophy (only) through the lens of practical reasoning. Based on these assumptions, much of the discussion has focused on what kind of reasons are involved, what impact the presence of authority has on the practical reasoning of agents, whether or not there is unity in practical reasoning, and whether or (...) not – and in what sense – the outcome of that reasoning involving those kinds of reasons is conclusive. -/- The aim of this chapter is to critically analyse this choice and its theoretical and practical consequences. First, through the analysis of Joseph Raz’s and John Finnis’ theoretical frameworks, I will show how concepts of authority such as Raz’s and Finnis’ are intrinsically linked –and heavily rely on– the endorsement of the idea that legal philosophy as a branch of practical philosophy and the endorsement of a so-called dominant position about practical reasoning, which characterises it as unitary under moral precepts. Second, I will points out some issues that can be tracked to this dependence. One set of problems is connected to the priority of the committed concept of authority based on moral acceptance, and the difficulties it implies for evaluating legitimacy. Another set is connected to the specific conception of acceptance they are built on, how it impacts on key notions such as effectiveness and compliance, and the difficulties the resulting concepts face at a conceptual, epistemic, and practical levels. Finally, a last set relates to how the strong dependence on these commitments might affect the plausibility and usefulness of these concepts. (shrink)

This essay considers how best to understand the relation between sacred values and rational reflection in a life of devotion. It focuses on a disagreement between Lisa Tessman (2014) and Paul Katsafanas (2022) concerning whether devotion requires refraining from justificatory reasoning about one’s commitment to a sacred value. After objecting to their accounts, it provides an alternative on which the devoted agent responds to sacred values with a sense of awe, recognizing a depth beyond their current reckoning. Devotion is a (...) form of evaluation and commitment that constitutively involves epistemic humility that renders one’s commitment invulnerable to revision. (shrink)

Incommensurability is often introduced with the small improvement argument. Options A and B are shown to be incommensurable when it is neither the case that A is preferred to (or better than) B nor that B is preferred to (or better than) A, but a slightly improved version of A (A+) is still not preferred to B. Since A+ is preferred to A, but not to B, we must also conclude that it is also true that A and B are (...) not indifferent (or equally good). Such incommensurable options seem incompatible with orthodox decision theory (and various forms of value theory) but options that obey the pattern described by this argument seem ubiquitous: my choice between lemon tarts and eclairs at my favourite pastry shop might exhibit this pattern, but so could my choice between jobs or careers. In trying to accommodate incommensurable options within various frameworks, philosophers have argued that we must preserve certain central features of the phenomenon. Among them is the supposed “hardness” of at least some incommensurable options: even if perhaps one would need to be a rather anxious gourmet to describe the choice between lemon tarts and eclairs as hard, the choice among careers could potentially be agonizing. However, it is not clear in which way choices among incommensurable options are “hard,” nor how and whether such hardness poses problems for the various accounts of incommensurable choices. To complicate matters, the deontic verdicts for choices between incommensurable options seem to be relatively straightforward: one appealing view is that in such circumstances I am rationally permitted to choose any option that is not worse than another option. This paper aims to provide a sharper formulation of at least a version of the hardness problem, to argue that various theories of incommensurability fail to account for the hardness of some incommensurable choices, and to propose that the theory of instrumental rationality I develop in Rational Powers in Action, aided by a Kantian insight, promises to provide an adequate explanation of the hardness of choice among incommensurable options. (shrink)

N.B. This is a significantly updated version of the paper. In The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidgwick opined that the 'profoundest problem in ethics' is the (at least apparent) possibility of conflict between what morality requires of us and what self-interest requires of us. This problem, sometimes called 'Sidgwick's dualism of practical reason', has been the subject of increasing study as of late. This chapter focus on how a new approach in ethics, the project of de-moralising ethical inquiry and theories, (...) can lead to a dissolution of Sidgwick's dualism. In particular, the chapter looks at the implications of what an impartial, welfarist version (impartial de-moralised universal welfarism) of the project are for Sidgwick's dualism. I argue that understanding IDUW helps to highlight the way in which Sidgwick's dualism is driven by assigning special normative to significance to prudence. The paper offers insights into how to understand distinct types of approaches to resolving, or accepting, the dualism. (shrink)

