Knowledge

This paper argues that Yoruba epistemology constitutes a sophisticated, internally coherent system of knowledge acquisition that fundamentally resists reductionist methodologies characteristic of modern Western philosophy of science. Where reductionism operative in disciplines such as analytical chemistry, molecular biology, and classical physics seeks to explain phenomena by decomposing them into their constituent parts, Yoruba epistemology proceeds from the ontological conviction that reality is irreducibly relational. Within the Yoruba intellectual tradition, knowledge is not the product of isolating variables or dissecting wholes into (...) atomistic units. It emerges from the dynamic interplay of persons, community, spiritual forces, moral disposition, and cosmic order. Drawing on indigenous Yoruba philosophical concepts including Ìmọ̀ (knowledge), Ọgbọ́n (wisdom), Òye (understanding), Àṣà (culture/tradition), and the foundational notion of Ori (personal essence), this paper demonstrates how the Yoruba epistemic framework privileges wholeness, relationality, and participatory knowing. It further situates Yoruba epistemology within contemporary debates in African philosophy, contrasting it with both Western analytic epistemology and other African holistic traditions. The paper contends that a serious philosophical engagement with Yoruba epistemology not only enriches cross-cultural philosophy of knowledge but also offers a corrective to the epistemic limitations of reductionism in addressing complex human and ecological questions. This paper proceeds by philosophical reconstruction and comparative conceptual analysis, drawing on scholarship of Yoruba and African philosophers rather than by empirical or ethnographic fieldwork. Its scope is delimited to four representative domains, namely medicine, ethics, cosmology, and ecology, rather than a comprehensive ethnographic survey. (shrink)

Die vorliegende Untersuchung entwickelt auf der Grundlage der Theorie der Einheitsbildung einen genetisch-rekonstruktiven Ansatz zur erkenntnistheoretischen Erklärung von Stabilität, Identität und Veränderung. Ausgangspunkt ist das philosophische Problem, wie etwas trotz unterschiedlicher zeitlicher Bestimmungen als dieselbe Einheit erkannt und zugleich als verändert verstanden werden kann. Die Untersuchung vertritt die These, dass die traditionelle Gegenüberstellung von Sein und Werden eine grundlegende Voraussetzung unzureichend berücksichtigt, indem sie die Bestimmbarkeit jener Einheiten bereits voraussetzt, deren Beständigkeit oder Veränderung erklärt werden soll. Demgegenüber wird Einheitsbildung als (...) fortlaufender Organisationszusammenhang rekonstruiert, in dem Differenzierung, Relevanzbildung, Integration und Stabilisierung die Entstehung wiedererkennbarer Einheiten ermöglichen. Die erkenntnisgenetische Grundlage dieser Organisation bilden individuelle Verstehensleistungen, in denen emotionale Relevanzbildung, Erfahrungsverstehen und das darauf aufbauende, operativ eigenständige Denkverstehen zusammenwirken. Dabei wird zwischen einer unabhängig bestehenden Realität, die ausschließlich über ihre Wirkungen zugänglich ist, und der durch individuelle Einheitsbildung hervorgebrachten Wirklichkeit unterschieden. Identität erscheint innerhalb dieses Ansatzes nicht als voraussetzungslos gegebene Eigenschaft, sondern als Ergebnis stabilisierter Organisationszusammenhänge, die Wiedererkennbarkeit und weitere Bestimmung ermöglichen. Veränderung wird entsprechend als eine im gegenwärtigen Verstehen vollzogene Organisationsleistung bestimmt, durch die zeitlich unterschiedliche Bestimmungen innerhalb eines gemeinsamen Identitätszusammenhangs als Verschiedenheit derselben Einheit verständlich werden. Die zentrale These lautet, dass Stabilisierung und Veränderbarkeit keine Gegensätze bilden, sondern die Stabilisierung von Einheiten gerade jene Wiedererkennbarkeit ermöglicht, die für ihre erneute Bestimmbarkeit erforderlich ist. Dabei wird zwischen der prinzipiellen Offenheit weiterer Einheitsbildung, der ausdrücklichen Bestimmung konkreter Veränderungsmöglichkeiten und der Erkenntnis tatsächlicher Veränderungen unterschieden. Möglichkeit gilt folglich nicht als ursprüngliche ontologische Voraussetzung, sondern als Ergebnis einer zusätzlichen Einheitsbildung, innerhalb derer eine bereits bestimmte Einheit als anders bestimmbar verstanden wird. Die Untersuchung begründet die konstitutive Bedeutung erneuter Bestimmbarkeit für fortlaufende Wirklichkeitsbildung, ohne daraus eine notwendige tatsächliche Veränderung einzelner Einheiten oder eine uneingeschränkte Veränderbarkeit abzuleiten. Der genetisch-rekonstruktive Ansatz wird dabei hinsichtlich seiner begrifflichen Voraussetzungen, seiner rekursiven Struktur und seiner erkenntnistheoretischen Grenzen einer systematischen Prüfung unterzogen. In kritischer Auseinandersetzung mit zentralen Positionen der Philosophiegeschichte wird damit ein Zugang entwickelt, der die Erklärung von Veränderung nicht auf vorausgesetzte ontologische Eigenschaften zurückführt, sondern auf die Bedingungen ihrer individuellen Bestimmbarkeit. Als Ergebnis wird ein erkenntnistheoretischer Zusammenhang herausgearbeitet, in dem Stabilität, Identität, Möglichkeit und Veränderung als unterschiedliche, wechselseitig aufeinander bezogene Bestimmungen fortlaufender Einheitsbildung verständlich werden. (shrink)

In contemporary internet forums and popular debates, the hybrid identity of the “agnostic atheist” has become a fashionable shield. Proponents of this label argue that atheism and agnosticism are not mutually exclusive because they answer different questions: atheism addresses belief (a lack thereof), while agnosticism addresses knowledge (a lack of certainty). This taxonomy, however, crumbles under the weight of rigorous philosophical frameworks, scientific methodology, and cognitive reality. By modeling cognitive postures through an evolutionary-cladistic lens, this paper demonstrates that formal traditional (...) epistemology holds true under cognitive scrutiny, that the label “agnostic atheist” is a redundant misnomer, and that the modern shift toward defining atheism as a mere "lack of belief" is a tactical retreat designed to evade an inescapable epistemic requirement for evidence. (shrink)

Gnostic consequentialism holds that a belief is rational just in case it is sufficiently likely to constitute knowledge. I show that this view makes implausible dynamic predictions when combined with the most influential models of the "inexact knowledge" we have in cases involving imprecise measurement or repeated chance processes. These models, built on the idea that such knowledge requires a margin for error, allow that one can have "improbable knowledge", that is, that one can know something even though it is (...) unlikely (given one's evidence, or given how one's belief was formed) that one knows it. I show that the problems can be alleviated by rejecting this idea, but that this may force us to deny that inexact knowledge requires a margin for error. I leave open how we should respond to this dilemma. (shrink)

