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China–Tanzania relations

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China–Tanzania relations
Map indicating locations of China and Tanzania

China
Tanzania

China–Tanzania relations are the foreign relations between China and Tanzania. China established diplomatic relations with Tanganyika and Zanzibar on December 9, 1961, and December 11, 1963, respectively. When Tanganyika and Zanzibar were united and became Tanzania on April 26, 1964, China extended its diplomatic ties to it.[1][2]

Tanganyika became the tenth African state to recognize the People's Republic of China in 1964 and the first to do it within days of independence.[3] Military and political unrest in the 1960s in mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar further strengthened ties between the two countries.[3] On January 12, 1964, the Zanzibari Revolution dramatically increased Chinese influence on the island as China quickly recognized the new regime and provided development assistance and military aid.[3] Additionally, the mutiny of the Tanganyikan army on January 19, 1964, led President Nyerere to request external military assistance to rebuild his army which, was answered first by the Chinese, who became primary suppliers of military assistance to the Tanzania People's Defense Force.[3] Moreover, Tanzania's resistance to alignment with either cold war superpower and continued emphasis on the liberation of Southern Africa created hostility with the West.[3] In 1970, China became the major supplier of military assistance to the Tanzanian armed forces and became the largest bilateral source of development aid.[3]

H.E. Benjamin W. Mkapa, the former President of the United Republic of Tanzania, described Tanzania-China relations as “transcended the traditional government to government contacts and extended to people to people cooperation, to the extent that the people of Tanzania and China call each other ‘rafiki’ which means ‘friend’ in Kiswahili”.[4]

Julius Nyerere being received by Zhou Enlai on his visit to Beijing in 1968.

Tanzania's Economic Background

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In the post-independence period, Tanzania inherited a colonial market economy where agriculture accounted for 59% of GDP in 1961 compared to other sectors of the economy such as transport, construction, mining, commerce, services, manufacturing, and more, making drastically smaller contributions.[5] 1967 to 1985 is considered the Ujamaa era; introduced by the Tanzanian ruling class; Ujamaa is a form of African socialism that creates a socialist principled society without conflict and exploitation.[5] This socialist ideology focused on fighting poverty, creating an egalitarian society, self-reliance, and distributive justice mainly through nationalization and villagization.[5] Nationalization resulted in an economy controlled by the state as all privately owned businesses became public property including banks, manufacturing companies, milling, mining, and all other major enterprises.[5] Villagisation was designed as a rural development program that assembled people living in sparsely populated areas to work on communal farms, build self-reliance, and collectively up-lift living standards. Following the Ujamaa era, phase I of restructuring began in 1986, which included liberalization of exchange and trade, liberalization of the agricultural sector, and implementation of various civil service reforms.[5] Phase II of restructuring occurred in 1996 with widespread privatization, liberalization of the financial system, development of market-oriented economic and regulatory reforms, trade reforms, changes in monetary & fiscal policy, and financing from foreign donors.[5]

China’s Belt and Road Initiative Foreign Policy

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Modern economic and infrastructural cooperation between Tanzania and China is highly connected to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).[6] In 2013, China expanded its Belt and Road Initiative as a form of foreign policy mainly to construct an overland network of infrastructure to better connect Chinese trade and further economic integration to other regions of the world, with a particular focus on East Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe.[6] The initiative includes building and financing railways, highways, power grids, gas & oil pipelines, telecommunications infrastructure, industrial parks, special economic zones, shipping facilities, information technology, alternative energy sectors, and more.[6] The Chinese government and Chinese companies coordinate these efforts with Tanzanian stakeholders through free trade agreements, generous lines of credit, and other measures intended to generate an investment-friendly environment for foreign investors.[6]