This book motivates and systematically develops the view that knowledge should be at the centre of our theory of practical rationality. Only act on what you know -- the book offers the first comprehensive defence of this slogan in the form of a knowledge-based decision theory. The proposed view is shown to be the most straightforward explanation of emerging bodies of evidence for a link between knowledge and rational action. The book provides novel solutions to well-known challenges that invoke high-stakes (...) scenarios, seemingly rational actions based on reasonable but false beliefs, and decision-making under risk and uncertainty. The emerging view brings together traditional and formal approaches to epistemology and the study of practical rationality. The resulting knowledge-based decision theory is embedded in a rich normative landscape, encompassing innovative accounts of excuses, rational acceptance, and the simplification of reasoning. Knowledge and Rational Action will be of great interest to researchers and graduate students interested in epistemology, practical rationality, and decision theory. (shrink)

I defend the novel thesis that structural rationality just is applied rational understanding. Applied rational understanding involves our grasping, appreciating, or being sensitive to the basic structure or “logic” of our attitudes, where such sensitivity leads us to properly maintain or revise our attitudes so as to achieve coherence among them. This approach addresses two main issues. First, it explains why there exists a puzzling dualism in our rational psychology: namely, that clear-eyed structural irrationality is unintelligible to us and resists (...) first-personal accounts of behavior in ways that substantive irrationality doesn’t. Second, this approach shows (i) that, given plausible reliabilist intuitions, there’s no necessary connection between the first-person and structural rationality; and (ii) that there is a necessary connection between the first-person and what Tyler Burge calls “fully realized rational agency.” In this paper, I provide a new way of defending this important Burgean claim. (shrink)

The theory and doctrine of proximate cause has been too easily dismissed. Two primary errors underlie this dismissal: a misunderstanding of “causal proximity,” and a mistaken inference from the correct observation that effects have multiple causes, to the claim that there is no hierarchy between proximate and more remote causes. This article defends the classic conception of proximate causation as causally grounded by reconstructing the doctrine and articulating an underlying concept of proximate causation in which proximity is relative (though still (...) objective). Proximate causation is a relation between two causes and an effect, when one cause mediates the effects of another. This idea informs the doctrines of proximate cause, which, following Bacon’s Maxim, trace back from the injury to its causes, in sequence. along the paths of causation, until responsibility is absorbed, at which point the process terminates. Causal chains “break”: not because the cause and effect are too remote, but because a set of causes that are proximate, relative to these remote causes, are sufficient to absorb responsibility. With responsibility absorbed, there is nothing further to trace back. This is missed if tracing is from cause to injury, rather than in reverse, from injury to cause. As a matter of responsibility, the responsibility of remote actors—those that act through the agency of others, or those that fail to prevent the wrongdoing of others—is always subordinate to that of the causally proximate actor. This does not mean that the proximate actor always bears greater responsibility than the remote one, but when responsibility is transmitted remotely, it must be in virtue of a justifying or excusing condition for the proximate actor’s act. The order of justification follows the order of causation. Properly understood, proximate cause is essentially a defense that asserts that the defendant is not the most proximate cause to the harm, and that someone (or something) else is. The implications for both liability and contribution are discussed. (shrink)

What electoral system should a democracy choose? I argue for proportional representation (PR). My main empirical premise is Duverger’s law: Under PR there are more viable candidates in district-level elections than there are under single-member plurality (SMP) systems. My main normative premise is that democracy is valuable because it enables ordinary citizens to rule themselves. To enjoy the value of self-rule, citizens must be able to make an autonomous vote choice. Yet, how autonomous any choice is depends on the diversity (...) of one’s adequate options. The fewer adequate options one can choose between, the less autonomous is one’s choice. So PR augments self- rule by increasing the diversity of adequate options citizens have at election time. (shrink)

"From the complex mesh of relationships Spinoza develops in the ‘Ethics’ arises what remains perhaps the most controversial and long-standing polemic in God studies. Human freedom and ‘free-will’, he asserts categorically, are “feigned seats and dwelling places” humans believe they enjoy but which are rendered inoperative in all but in name under what he calls ‘the sole causality of God’.".

Essentially, the paper is a complaint regarding philosophy in its most current iterations. And although not an attack on specific traditions, its objective is to instead point out a betrayal of the classical philosophical praxis. It is a betrayal of questioning and being that pesky, Socratic gadfly regarding people and institutions of power. The key objective is to not only draw a link between the philosopher and said institutions but also to show that the philosopher does not exist in a (...) vacuum—they are products of their time, even if not merely that. At its end, this short essay will make a call to uphold that precious tradition and preserve philosophy’s braver elements in the face of power and adversity. (shrink)