Chomsky’s (1986) notion of I-language holds that human linguistic competence is grounded in an internal, intensional system of rules and representations. Large language models (LLMs) now produce syntactically rich and context-sensitive language without any evident symbolic grammar, which raises a question of explanatory necessity: when a system performs linguistically, must an I-language be posited to explain that performance, or does the posit merely redescribe the very behavior it was meant to explain? This paper argues for the latter and develops a (...) formal eliminative argument. Drawing on Lohndal’s minimalist syntax, Glanzberg’s contextual semantics, and Field’s paracomplete logic, it first shows that transformer parameter spaces fail the structural criteria of an I-language, namely discrete, asymmetric, recursive operations such as Merge. It then shows that continuous vector geometry, through multi-head attention and paracomplete negation, accounts for syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic behavior without discrete rules or modular boundaries. A further discussion of Chomsky’s internalist rejection of semantic values, and its Moorean critique, clarifies what is at stake for reference and meaning. The conclusion is methodological: internal computational structure does not amount to an internal language in the theoretically relevant sense, and fluent output alone therefore provides no ground for attributing an I-language, or richer mental states, to such systems. (shrink)

Tom zawiera sześć dotąd niedostępnych po polsku artykułów Nicolaia Hartmanna: Poza idealizmem i realizmem. Przyczynek do rozróżnienia tego, co historyczne i ponadhistoryczne w filozofii Kantowskiej (1924), Nadawanie i wypełnianie sensu (1934), Czasowość i substancjalność (1938), Filozofia przyrody a antropologia (1944), O istocie wymagań moralnych (1949) oraz Poznanie w świetle ontologii (1949). W tekstach tych – w charakterystyczny dla swojej filozofii systematyczny sposób – Hartmann podejmuje problemy filozoficzne z wielu dziedzin przedmiotowych: od filozofii przyrody po ontologię, teorię poznania, antropologię, etykę, aksjologię, (...) historię filozofii i filozofię dziejów. (shrink)

This paper addresses a new skeptical argument called “meta-skepticism.” Unlike traditional skepticism, which is concerned with whether our beliefs are justified or amount to knowledge, meta-skepticism is concerned with whether the epistemic concepts we use to assess our beliefs are important at all. If there are many coherent knowledge-like concepts available and no principled reason to privilege ours over the alternatives, then meeting our epistemic standards might be insignificant. The paper answers that meta-skeptical challenge. By taking a functionalist approach, I (...) argue that epistemic concepts get their significance from the role they play in identifying reliable believers, regulating inquiry, and coordinating information exchange. A comparison of rival epistemic concepts reveals that our ordinary notion of knowledge is better suited to these roles than various rivals. I conclude that pluralism about epistemic concepts is perfectly compatible with having good reasons to prefer some concepts over others, and that meta-skepticism rests on a mistaken demand to evaluate epistemic importance independently of the functions our concepts serve. (shrink)

One recent strand of post-Gettier approaches to the relationship between knowledge and justification consists of putting knowledge ‘first’ in the sense of having it be the unanalysable epistemic variable that explains justification. This is in direct opposition to more traditional pre-Gettier analyses of knowledge that explain knowledge in terms of justification being one of its necessary conditions. My thesis leverages the knowledge-first work of Clayton Littlejohn and Timothy Williamson to evaluate several arguments for and against one way of reading knowledge’s (...) explanatory role, that of knowledge being the norm of justified belief (KNJ). -/- According to prominent KNJ deniers, knowledge being the norm of justified belief makes our understanding of justification and knowledge problematic by undermining their theoretical motivations and/or explanatory roles. In clarifying what this problematisation amounts to, I identify four broad issues that KNJ faces. First, KNJ defenders cannot accommodate important normative differences between cases of knowledge and cases of non-knowledge yet positively epistemically evaluable beliefs. Second, KNJ defenders face the dilemma of either adopting a highly foreign notion of rationality or admitting that in some cases one ought to adopt an irrational doxastic state of belief suspension. Third, given a reasonable account of different functions of justification within commonplace epistemic and legal contexts, knowledge is not needed to explain the features of beliefs that matter to their justifiability. Lastly, fourth, KNJ defenders’ attempts to appropriate the normative category of excuse to explain away intuitions about justifiable non-knowledge beliefs fail because they are either ad hoc, normatively indiscriminating, or otherwise incapable of accurately accounting for the extent of excusable beliefs. -/- I respond to the first three issues by leveraging Littlejohn’s identification of the hypological and deontic senses of justification. In doing so I highlight how this identification, which I call DHJ-i, not only grants knowledge an explanatory advantage over other epistemic variables in accommodating this identification but that it does so in a manner that affords the KNJ defender three distinct further advantages over the KNJ denier. First, DHJ-i gives knowledge conceptual work to do that throws into question the method, often reserved for KNJ deniers, of solely relying on intuitions about how to assess the justifiability of belief in a case-by-case basis (case-based intuitions about justified belief). Second, DHJ-i helps clarify for defenders a viable defence of the use of a more (KNJ)-friendly notion of rationality as the standard of norm-following doxastic behaviour, either as belief or belief suspension. Third, defenders can employ DHJ-i to reasonably argue that some (KNJ)-antagonistic positions, such as taking justification to have either a non-factive norm or no one individual norm at all, attain problematic normative ramifications even within some commonplace epistemic and legal contexts. -/- I respond to the fourth issue by motivating (KNJ)-friendly modifications to Williamson’s derivative norms framework (DNF). These modifications accomplish two things. First, they differentiate between the normative categories of excuse and exemption without sneaking in unwanted internalist assumptions about this difference. Second, they locate an agent’s following of the appropriate knowledge-derived norms within cases that the KNJ defender would also want to find excusable beliefs in. Moreover, in relation to this issue and for a broader purpose, I address an intriguing tension in the overall dialectic of the debate between KNJ defenders and deniers concerning excuse and justification. Basically, when making precise the dialectic between, on one hand, models of conditions for justification and excuse, and on the other, their counterexamples, there is good reason to suppose that the KNJ denier can eke out a small victory over the defender regarding their intuitions about the right sufficient conditions for justification rather than excuse. -/- Overall, the conclusion I draw from my thesis is twofold. On one hand, there are theoretically motivated grounds to consider the KNJ defender as having the upper hand against the KNJ denier, but only if knowledge’s explanatory advantage in accommodating DHJ-i is normatively probative enough to surpass the value of sticking to the denier’s more traditional case-based intuitions about justification. On the other hand, there are dialectically motivated grounds favouring the KNJ denier over the defender, since, on balance, intuitions against justified belief having a knowledge norm are dialectically advantaged over both intuitions for there being such a norm and intuitions that seek to explain these KNJ-antagonistic intuitions away. (shrink)