Economic ties

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From the outset of bilateral relations, China has assisted Tanzania with a variety of economic aid programs. The most notable early aid project was the TAZARA Railway built from 1970 to 1975 with Chinese funding, labor and technical assistance.[1] The 1,860 km railway connects landlocked Zambia with Dar es Salaam. The Chinese government sent as many as 56,000 workers, and has continued to aid the railway in the decades since. From 2000 to 2011, there are approximately 62 Chinese official development finance projects identified in Tanzania through various media reports.[7] These projects range from the Chinese government's efforts to launch the Tanzania Agricultural Development Bank,[8] to a loan of $400 million to help alleviate the Kiwira coal mine's financial problems,[9] and the construction of the Benjamin Mkapa Olympic Stadium, namely the National Stadium.[10] In 2020, Tanzania canceled a $10 billion loan that was part of the Belt and Road Initiative.[11][12]

Mining

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In September 2011, China's Sichuan Hongda Co. signed an agreement with Tanzania to mine iron ore and coal; the joint venture with Tanzania's National Development Corporation is worth more than US$3 billion.[13] The project has given the Tanzanians access to agreements with the Chinese government, including financing of natural gas pipelines, power plant developments, as well as a port, railway, and roadway upgrades.[13] These mineral resources are concentrated in areas distant from the coast, posing infrastructural and logistical challenges that constrain economic activity like trade.[14] This is evident from prospecting companies and their mining partners looking at major South and Eastern Tanzania projects citing infrastructure as the primary deterrent to investment.[13] Mining companies require infrastructural networks that can handle high tonnage loads, which are widely absent and lack government stakeholder support and investment.[13] However, the Central Development Corridor has engaged in significant planning to improve infrastructure in the northwest gold mining region and the nickel and iron-ore deposit regions along the borders with Rwanda and Burundi.[13] Institutional infrastructure is available via the Central Corridor Transit Transport, which maintains and regulates roadways but has done little to improve rail and power grid improvements.[13]

Information and Communications Technology (ICT)

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Chinese financial institutions and technology companies supported Tanzania's telecommunications revolution of the 1990s and 2000s.[15] In February 2009, the Tanzanian National ICT Broadband Fibreoptic Backbone (NICTBB) was launched to provide higher capacity ICT services at a more affordable rate to make Tanzania East Africa's digital hub.[15] The project was financed with US$264 million in loans from China's Exim Bank and was implemented by the Chinese International Telecommunications Construction Corporation (CITCC) and Huawei.[15] In 2010, phase II of the NICTBB project launched with an additional US$100 million in loans from China's Exim bank with the stipulation that Chinese suppliers and equipment be used for the project; therefore, the partnership with the CITCC and Huawei continued.[16] The project is being used to lower costs of communication, promote e-learning, e-health, e-commerce, e-government, and facilitate the development of science and technology.[16]

Infrastructure Projects

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Tazara

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The Tanzania-Zambia Railway (Tazara) is a 1,860 km long railway from Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, to Kaprimposhi, Zambia, to link Central and Southern Africa with East Africa to facilitate trade, tourism, and inter-state cooperation.[17] On September 5, 1967, the first agreement regarding the railway was signed by China, Tanzania, and Zambia, representing the beginning of China's formal commitment to the project in that they agreed to provide the technical and professional manpower needed for each phase of construction.[14] By 1970 China officially agreed to finance the project by providing a $401 million interest-free loan shared equally between Tanzania and Zambia.[14] The loan was repayable over 30 years with a 5-year grace period and required repayments to be made in third-party currency or from the two countries exports.[14] The railway project implemented by the Chinese Engineering Construction Company included the construction of 320 bridges, 22 tunnels, and 2,225 culverts along the trains pathway and required additional financing from the Chinese to cover the cost of power, rolling stock, steel rails, signaling equipment, cement, stations, a training school, workshops, and other related infrastructure.[17] Since 2010, China has continued its technical and financial support for the Tazara by funding and upgrading the railway to achieve increased operational efficiency to help meet growing passenger and trade demand.[17]