This text should have been written by John Deely (1942–2017). But we all pass from this coil with our life’s work left unfinished—leaving thereby to others the choice of whether or not that work is continued. During our last conversation, knowing that his time in this life was limited, John expressed to me a wonder and a trepidation whether the human soul really is immortal. I repeated to him, in paraphrase, words he had once said in class: “It is an (...) experiment we all make, but only once.” He chuckled and said that’s true. -/- Reflecting at the distance of nearly seven years and having since oft-read C.S. Peirce’s brief essay, “Immortality in the Light of Synechism”, it occurs to me that the immortality of the individual soul is the wrong question, if we understand it strictly as materially individuated: for we are all of us sustained more by relationality than substantiality, by our common and shared intentionality, and though we may not know with certitude his final resting place, we do here—I hope—sustain something of the soul that belonged to John Deely. -/- I hope this doesn’t “go off the rails”. -/- All the contents are fully attributable to the author, Doctor Brian Kemple. Should you wish to get this text republished, get in touch with the author or the editorial committee of the Studia Poinsotiana. Insofar as possible, we will be happy to broker your contact. -/- Studia Poinsotiana The first-ever peer-reviewed scholarly publishing venue offering an encyclopedic web of understanding concentrating on John of St. Thomas (Poinsot). (shrink)

This paper examines the nature of the specific grasp involved in moral understanding. After discussing Hills's ability account of that central component of moral understanding in light of problematic cases, I argue that moral grasp is best conceived of as a type of knowledge that is grounded in a subject's moral appreciation. I then show how and why the relevant notion of moral appreciation is connected to moral virtues and to one's affective and motivational engagement with moral reasons. Finally, I (...) discuss the connection between moral appreciation and a subject's ability to offer moral explanations in relation to the debate between pessimists and optimists about moral understanding's testimonial transmission. (shrink)

In contemporary philosophy of mind, understanding others is often presented as an activity of attributing mental states to agents or mindreading – the central question being then how to access their minds. The paper argues that this pervasive approach should be rejected, in favour of the view along which identifying an action comes from exercising conceptual skills acquired through being inserted into shared practices characterizing a social world. Examining the conditions of their acquisition then sheds new light on the semantics (...) of psychological concepts as well as on the roots of misunderstanding. (shrink)

A short discussion on how photography can capture the sturdiness lent to our personality by our long-term policies structuring our reasoning, even during times of war and other cataclysms.

Interweaving hazards in environmental crises can be framed as a wicked problem as well as an opportunity for the interdisciplinary contribution of philosophical analysis on risk. Due to nonlinear mechanisms and contextual variations, this shows the importance of inquiring about contrasting assessments of vulnerability and the demand for comprehensive collective actions in coping with climate risks. The article examines how to address overlapping ecological and social risks, focusing on decision-making in the context of local energy transition projects through the lens (...) of collective epistemic responsibility. By analyzing disciplinary accounts and exploring the links between assessment and decision-making further research directions for collective risk prevention strategies will be outlined, and some implications for interdisciplinary investigation on risk and expertise will be sketched. (shrink)

In the first part (sections 2-5) an empirical theory of practical reasons is sketched and defended. It consists of: hypotheses about what intentions are, namely optimality beliefs, (2), hypotheses about how intentions are formed on the basis of probabilistic beliefs and intrinsic desires (3), a pluralist theory about intrinsic desires (4) and a theory about motives for moral action (5). In the second part (sections 6-8) it is argued that normative practical philosophy must rely on empirical theories of practical reasons (...) (6). Then it is shown that theories of prudential practical rationality and of morals that are not based on such empirical theories run into problems. And it is sketched how the empirical theory outlined in the first part can be used as a basis for a reconstructive approach to practical rationality and of an internalist approach to morals (7-8). (shrink)

We investigate the causal manipulability hypothesis, according to which what partly explains (a) why people tend to prefer negative events to be in their further future rather than their nearer future and positive events to be in their nearer future rather than their further future and (b) why people tend to prefer that negative events be located in their past not their future and that positive events be located in their future not their past, is that people tend to discount (...) the value of events they are less able causally to manipulate. If people discount the value of events they are less able to causally manipulate, then since often temporally nearer future events are more causally manipulable than further ones, and since future events are manipulable whereas past ones aren’t, this could explain both (a) and (b). In turn, if the causal manipulability hypothesis is correct, this might suggest that insofar as people’s preferences are explained in this manner, those preferences are rationally permissible, since relative causal manipulability is normatively relevant. Thus, ascertaining whether the causal manipulability hypothesis is true may shed light on the normative status of such preferences. We investigate the cognitively mediated version of the causal manipulability hypothesis, according to which people’s consciously held beliefs about the relative causal manipulability of events explains (a) and (b). Contrary to expectations, we found no evidence in favour of this view. We suggest that either relative causal manipulability plays an explanatory role, but one that is not cognitively mediated, or that it does not play any role, even if it is sometimes associated with other factors, such as probability, that may play a role in explaining some time biased preferences. (shrink)