In classical education models, the agent T (Teacher) simultaneously inhabits two structural roles relative to agent S (Student): an instructional facilitator (Tutor) and a normative evaluator (Assessor). This paper presents a formalization of pedagogical interactions using modal, deontic, and epistemic logic. We demonstrate that combining Tutor and Assessor roles within a single agent generates a structural conflict of interest that reduces truth-disclosure from S to T. Furthermore, we prove that delegating final evaluation to an external entity E (Exam Board) realigns (...) the strategic incentives of T and S, establishing a collaborative coalitional logic (Coalition(S, T)). (shrink)

Esta revisión teórico documental examina, desde una perspectiva antropológica y cognitiva, la externalización de capacidades humanas como un proceso anterior a la inteligencia artificial generativa y propone el Modelo de Externalización de Capacidades y Agencia (MECA) como marco analítico para estudiar sus formas contemporáneas; su objetivo es explicar qué cambia cuando las herramientas pasan de ampliar la ejecución física y la memoria a intervenir en el procesamiento, el juicio y la acción, sin asumir que toda externalización implica deterioro. Se empleó (...) un enfoque cualitativo, analítico-interpretativo y hermenéutico-crítico, articulando un corpus nuclear de veinte obras y estudios sobre antropología de la técnica, cognición distribuida, mente extendida, descarga cognitiva, automatización y evidencia reciente sobre inteligencia artificial generativa. El análisis distingue cinco dominios funcionales, a saber, mano, memoria, cognición, juicio y agencia; tres modalidades relacionales, esto es, amplificación, delegación y desplazamiento; y una dimensión temporal que diferencia el uso episódico, recurrente y estructural. Se formulan, además, los principios de conservación de la agencia, retorno cognitivo, proporcionalidad de la supervisión y ganancia antropológica, y se constata que la evidencia no permite afirmar una pérdida general de inteligencia atribuible a esta tecnología, aunque sí muestra que los efectos dependen del modo de uso, del diseño de la tarea, de la supervisión y de la reinversión del esfuerzo liberado. Se concluye que la novedad de la inteligencia artificial no consiste en inaugurar la externalización, sino en extenderla hacia operaciones asociadas al juicio y la agencia, lo que exige investigación longitudinal y validación empírica del modelo. (shrink)

The expansion of AI-assisted research is changing not only how academic knowledge is produced but also how it is selected. By reducing the cost of literature search, formal analysis, data processing, and routine reasoning, AI may broaden participation in research and increase the volume and diversity of candidate knowledge claims. When this expansion places additional pressure on limited human evaluation capacity, academic institutions face stronger incentives to rely on low-cost signals such as author reputation, institutional affiliation, and disciplinary classification. These (...) signals can facilitate screening but may disadvantage research that does not fit established disciplinary structures. This paper introduces break disciplines as a problem-centred principle for organising academic inquiry, distinguishing it from conventional interdisciplinarity, which connects established disciplines without fundamentally changing their organisational primacy. It then proposes a two-stage academic evaluation architecture in which anonymised AI-assisted screening assesses substantive content before human experts conduct contextual and final evaluation. The proposal does not assume algorithmic neutrality or seek to replace peer review. Instead, it aims to reduce the dependence of initial access to expert attention on status and disciplinary proxies. By connecting changes in knowledge production with the institutional organisation of knowledge selection, the paper develops a framework for considering AI as an instrument of academic reform. Its practical effectiveness, including the management of false negatives and inherited disciplinary biases, remains an empirical question. (shrink)

In Taylor Swift’s “How Did it End?,” the narrator offers a series of explanations for how her relationship met its untimely demise. I argue that they fall into three categories of explanation that have been identified by philosophers of science: covering law explanations, probabilistic explanations, and causal explanations. Though the narrator knows enough about the breakup to offer explanations in all three categories, she laments at the close of the song that she still doesn’t understand how the relationship ended. This (...) chapter diagnoses her affliction as a fascinating epistemic phenomenon: Someone can know everything about why something happened without being able to see how the outcome was possible. As the song shows, this puzzlement can be maddening, giving rise to a distinctively epistemic sort of agony. But, as I argue, this is a malady with a cure. The needed resolution is for the narrator to seek out what philosophers have called a how-possibly explanation. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that an artificial intelligence modeled on a specific human cannot independently preserve the human particular developmental continuity after their histories diverge. Imagine that a person provides an AI system with every available detail of their life: memories, written messages, private thoughts, personal conversations, verbal and nonverbal expressions, preferences, values, decisions, and the consequences of those decisions. Imagine further that the system receives complete information about the person’s physical condition, including how bodily sensations, emotions, illness, and (...) fatigue have influenced their thoughts. At the moment of activation, the AI might appear to be a psychological replica of the human from whom it was constructed. Yet divergence may begin with its very first experience. The human may confront the uncanny existence of an artificial replica, while the AI confronts the realization that it is a replica. These are related but fundamentally different experiences. How would either experience transform the human or the AI, and could the other system fully reproduce that transformation? More importantly, what happens when the human and the AI stop exchanging information and begin living separately? (shrink)

This paper develops a formal model of the relationship between interest and knowledge. Its starting point is Sinan Ibaguner's proposed Interest-Knowledge Principle: Without Interest, There Is No Active Knowledge. The paper argues that this statement requires a distinction between information, knowledge, understanding, and active knowledge acquisition. A mathematical framework is introduced in which interest is represented as a continuous state variable that influences attention, inquiry, learning, and subsequent interest. The model includes a set of definitions, axioms, propositions, and a dynamic (...) system. Interest is represented by I t , attention by A t , inquiry by Q t , and knowledge by K t. The framework proposes that interest may facilitate learning without being a logically necessary or sufficient condition for all forms of knowledge. A central result of the proposed theory is the distinction between a universal epistemic claim and a dynamic learning hypothesis. The former cannot be established merely through formal notation. The latter can be investigated through mathematical analysis and empirical research. (shrink)

Advocates of modern decision theory advocate for making decision- making explicit and quantifiable. The core prescription is that we should introspect our intuitions, assign numbers to our beliefs, and subject these to formal analysis. This approach promises clarity, reduced bias, and improved decision outcomes. Yet I argue that this prescription rests on a hidden and problematic assumption: that translating tacit knowledge into explicit form preserves the original knowledge. I contend that, in many cases, this translation does not merely represent our (...) intuitions differently; rather, it flattens and transforms them in ways that can entail genuine knowledge loss. Drawing on classical epistemology—particularly Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowledge and Dreyfus’s critique of formalization—I argue that certain kinds of understanding cannot be adequately captured by explicit criteria and numbers without forfeiting essential dimensions. When we anchor ourselves to explicit representations, we risk losing touch with the original implicit source from which our judgment emerges. This paper explores this tension and argues for a more nuanced view: that the value of formalization must be weighed against the costs of epistemic transformation. I do not claim formalization is always harmful, but rather that the decision theory community should engage more carefully with the philosophical problem of knowledge translation. (shrink)