Unity Bridge

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The Ponte da Unidad/Umoja, also known as the unity bridge, is a 720-meter-long bridge connecting Tanzania with Mozambique across the Rovuma River.[17] The China GeoEngineering Corporation implemented the project with funding from the Tanzanian and Mozambique governments at a total cost of US$26.8 million.[17] The bridge, which opened in May 2010, is lowering business costs in the region by facilitating a more accessible route for trade and travel between Southern African and East Africa.[17]

National stadium

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In 2007 the Beijing Construction Engineering Group completed the construction of the Tanzanian National Stadium located in Dar es Salaam.[18] The new stadium was estimated to cost more than $60 million, with the Tanzanian government contributing more than half of the project's total financing.[18] The stadium is considered another landmark accomplishment in China-Tanzanian relations, a sentiment communicated by former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, who emphasized the high-quality construction and importance of the two nations' cooperation in his visit to the site in 2006.[18]

Bagamoyo Port

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Bagamoyo is the site of a Chinese-run special economic zone with a mega-port constructed by China Merchants Ports Holdings.[19] In 2012, The Tanzanian government, Oman, China Merchants Ports Holdings came to an agreement on a flagship Belt and Road initiative project with a total investment of over US$10 billion.[19] In addition to the port itself, the 3,000-hectare site will link Tanzania's new Standard gauge railway and the Tanzania-Zambia railway.[19] However, the project faced several challenges, including in 2016, when the project was briefly canceled.[19]

Zanzibar International Airport

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In January 2011, the Chinese Beijing Construction Engineering Group began upgrading Tanzania's Zanzibar international airport by renovating terminal 2 and constructing terminal 3.[16] The Tanzanian government received US$70 million in financing from China's Exim Bank to support the project, which is projected to support the travel of 1.5 million passengers annually.[16] In addition to expanding air transport for passengers, the project also improves air transport of goods to and from Zanzibar by providing a safe and reliable airport for large aircraft and a high volume of flights.[16]

Chinese Managerial Enclaves

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Enclaves are distinct territorial, cultural, or social units enclosed within the boundaries of a foreign territory.[20] Chinese enclaves have formed in Tanzania, evident from Chinese workers not venturing into the local community, consuming local entertainment, or gaining cultural exposure outside of work, which is often company policy.[20] Chinese enclaves have been formed primarily due to language barriers as older Chinese managers often do not speak English and younger managers struggle with the Tanzanian's heavily accented English. Additionally, very few Chinese workers speak Bemba, a dialect of East Africa's Copperbelt, or Swahili, the national language of Tanzania.[20] In the cities of Chambishi, Kitwe, and Urafiki Chinese management teams live in segregated houses known as the "China houses" or the "Chinese compound".[20] These residential quarters for Chinese workers often include their own security guards, ping-pong tables, cooks, television, video and DVD media from China, athletic spaces, vegetable gardens, and livestock.[20] The salaries of workers living in the Urafiki compound go directly to their bank accounts in China to encourage saving, the staff is only provided an allowance to buy items like fruit or toiletries because entertainment and necessities are provided in the compound; this further alienates workers from the local population.[20]

Sovereignty issues

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Tanzania was among the African countries which expressed support for the Chinese government during the 2019-2020 Hong Kong protests.[21]: 41  In October 2019, Tanzania's chief government spokesperson stated that the country supports China's one country, two systems policy, that the Hong Kong government was taking the best approach to the situation, and that other countries should support China.[21]: 41 

Military ties

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Main article: Tanzania People's Defence Force

Tanzania is one of China's most important military partners in Africa.[21]: 218  On an annual basis, Tanzania sends a significant amount of officers and NCOs to train in China.[21]: 239 

In 1972, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) listed the Tanzania People's Defence Force (TPDF) army with 10,000 personnel, four infantry battalions, 20 T-59, 14 Chinese T-62 light tanks, some BTR-40 and BTR-152, Soviet field artillery and Chinese mortars.[22]

China first began training Tanzanian pilots in the early 1970s.[21]: 239  It has continued to support Tanzanian air force training as of at least 2023.[21]: 239 

The Uganda–Tanzania War happened in 1978–1979, in which the first tank battle happened in African continent, between Tanzania's Chinese tanks with Libya's Soviet tanks.