What is it that one fundamentally rejects when one criticizes a way of thinking as moralistic? Taking my cue from the principal leveller of this charge in philosophy, I argue that the root problem of moralism is the dualism that underlies it. I begin by distinguishing the rejection of moralism from the rejection of the moral/nonmoral distinction: far from being something one should jettison along with moralism, that distinction is something that any human society is bound to develop. But this (...) valuable distinction is transformed into a problematic dualism when it casts the two sides of the distinction as contrasting sharply in nature, value, and structure. In ethics, the resulting dichotomy takes the form of a dualism of morality and prudence. In politics, it takes the form of a dualism of principle and interest. I explain the enduring appeal of such dualisms before laying out the costs of moralism thus conceived: moralism erodes our sensibility to the moral and political costs of value conflicts; it projects an unrealistic conception of agency that sets up scepticism about responsibility; and it limits our ability to appreciate and realize the wider variety of nonmoral values that sustain us, our achievements, and morality itself. (shrink)

This paper explores the analysis of ability, where ability is to be understood in the epistemic sense—in contrast to what might be called a causal sense. There are plenty of cases where an agent is able to perform an action that guarantees a given result even though she does not know which of her actions guarantees that result. Such an agent possesses the causal ability but lacks the epistemic ability. The standard analysis of such epistemic abilities relies on the notion (...) of action types—as opposed to action tokens—and then posits that an agent has the epistemic ability to do something if and only if there is an action type available to her that she knows guarantees it. We show that these action types are not needed: we present a formalism without action types that can simulate analyzes of epistemic ability that rely on action types. Our formalism is a standard epistemic extension of the theory of “seeing to it that”, which arose from a modal tradition in the logic of action. (shrink)

Dieses Buch widmet sich der ebenso alten wie aktuellen Frage, wie das Handeln des Menschen plausibel und nachvollziehbar erklärt werden kann. Es wird das Ziel verfolgt, dieses brisante und immer noch kontrovers diskutierte Problem der Handlungserklärung philosophisch zu bedenken und adäquate Losungen zu entwickeln. Dabei wird zunächst ein Umweg eingeschlagen, der sich jedoch als besonders lohnenswert erweist, nämlich den über die philosophische Handlungstheorie von Wilfrid Sellars, die untrennbar mit seiner weitbekannten Philosophie des Geistes verknüpft ist und, obgleich bereits zur traditionellen (...) Handlungstheorie gehörend, von bemerkenswerter Aktualität ist. Seine Handlungstheorie wird in diesem Buch erstmalig systematisch, vollständig und kritisch rekonstruiert. Über Sellars hinausgehend wird anschließend der anspruchsvolle Versuch unternommen, alternative Wege zur Lösung des Problems der Handlungserklärung aufzuzeigen, die sich besonders dadurch auszeichnen, dass sie die bekannten Unzulänglichkeiten traditioneller Grunde- und Kausalerklärungen von Handlungen überwinden. (shrink)

In “Normative Reasons from a Naturalistic Point of View”, Marko Jurjako explores the foundational concept of normative reasons through the lens of methodological naturalism. Departing from traditional analytic or purely conceptual approaches, this philosophical inquiry navigates the terrain of reasons, rationality, and normativity—concepts with a long philosophical pedigree—within a framework rooted in our understanding of the natural and social world. By aligning the exploration with scientifically based theorizing, the book seeks a synoptic view that bridges the gap between relatively isolated (...) philosophical discussions of the nature of normative reasons and their grounding in human intrapersonal and interpersonal interactions that can be understood and explained by an array of scientifically inspired models. (shrink)

This article explicates the nature of social ontology. There are three social holist theses relevant to the problem: First, the individual and society are not independent of each other. Second, the development of the individual’s human potential depends upon the nature of society. Third, a good society cultivates rather than undermines human potential. To explore the problem, this paper juxtaposes Muhammad Iqbal and Philip Pettit, two social holist philosophers, who belong to the Islamic and Western traditions, respectively. Drawing on the (...) Islamic tradition, Iqbal argues that the individual cannot develop human potential, such as creativity, without a society. Iqbal’s social ontology, based on his theory of egohood, asserts that the individual ego (the individual) develops in relationship to the holistic ego (society). Iqbal repudiates a totalitarian society while supporting an Islamic society based on the principles of freedom, equality, and fraternity. In the Western tradition, Pettit posits an idea of holistic individualism by drawing on four contrasting social theories: atomism, holism, collectivism, and individualism. Pettit envisions a society that is neither totalitarian nor anarchic, but it is a creation of autonomous individuals. Hence, Iqbal’s and Pettit’s social ontological positions are significant to understanding the nature of society and their malign and benign roles in the social world. (shrink)