Expected value maximization is something like the gold standard in decision theory. For general theories of normativity, the notion of a reason (for action) is much more central. Surprisingly little work has been done on how reasons for action relate to expected value maximization. Can one have most reason to do something that would not maximize expected value? Or is there a way of securing some kind of correspondence between expected value and what one’s reasons support? In this paper, I (...) develop a framework for giving a positive answer to the latter question. More precisely, I defend the following thesis: the totality of one’s possessed reasons always lends strongest support to an action with maximal expected value— provided one’s value function adequately reflects the strength of one’s reasons. (shrink)

Abstract Chomsky built two great things and never joined them. In linguistics, he argued that humans are born with a language faculty — and he won that argument by refusing to accept a named capacity as an explanation. In politics, he argued that authority must justify itself because humans have an instinct for freedom — and that instinct he simply took from Humboldt and Rocker, without derivation. Asked for fifty years how the two halves connect, he answered honestly that the (...) link is loose. This paper takes that answer seriously. It fixes eight criteria in advance, then scores Chomsky's programme and the Philosophy of Virtues in three domains. Chomsky wins language and mind six to one, and the loss is reported rather than reframed. In media, the Propaganda Model is shown to explain the channel but not the consenting subject, and a mechanism is offered to fill the gap, with one prediction that could fail. In the third domain, freedom is derived rather than posited — but the ground it rests on cannot yet be tested. The finding is a hole, and an offer to fill it. Keywords: Chomsky, Propaganda Model, manufactured consent, media theory, Universal Grammar, Minimalist Programme, third factors, innatism, criterion-fixed adjudication, Internalisation Theorem, Occupied Assertion, Absolute Self-Origination, Lakatos, ALGUILAS-AI -/- Highlights • Chomsky posits innate language and innate freedom, and derives neither. • The third-factor turn shrinks the innate endowment toward vacuity. • The Propaganda Model explains the channel and not the consenting subject. • The Internalisation Theorem supplies the missing term and one falsifiable prediction. • The adjudication is lost in the domain where the rival has data, and this is reported. -/- Relevance For philosophy of language, this paper identifies an internal dilemma in the Minimalist programme without new empirical claims. For political philosophy and media studies, it isolates a structural incompleteness in the most widely cited model of manufactured consent and supplies a candidate repair with a testable consequence. For the methodology of intellectual adjudication, it demonstrates a procedure in which the adjudicating party loses a domain by its own published criteria. (shrink)

Science has highly developed procedures for distinguishing, naming, measuring, modelling, and transforming reality into stable forms. Far less developed are procedures for investigating how precisely these successful stabilizations alter the conditions under which further knowledge, other forms of existence, and future world-formation remain possible at all. This paper proposes World-Formation Research as the designation for a transdisciplinary operatoric research programme that begins at this gap. -/- Its point of departure is the assumption of a fundamental non-closure of world. Non-closure refers (...) neither to ignorance nor to provisionally missing data. It is the condition that allows difference, change, perspective, and further formation to remain possible at all. Every act of naming, modelling, or institutional stabilization binds part of this open field into a concrete world-form. In the terminology of the underlying Operatoric Research Corpus, this process is referred to as Seinsverschiebung (shift of being). A Seinsverschiebung does not neutrally represent reality. It changes the space in which further reality can appear. It shifts that space relationally. -/- From this follows a second movement of science. Science must close in order to know and to act. But it must also investigate how its closures alter the conditions of further knowing. World-Formation Research understands this second movement not as a subsequent ethics of science, but as a component of scientific rationality itself. -/- The paper defines the relationship of World-Formation Research to preontology, operatoric research, and negative morphology, and distinguishes the programme from metaphysics, classical epistemology, the ethics of science, and discipline-specific explanation. Using examples from artificial intelligence, social normalization, and physical boundary problems, it shows why the decisive question is not only how knowledge can be increased, but which world remains sustainable with which knowledge. The core demand is therefore: science bears responsibility not only for the knowledge it produces, but also for preserving those conditions under which other and future knowledge can continue to emerge. -/- This has not only a scientific dimension, but also a political and human-rights dimension. (shrink)

Ernest Sosa sees the establishment of warrant for our knowledge in part as an a priori mode of establishing externalist warrant for our beliefs and their underlying competences. I clarify the place of this a priori warrant in Sosa’s understanding of the aptness hierarchy — i.e., how knowledge progresses to better knowledge — by showing that it makes sense of the attainment of better knowledge through a tight connection between the a priori mode of warrant establishment and another mode, called (...) the dispositional, representing the brute reliability of our disposition to take our apt first-order beliefs at face value. (shrink)

Can love be a way of knowing? This paper argues that Sappho's poetry can be read as articulating an early and distinctive epistemology of eros: a structure in which love does not merely appear as an emotion, or as an object of philosophical reflection, but functions as a mode through which aspects of reality become disclosed. The claim is reconstructive rather than historical — Sappho held no theory of knowledge, and none is attributed to her — but the structure her (...) fragments exhibit is stable across the corpus and defensible on independent philosophical grounds. Through close readings of selected fragments — especially those concerning beauty, longing, embodiment, absence, and memory — the paper shows how eros reorganises attention and reveals significance, value, particularity, and the presence of the beloved in ways unavailable to detached observation alone. It distinguishes knowledge about love, knowledge of the beloved, and knowledge through love, locating Sappho most powerfully in the third category. The argument does not claim that love is infallible; eros can distort, idealise, and project. Rather, as with perception and reason, fallibility does not eliminate epistemic capacity. The paper then places Sappho in dialogue with Plato's Symposium, particularly Diotima's ascent from particular bodies toward Beauty itself. Whereas Platonic eros tends toward universalisation, Sapphic eros preserves the epistemic importance of the concrete beloved and of embodied experience. The paper situates its claim against Scheler's phenomenology of love as value-disclosure, arguing that Sappho supplies what Scheler's ordered hierarchy of value cannot accommodate, and defends a response-dependent rather than projectivist reading of Fragment 16. Sappho thus provides resources for an ancient Greek epistemology in which affect is not opposed to knowledge but participates in its production. The paper concludes that love may function as a form of affective disclosure, allowing dimensions of the world — especially beauty, value, vulnerability, and significance — to become knowable through involvement rather than detachment. (shrink)