In 1992, the IISS listed the army with, among others, 30 Chinese Type 59 and 32 T-54/55 main battle tanks.

Elephant poaching and Chinese nationals

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The published report of the 14th meeting of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (3–15 June 2007 at the Hague, Netherlands), expressed explicit concern over the

involvement of Chinese nationals in the direct procurement of ivory in elephant range States in Africa. The ETIS data illustrate that Chinese nationals have been arrested, detained or absconded in at least 126 seizure cases – representing some 14.2 tonnes of ivory – which have occurred in, or originated from, 22 African elephant range States, including Botswana, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, the Sudan, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. This is a relatively recent phenomenon as 87 % of these cases occurred in the most recent period since 1998. With an already strong and growing economic presence throughout Africa, Chinese nationals are now well positioned to exploit direct sources of illicit ivory in a manner that was not the case in the past.[23]

In its 2013 report Transnational Organized Crime in Eastern Africa: A Threat Assessment, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime found that

China’s recent wave of investment in Africa has brought thousands of Chinese executives and workers to the continent, including countries where ivory is openly sold, often carved into items for the Asian market. It may be transported in luggage or by post in small quantities, for personal use or re-sale at great profit in Asian markets. The quantities involved are generally small (although tusks cut into suitcase-sized chunks have been detected), but, due to their frequency, could constitute a major source of supply.[24]

Chinese nationals on the ground in Tanzania have been jailed in connection with large-scale interdictions. In November 2013 three Chinese nationals were arrested in Dar es Salaam with a stockpile of 797 tusks.[25]

Growing purchasing power among Chinese tuhao and baofahu[26] has combined with corruption among Tanzanian rangers and police[25] to devastating effect. Between 2010 and 2013, over three tonnes of ivory has been seized in Tanzania, and two-thirds of the elephants at Selous Game Reserve—Tanzania's largest—have disappeared.[25]

According to the United Nations report, the link between Chinese demand and Tanzanian supply is the single most destructive influence on the African elephant population:[24]

  • Recent research indicates that the rate of poaching in Eastern Africa has increased, rising to levels that could threaten the local elephant population.
  • The bulk of the large ivory shipments from Africa to Asia appears to pass through the container ports of Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania, where interventions could be addressed.
  • It is estimated that between 5,600 and 15,400 elephants are poached in Eastern Africa annually, producing between 56 and 154 metric tons of illicit ivory, of which two-thirds (37 tons) is destined for Asia, worth around US$30 million in 2011.
  • Expatriate Chinese residents in Eastern Africa comprise some of the most important middlemen. Although they have taken measures to address the illicit trade, Thailand and China remain two of the most important destinations.
  • Recent Interpol operations...have found a growing number of carved objects...with vendors speaking Chinese to their clients.

In the immediate aftermath of the UNODC findings, Tanzania's Deputy Minister for Natural Resources and Tourism was forced to respond to citizen complaints of "... Chinese nationals, engaging in the massacre of our animals and transporting them to their countries for their own benefit."[27] Lazaro Nyalandu said that the government of Tanzania would take action against poachers without regard to their countries of origin, and that any threat against tourism revenues would be taken seriously.[27]

In March 2014 Chinese national Yu Bo appeared before the Kisutu Resident Magistrates’ Court in Dar es Salaam, accused of illegally collecting 81 elephant tusks. Yu petitioned for leniency, citing his several dependents and lack of criminal history, as he entered a guilty plea. Senior Resident Magistrate Devota Kisoka imposed a fine of 9,781,204,900 Tanzanian shillings, in default of which Yu is detained in Tanzania pending appeal of a 20-year sentence.[28] Chinese officials have taken steps to curb the influx of illegal ivory[23]—of the 900 ivory seizures performed annually in China, 90% involve items uncovered in hand inspections of travelers' luggage—and they are not known to have offered legal-, financial-, or political assistance to Chinese nationals suspected of poaching in Tanzania.[29]

Medical cooperation

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Air Tanzania Boeing 787 at Guangzhou Airport.