I consider Agnes Callard's _Aspiration_, primarily with regard to its characterization of aspirants as having a partial grasp of a value and being oriented toward their own self-improvement, and to its descriptions of individual case studies, primarily those of Alcibiades and the "good music student" who wishes to learn more about music for its own sake. While she surely has a real phenomenon in view, her theorization of it is more baffling than enlightening, hemmed in by bizarre side conditions on (...) what could count as a reason for pursuing something and by curiously anhedonic exemplars. Her agents have no actual desire to engage in their pursuits, only intellectual respect for them, and no reason to do so: Callard substitutes for "partial grasp of a reason" the idea of two-faced "proleptic reason", whose two faces are a non-aspirational reason the agent has and an aspirational reason the agent doesn't have. Despite the book's subtitle and occasional obiter dicta, she has no concept of becoming, or agents who understand themselves as deepening their engagement with something out of interest in it. (shrink)

Schelling’s Principle of Art returns us to an ancient epic sensibility, laying the foundations for reversing the unrealistic ‘modern mythology’ arguably at the core of humanity’s ecological/existential crisis. This contribution examines how, by detailing his systematic approach to constructing art ‘in the particular’ (art-forms/works). ‘Particularity’ is subject only to the reason inherent in the potences (or consequences) of the affirmation of the whole unity (Principle). Hence Schelling’s ‘affirming principles’ determine boundary conditions for his ‘mythological categories’, revealing why their generalities inform (...) a ‘scientific sequence’ for explaining the features of the Formative and Verbal arts (ie., all artforms, ‘for all time’). Examining specific examples shows how Schelling resolves key difficulties (appearance/reality, form/non-form, intentionality, and purpose) for assessing art’s higher meaning-value directionality; why phenomenology is key to understanding it; and how we arrived at the problematic modern ‘epic’ reversal of ancient universalising focusing our attention on ‘efficient’ over ‘final’ causes in art-making/admiring. Explaining practical application of the Principle-in-action expands on why Schelling’s ‘dialectical aesthetics’ presents a hitherto unrecognised radical advance on Kant’s. My conclusion summarises what shifts in attendance to the art object Schelling’s system demands, and why his Philosophy of Art offers a suitable framework for collectively re-worlding the world. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to reject what I call the entitlement model of directed obligation: the view that we can conclude from X is obligated to Y that therefore Y has an entitlement against X. I argue that rejecting the model clears up many otherwise puzzling aspects of ordinary moral interaction. The main goal is not to offer a new theory of obligation and entitlement. It is rather to show that, contrary to what most philosophers have assumed, directed (...) obligation and entitlement are not the same normative concept seen from two different perspectives. They are two very different concepts, and much is gained by keeping them distinct. (shrink)

When police abuse their duties, it undermines the state's internal security. It creates a crisis of legitimacy of police because people detest them for their abuse and tyranny. In 1957, IACP (the International Association of Chiefs of Police) developed an ethics tool Code of Ethics for law enforcement. Nevertheless, training has been focused and emphasized on techniques and tactics of policing. Ethics is not the part of presell of the training. The Code of Ethics is pronounced once in a life (...) only during pass-out day. Police face dilemmas in real-time situations with people and society. This is why, this article is concerned with ethics a tool, and procedures to reduce police abuse. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide a detailed characterisation of some ways in which our preferences reflect our reasons. I will argue that practical reasons can be characterised along two dimensions that influence our preferences: their balance and their weight. This is analogous to a similar characterisation of the way in which probabilities reflect the balance and weight of evidence in epistemology. In this paper, I will illustrate the distinction between the balance and weight of reasons, and show (...) how this is crucial for an adequate account of preference and choice. The upshot is a more complete picture of a particular kind of decision, labelled by Isaac Levi and, more recently, Ruth Chang as ‘hard choices’. These are choices in which one option is better than another in some ways, the other is better than the first in some ways, but neither seems better overall. The distinction between the balance and weight of reasons presents a new way of understanding how hard choices vary by degree and what it is that makes them so hard. (shrink)