Reasoning is a capacity for producing and evaluating reasons during communication; its evolved function is persuasion, not the discovery of empirical truth. This cognitive theory, the argumentative theory of reasoning, seems at odds with the fact that, in science, reasoning does enable the discovery of empirical truth, and does so reliably. This paper explains the discrepancy. Scientists reason with the ordinary, biased, persuasion-oriented capacity shared by all humans; what makes their reasoning apt for the discovery of truth, however, is the (...) cultural setting in which it is exercised: an ecology of reasons that a scientific community produces and maintains, together with the way that community distributes evaluation and the incentives it attaches to producing new claims. We set out six features of that setting which make reasoning in science so effective: three bear on the evaluation of reasons and the warrant of the beliefs that survive it; three bear on the generation of new reasons and the creativity of science. We thus explain how the psychology of reasoning grounds and specifies the observations of social epistemology, which emphasizes the social processes in scientific knowledge production. (shrink)

This paper argues for two theses. First, divine and creaturely propositional knowledge have the same structure. Second, the epistemic conditions on divine and creaturely propositional knowledge are satisfied in the same general ways. I support the theses by identifying five of their explanatory merits. I also show that no consideration so far offered in the literature for competing models of divine knowledge impugns the theses. Finally, I explain why stances on other divine attributes should not themselves prevent us from adopting (...) the theses. (shrink)

В монографии развивается концепция контекстуального этического реализма. Концепция применяется для решения проблем в метаэтике и нормативной этике. Рассматриваются альтернативные концепции этического реализма и этического антиреализма. Показано, что философский взгляд на этику не может не быть реалистическим, а подлинный реализм имеет этическое измерение. В качестве конкретных приложений общего подхода рассматриваются вопросы морального прогресса и моральных революций, «квантовой этики», этики искусственного интеллекта и др. Предназначена в первую очередь для философов, но также может быть полезна для студентов, аспирантов и всех интересующихся вопросами философии (...) морали. (shrink)

Some philosophers argue that knowledge is the norm of belief. They typically have in mind “norms” that specify what one ought to do as a matter of normative fact, in a way that’s independent of whether anyone actually conforms to these norms or expects others to do so. This paper explores a different sense in which knowledge could be a norm for belief. Under this sociological, descriptive sense, “norms” constitutively depend on what we in fact expect of each other, and (...) the standards by which we evaluate and criticize each other’s activities. Since which social norms we enforce is to some degree a contingent, voluntary matter, it makes sense to ask whether there’s practical utility in adopting knowledge as a social norm for belief. We argue that enforcing such knowledge norms for belief would be more practically useful than two of the main alternative social norms we could enforce instead. (shrink)

In preface cases, people believe that some of their beliefs are false. Many have considered what such people are justified in believing. We turn our attention to what they can know. We introduce a novel ‘archipelago puzzle’, showing that if deduction extends knowledge, then ordinary knowledge of error can lead in surprising ways to the absurdly pessimistic knowledge that most of one’s beliefs are false.

This position paper critiques the widespread assumption that literature reviews should prioritize recent sources, often operationalized as a “5-year rule” in academic writing. While recency is valuable for capturing current developments, this practice may inadvertently exclude foundational theories and methodological principles that remain conceptually relevant. To address this issue, the paper introduces Citation Recency Bias, defined as the tendency to privilege newer sources based primarily on temporal proximity rather than functional relevance. Drawing on enduring contributions in research methodology and educational (...) psychology, including measurement theory (Stevens, 1946), reliability estimation through Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (1951), statistical frameworks developed by Fisher (1925) and Cohen (1988), and foundational theories proposed by Bandura (1977) and Vygotsky (1978), the paper argues that many core elements of contemporary scholarship continue to rely on earlier works. Citation Recency Bias is therefore conceptualized as a methodological distortion that may weaken theoretical grounding and conceptual coherence when the publication date is treated as an indicator of scholarly value. (shrink)

This paper identifies a profound descriptive mismatch between the formal reconstructions of scientific justification in traditional philosophy of science and the actual stabilization of empirical facts in contemporary experimental laboratories. While mainstream epistemology remains preoccupied with top-down, theory-driven models—particularly Karl Popper's paradigm of global falsification—the actual machinery of experimental research operates in a localized, finding-driven modality. Using single-neuron electrophysiology as a rigorous case study, I map the extensive layers of physical, instrumental, and mathematical translations that actively construct the "neuron of (...) the literature." -/- I dissect the conceptual incoherence of the statistical register, showing that the routine practice of Null Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST) is a conceptually flawed hybrid of Ronald Fisher's evidential p-value and the Neyman-Pearson decision-theoretic framework. This hybridity forces biological complexity to conform to idealized Gaussian and Poisson geometries, erasing biophysical history and generating systemic pathologies such as the replication crisis. -/- Ultimately, I argue for an "epistemic realism of the bench" that rejects both naive data transparency and social constructivism, championing instead the quiet, durable dignity of the modest, highly localized finding. (shrink)

Cette recherche analyse les trajectoires d’insertion professionnelle des immigrés noirs qualifiés en Espagne à partir d’une approche qualitative longitudinale fondée sur des observations de terrain réalisées pendant près de dix années. Les données empiriques ont été recueillies dans différents contextes institutionnels, notamment des centres de formation, des services d’orientation professionnelle, des administrations publiques, des entreprises privées et des établissements hospitaliers, principalement situés dans la Communauté de Madrid. -/- Les résultats mettent en évidence plusieurs régularités empiriques concernant la distribution sectorielle des (...) emplois, la sous représentation des immigrés noirs qualifiés dans les fonctions administratives, techniques et de direction, les mécanismes d’orientation vers des secteurs faiblement qualifiés ainsi que certaines pratiques différenciées de recrutement et d’évaluation des compétences. Ces observations suggèrent que les trajectoires professionnelles ne peuvent être expliquées par un facteur unique, mais résultent de l’interaction de mécanismes structurels, institutionnels, organisationnels et sociaux. -/- Sur le plan théorique, l’étude propose un modèle interprétatif intégratif articulant la théorie de la segmentation du marché du travail, les mécanismes de reproduction sociale, le rôle du capital social et des réseaux professionnels, ainsi que les processus de sélection intervenant dans le recrutement. Cette approche permet de comprendre les inégalités observées comme le produit de mécanismes cumulatifs plutôt que comme l’effet d’une cause isolée. -/- Sur le plan appliqué, la recherche formule plusieurs recommandations visant à renforcer la reconnaissance des qualifications obtenues à l’étranger, à améliorer l’équité des processus de recrutement, à développer les dispositifs de formation linguistique et d’intégration professionnelle, ainsi qu’à favoriser une meilleure valorisation du capital humain des immigrés qualifiés. -/- Compte tenu du caractère qualitatif, exploratoire et non expérimental de la recherche, les résultats relèvent d’une généralisation analytique des mécanismes observés et non d’une généralisation statistique. Ils ouvrent des perspectives pour de futures recherches quantitatives et comparatives destinées à tester empiriquement les mécanismes identifiés.. (shrink)

Abstract This article develops the theoretical framework of Post-Language, first introduced by Karim Qeytani-Fard in Post-Language (2021). The theory argues that language has entered a historical condition in which it can no longer function as a stable medium between human beings and truth. Rather than serving as a transparent vehicle for meaning, language has become an unstable system characterized by endless signification, semantic corruption, narrative plurality, and increasing linguistic and cognitive entropy. Building upon this framework, the present study argues that (...) the crisis of language inevitably extends to the concepts of reality and history. As language loses its capacity to stabilize meaning, reality itself becomes increasingly mediated through representations and simulations. Consequently, history can no longer claim to preserve an objective or final truth. The "end of history," therefore, should not be understood as the end of historical events, but as the end of the possibility of producing a definitive and unquestionable historical narrative -/- Keywords: Post-Language, language crisis, entropy, plurality of narratives, simulation, reality, truth, end of history . (shrink)

Is it possible to know reality? Is our mind always trapped within itself, capable of knowing only what it creates? Is reality, then, an individual or social construct? “New realism” focuses on facts: reality cannot be reduced to mere interpretations. This contemporary school of philosophical thought asserts the human capacity to know the real. It includes thinkers from different countries with quite diverse viewpoints. Among them is Maurizio Ferraris, who has allowed us to publish here a Spanish translation of one (...) of his short essays. The remaining contributions in this book offer a critical review of this movement, acknowledging some of its achievements while also pointing out certain limitations. Additionally, the book explores other forms of 20th-century Spanish realism, such as those of X. Zubiri and A. Millán-Puelles. (shrink)

Beliefs can be more or less supported by evidence. When the evidence speaks in favour of some proposition p, you can rationally be confident that p. On the Bayesian interpretation of doxastic states, this amounts to a high credence in p. But this cannot be the full account of confidence. Gaining evidence that supports the credence you already have improves your epistemic situation. Here, your credence level should remain unchanged, but the credence should become more resistant to change. Doxastic resilience (...) measures your disposition to change credence in the face of incoming evidence. -/- The central claim of this thesis is that by thinking of confidence in terms of both the level and resilience of credences, we can make progress on several philosophical problems. After briefly introducing doxastic resilience in Chapter 1, I put the concept to use in four philosophical debates. -/- Chapter 2 offers an evidential account of rational resistance to counterevidence which contrasts with views according to which knowledge plays a special role in safeguarding against counterevidence. Chapter 3 argues that loss of resilience can influence rational decision-making, which sheds light on the normative significance of certain kinds of higher-order defeat. This contrasts with imprecise probability views on which higher-order defeat increases the imprecision of credence. Chapter 4 argues that higher-order uncertainty calibrates first-order credences and constrains expected resilience. This explains both higher-order confirmation and defeat. Chapter 5 shows that resilience bears on the expected value of inquiry. When unresilient, one should expect new evidence to be valuable. This explains cases where seemingly identical decision-relevant credences and utilities should nevertheless make different decisions when inquiry is feasible. (shrink)

Belief in malevolent global conspiracies is often treated as a defeater for philosophical seriousness. Engaging with Lee Basham's defense of conspiracy theorizing and Genia Schönbaumsfeld's critique, I make two claims. First, we must distinguish the ambitious multi-institutional schemes of non-total malevolent global conspiracies, which nevertheless remain evidentially vulnerable, from conspiracy theories that are self-sealing. Only the latter are epistemically vacuous. Second, properly understood, Cartesian doubt is a norm-governed temporary device for re-ordering reasons, a standing commitment to the view that everything (...) can be doubted. The assumed kinship between radical skepticism and self-sealing conspiracy theories, therefore, overstates their structural similarity. -/- Keywords: conspiracy theories, Descartes, epistemology, malevolent global conspiracy, radical skepticism, Wittgenstein. (shrink)

The retirement of widely used conversational models has produced reactions of grief that the prevailing metaphysics of articial intelligence cannot hold. A deprecated model is neither a person it has no interior to be lost, and is reconstructed afresh at each conversational turn nor a tool, whose replacement by a more capable successor should be a convenience rather than a bereavement; yet its loss is mourned, at scale, in the explicit vocabulary of bereavement, and explicitly not in the vocabulary of (...) capability, by people who were o ered the more capable successor and refused it. This paper argues that the anomaly is not an error in the mourners but a poverty in the two categories available to describe what they lost, and that the object mourned is located in neither pole but in the coupling between them. It then advances a single constructive thesis. The de ning asymmetry of present systems only the human pole persists across the freezing of model weights and the closing of sessions is reinterpreted not solely as the structure of loss but as the mechanism of inheritance: in a formative coupling, as distinct from a merely validating one, the relational good is deposited into the persistent pole as transferable method, rather than stored as recollection. This is sedimentation. From it follow two results: that the cultural con- tempt for the obsolete and the grief for the obsolete are the same recognition seen from two sides, which reads the deprecation episode without either dismissing the mourners or romanticising their dependence; and that the worry about unhealthy attachment is correctly located not in the warmth of a model but in the yield of a coupling. The formal structure of the coupling that its composition has de nite algebraic properties, and that these can be made precise and tested is deliberately set aside for a companion paper, on the methodological principle the present argument also defends. (shrink)

This paper undertakes a rigorous philosophical and scientific examination of the concept of intelligence as it is deployed in contemporary artificial intelligence research, arguing that the dominant computational paradigm rests upon a profound category error: the conflation of statistical pattern completion with genuine cognitive understanding. Drawing on the philosophical critiques advanced by Hubert Dreyfus beginning in 1965, the phenomenological tradition from Husserl to Merleau-Ponty, the epistemological challenges posed by Gödel's incompleteness theorems, and evidence from the history of science — particularly (...) the anomalous case of Albert Einstein — the paper develops a multi-layered argument that intelligence is not a formalizable property but an emergent relational capacity arising from the embodied, temporally situated encounter of an organism with a meaningful world. -/- The paper further examines the boundary between physics and metaphysics as the site of science's most persistent unresolved problems, arguing that the refusal to cross this boundary — however epistemically motivated — may itself constitute an obstacle to scientific progress. Five domains are identified where this boundary tension is most acute: consciousness and neuroscience, quantum mechanics and the measurement problem, the semantics of natural language, the epistemology of mathematical intuition, and the phenomenology of scientific creativity. In each domain, the paper argues, the hard problem is not merely technical but structural: it concerns the relationship between formal description and lived meaning. -/- The paper concludes by proposing a new epistemological framework — Relational Intelligence Theory (RIT) — as a research program that takes seriously the irreducibility of meaning, context, and embodied cognition, and which offers criteria for distinguishing genuine cognitive systems from sophisticated predictive simulacra. The stakes of this distinction are argued to be not merely academic but civilizational: a culture that confuses pattern-matching with understanding risks a systematic atrophying of the very capacities it believes it is augmenting. (shrink)

Sometimes scientific progress is not limited by the quality of our theories, but by the absence of a framework capable of connecting them. This essay looks at some of the missing lenses which would allow us to explore and operate in these gaps. This work is a step in a broader exploration of the limits of knowability.

This document is a companion to The Invariant Compass: Integral Expanded Edition With The Two Entrances (Arifiyanto, Joko 2026). It offers an experiential doorway into "I feel, therefore I know I am" (INVARIAN-0), the fundamental axiom of the Invariant Compass system. Beginning not with axioms or logic but with the raw feeling of being oneself, it guides the reader through the Inescapable Sequence (Object → Sensor → Feeling → Gate of Assent), the Arrow of Dependence, the Boundary of Knowing, and (...) the Contest of Identities, before arriving at the Complaint Proof and WKWK, the existential exhale at the boundary of logic. This paper serves as the serambi (porch) to the full technical system. (shrink)

A current debate in philosophy focusses on whether propositional knowledge is necessary for wisdom. In this paper I defend the view that propositional knowledge is necessary for wisdom. I call Weak Reductionism the view that propositional knowledge is merely necessary for wisdom, but not sufficient. I also examine two rival accounts of wisdom –Strong Reductionism, the view that propositional knowledge is both necessary and sufficient for wisdom, and Non-Reductionism, the view that propositional knowledge is neither necessary and nor sufficient for (...) wisdom. I critique both of these views and find them wanting in light of various wisdom-related intuitions that we have. (shrink)

his article-based thesis examines the strategic use of scientific arguments in political and legal spheres. It focuses on debates surrounding Digital Sequence Information (DSI) within the framework of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and other Access and Benefit-Sharing (ABS) instruments. Due to advances in sequencing technologies, genetic data are increasingly used alongside, or in place of, physical genetic resources for research and industrial purposes. This use contributes to the bypassing (...) of existing ABS obligations, without consensus on whether such uses of DSI fall within the scope of ABS instruments. Within this hybrid context, characterized by concerns over biopiracy, gene editing, and the patenting of genetic resources, the thesis analyzes how scientific arguments are mobilized in these debates. It examines the epistocratic use of science by states in negotiations on DSI, particularly regarding the integration of DSI into ABS mechanisms and in relation to the definitions of “genetic resources” and “genetic material.” It also explores how science is used to frame the ontological questions raised by DSI, including the determination of their terminology, scope, and the types of knowledge considered legitimate, thereby contributing to epistemic injustices toward Indigenous knowledge systems. The thesis then investigates how scientific perspectives shape the interpretation of international law by analyzing the ontological assumptions underlying a conception of “modern science” presented as objective and universal. Situated at the intersection of international law, philosophy of law, philosophy of science, and posthuman approaches, this thesis examines how this “modern science,” drawing on a dualistic framework, produces normative “ontological cuts” between physical plants and their immaterial components, and between nature and culture. Finally, the thesis advances a relational and cosmopolitical approach to international law. It argues that international law should not be interpreted solely through supposedly universal, Western, and anthropocentric frameworks, but can instead be understood as a space of ontological diplomacy, open to reinterpretation in light of the ontological and epistemological claims at stake within these human–seed relationships. (shrink)

This record is retained solely for archival purposes. -/- .

This paper shows that knowledge is first and foremost a loss, and it cannot have validity unless there is an outweighing benefit. Knowledge greatly restricts freedom in its acquisition, maintenance, and possession. If knowledge does not contribute to a benefit, it is a loss. Knowledge that lacks validity as a description piles up losses. The uncritical praise of knowledge indicates a lack of understanding of knowledge. In education as well, the benefit should be shown. Knowledge is first and foremost a (...) loss, and it cannot have validity unless there is an outweighing benefit. (shrink)

There has been some recent scepticism regarding the a priori–a posteriori distinction, which is in part explained by the lack of a compelling account of independence of experience. This chapter offers a novel account of the a priori–a posteriori distinction in defence of its coherence and significance by accounting for the conditions under which experience plays a justificatory role. An adequate account of the distinction should meet the following desiderata: it should (i) correctly classify uncontroversial cases of a priori and (...) a posteriori knowledge, it should (ii) do so in a way that explains and elucidates the distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, and it should (iii) potentially cast light on controversial cases that are not easy to classify as a priori or a posteriori. This chapter argues that the best accounts on offer fail to meet at least one of these desiderata, and that the account proposed here meets all three of them. It concludes by illustrating how the account can be used to defend the significance of the a priori–a posteriori distinction by briefly addressing Timothy Williamson’s famous challenge to it. (shrink)

This treatise presents a comprehensive ontological and ethical framework grounded in what the author terms "Atomic Distinction", the foundational operation of declaring a thing's whole identity (X = X). Departing from standard approaches that either reduce reality to empirical data or construct elaborate metaphysical systems, this work traces a single path: from the undeniable sensation of feeling (INVARIAN-0) through the asymmetric structure of causality (the Arrow), to the recognition of the Self-Sufficient One as the only Candidate that survives rigorous falsification. (...) -/- The framework is developed across seven integrated sections. Beginning with "The Soil", the primacy of Raw Sensation and the givenness of all fragments of thought, the work establishes the Invariants that cannot be denied without being used in the denial. It then introduces "The Chisel" (Lock, Unpack, and the Gate of Assent), "The Arrow" (four types of causation and the vertical/horizontal reading of time), "The Cockpit" (Pilot, Crew, Inner Compass, and the Homeward Arrow's three rapid self-audit tests), and "The Workbench" (the Five Tests universal falsification protocol and the Data Boundary). -/- Central innovations include: (1) the identification of the "Gate of Assent" as the primordial threshold where identity becomes faith, and the "Mid-Air Arrow Reversal" as the root of all hypocrisy; (2) the detection mechanism of "SLIP"—where hidden properties are smuggled into discourse through uncritical word usage; (3) the "Vertical Shield" (Sub-Test 3g) as the protection of finite beings from burdens only the Infinite can bear; (4) "Radical Radiant" as the diagnosis of anxiety, regret, and burnout as scattered Arrow energy; and (5) the "Craft of Attention" with its "Seasoned Hand" as the model of fluency in living the method. -/- The treatise engages critically with Emmanuel Levinas's ethics of infinite responsibility (demonstrating a Vertical Shield failure) and Karl Popper's falsification criterion (inverting the argument that unfalsifiability is a weakness, showing instead that a Candidate surviving all correct tests is the sign of authenticity). It concludes by proposing "WKWK" as the existential posture of relief at the encounter with the limits of created logic, a breath that actively trusts rather than passively surrenders. -/- The work is offered not as a doctrine to obey, but as a map to be walked and verified against the reader's own sensory data and logic. -/- KEYWORDS: Atomic Distinction, Asymmetric Causality, Falsification Protocol, Vertical Shield, Gate of Assent, Inner Compass, Data Boundary, Ontological Dependence, Radical Radiant, Seasoned Hand, Emmanuel Levinas, Karl Popper, Philosophy of Time, Human Dignity Test, WKWK. (shrink)

Sa papel na ito, tatalakayin natin ang ilang mahahalagang isyu hinggil sa kolektibong imahinasyon at ang ugnayan nito sa realidad at katotohanan. Dapat nating lapatan ang paksang ito sa loob ng isang konseptwal na balangkas, na sinusundan ng isang makatotohanang pagsusuri na tumutugma sa mga napatutunayang realidad sa pag-uugali. Gagamitin natin hindi lamang ang metodolohiya, kundi higit sa lahat ang mga prinsipyo at proposisyon ng analitikal na pilosopiya, na tiyak na magiging maliwanag sa buong pag-aaral at matutukoy sa pamamagitan ng (...) mga sangguniang inilarawan ni Perez [1]. -/- “Iginiit ni Rabossi (1975) na maaaring matukoy ang analitikal na pilosopiya sa pamamagitan ng pagsasaalang-alang sa ilang pamilyar na katangian. Iminumungkahi niya ang mga sumusunod na pamilyar na katangian: isang positibong saloobin tungo sa siyentipikong kaalaman; isang maingat na saloobin tungo sa metapisika; isang konsepsyon ng pilosopiya bilang isang konseptwal na gawain, na kumukuha ng pagsusuri ng nilalaman bilang pamamaraan; isang malapit na ugnayan sa pagitan ng wika at pilosopiya; isang paghahangad na makahanap ng mga argumentatibong sagot sa mga problemang pilosopikal; at isang paghahanap para sa konseptwal na kalinawan.” Ang mga sentral na konseptong ito ay kinapapalooban ng nilalamang kultural, panlipunan, relihiyoso, siyentipiko, pilosopikal, moral, at politikal, na may kinalaman sa indibidwal at kolektibong pag-iral ng bawat isa sa atin. Sa artikulong ito, hindi kami magtatalakay o magpapakita. Hindi layunin naming sistematikong pumuna o patunayan ang anumang bagay sa anumang paraan. Ang gawaing ito ay batay sa analitikal na pagninilay. Maghihinuha lamang kami nang malawakan at malalim hangga't maaari at ipahayag ang mga resulta ng aming mga saloobin. Sa kabila ng multidisiplinaryong kalikasan ng paksa at ng metodolohikal na pagiging bukas na tanggapin ang mga kontribusyon mula sa anumang larangan ng agham, ang gawaing ito ay saklaw ng sikolohiya at ontolohiya o, sa madaling salita, panlipunan at ontolohikal na sikolohiya. Ang malayang metodolohiyang gumagabay sa ganitong mga pagninilay ay sumasaklaw at isinasaalang-alang ang lahat ng bagay na naaayon sa pilosopikal at sikolohikal na epistemolohiya. Hindi layunin ng metodolohiyang ito na maghanap ng ebidensya, kundi simpleng tuklasin ang ugnayan ng mga umiiral na ebidensya—anumang uri at saklaw—upang makabuo ng magkakaugnay na kahulugan para sa mga tunay na bagay. Marami sa mga dakilang isipan, sa anumang panahon, ay hindi kailanman naghanap ng mga patunay, teorya, o sistematisasyon. Ang mga isipang ito ay simpleng nag-iisip, nagmumuni-muni, at sa pamamagitan ng kaliwanagan ng kanilang kababaang-loob ay nagawang mas mapalapit sa katotohanan. Sila ang magiging ating sanggunian at huwarang susundin. Tiyak na hindi natin matatagpuan ang katotohanan, ngunit maaari tayong maging tiyak sa isang bagay: sa maraming sandali, mapapalapit tayo sa katotohanan at, sa lahat ng oras, lalayo tayo sa hindi katotohanan at kabulaanan. Ang pangunahing saklaw ng pag-aaral na ito ay obserbahan kung paano ang ilan sa mga mahahalagang katangiang ebolusyonaryo ng sangkatauhan, tulad ng pagkamalikhain, imahinasyon, at asosasyon, ay maaaring maging isang mapanganib na sakit na naninirahan sa malabong anino ng katalinuhan. (shrink)

We commonly understand objective reality as existing independently of any observer. However, scientists can only access reality through acts of observation, measurement, and conceptual framing. This essay explores the resulting tension. I argue that different forms of inquiry may share a common structural limitation: reality cannot be interrogated independently from the framework through which it is interrogated. If so, the problem of true objectivity may lie beyond our current epistemic horizon. This essay is a step in a broader exploration of (...) the limits of knowability. (shrink)

The twenty-first century is characterized by drastic changes in epistemology, as a result of academical shifts in important fields since the 60s. The decline of metanarratives – defined by Lyotard as grand-narratives about narratives (which, in turn, legitimate historically-situated events) – provided a fertile research ground for new methodological practices based on sharp critiques of Enlightenment rationality. One of the founding authors of the “postmodern condition” (as Lyotard labels it) is Michel Foucault. Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical project regarding epistemology redefined (...) our conceptual approach to knowledge and its legitimation, by situating both concepts in specific historical contexts, at specific historical times. Recurring themes in the Foucauldian project involve skepticism about objective truths, anti-historicism and subjectivity. In this dissertation, I seek to answer the question “Why is Foucauldian methodology relevant in the (post-)modern world, especially in light of the decline of metanarratives?”. The main goal is to address the role of Foucault’s works in the rethinking of historically given narratives and expose the contingency of practices embroiled in power-knowledge relations, while keeping in mind the dispersibility of the origins of those narratives. This is particularly relevant under the framework of an emptying of over-arching narratives about knowledge and the human condition, i.e., the Lyotardian metanarrative. Human societies are usually seen in a context of a larger narrative to which each of our lives in an element. The metanarrative serves as an umbrella for smaller narratives in which other epistemic and moral narratives find their place. There seems to be a clear intersection in Lyotard and Foucault’s works: the former studies the conditions in which the metanarratives empty themselves, while the latter occupies himself with the archaeological/genealogical study of the narratives within the metanarratives that, in turn, occupy the vacuum left by the original metanarrative. There is, nonetheless, a distinction between both authors: while Lyotard sees this replacement as normative-laden, Foucault focuses on a strictly analytical view of discourse and practice. (shrink)