On its 2017 medical mission to Africa, the People's Liberation Army Navy hospital ship Peace Ark traveled to Tanzania, where it treated 6,421 Tanzanian patients.[21]: 284 

Resident diplomatic missions

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See also

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References

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  1. ^ a b Chau, Donovan (2014-04-15). Exploiting Africa: The Influence of Maoist China in Algeria, Ghana, and Tanzania. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-61251-251-8. OCLC 892804851.
  2. ^ Armstrong, J. D. (2018-08-14). Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine. Univ of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-30292-1. OCLC 1041526196.
  3. ^ a b c d e f Bailey, Martin. “Tanzania and China.” African Affairs, vol. 74, no. 294, Jan. 1975, pp. 39–50.
  4. ^ "Tanzania - China Relations".
  5. ^ a b c d e f Mandalu, Martin, et al. “Investigation on Tanzania’s Economic History since Independence: The Search for a Development Model.” World Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, vol. 4, no. 1, 2018, pp. 61–68.
  6. ^ a b c d OTELE, OSCAR MEYWA. “China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Intra-Regional Dynamics in Africa.” African Studies Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 3-4, Oct. 2020.
  7. ^ Austin Strange, Bradley C. Parks, Michael J. Tierney, Andreas Fuchs, Axel Dreher, and Vijaya Ramachandran. 2013. China’s Development Finance to Africa: A Media-Based Approach to Data Collection. CGD Working Paper 323. Washington DC: Center for Global Development.[1]
  8. ^ Strange, Parks, Tierney, Fuchs, Dreher, and Ramachandran, China’s Development Finance to Africa: A Media-Based Approach to Data Collection.http://aiddatachina.org/projects/1905
  9. ^ Strange, Parks, Tierney, Fuchs, Dreher, and Ramachandran, China’s Development Finance to Africa: A Media-Based Approach to Data Collection.http://aiddatachina.org/projects/1906
  10. ^ Strange, Parks, Tierney, Fuchs, Dreher, and Ramachandran, China’s Development Finance to Africa: A Media-Based Approach to Data Collection.http://aiddatachina.org/projects/1783
  11. ^ Sharma, Shashi (2020-04-23). "Only a drunkard would accept these terms: Tanzania President cancels 'killer Chinese loan' worth $10 bn". International Business Times. Retrieved 2020-04-24.
  12. ^ Bariyo, Joe Parkinson, James T. Areddy and Nicholas (2020-04-17). "As Africa Groans Under Debt, It Casts Wary Eye at China". The Wall Street Journal. ISSN 0099-9660. Retrieved 2020-04-24.{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  13. ^ a b c d e f Robbins, Glen, and David Perkins. “Mining FDI and Infrastructure Development on Africa's East Coast: Examining the Recent Experience of Tanzania and Mozambique.” Journal of International Development, vol. 24, no. 2, 2012, pp. 220–236., doi:10.1002/jid.2817.
  14. ^ a b c d Yu, George T. “Working on the Railroad: China and the Tanzania-Zambia Railway.” Asian Survey, vol. 11, no. 11, Nov. 1971, pp. 1101–1117.
  15. ^ a b c China-Powered ICT Infrastructure: Lessons from Tanzania and Cambodia. South African Institute of International Affairs; 2021.
  16. ^ a b c d e China, Tanzania sign loan agreements on ICT, air transport infrastructure. News from Xinhua News Agency China. Daily bulletin. 2010.
  17. ^ a b c d e f Vhumbunu, Clayton Hazvinei. “Enabling African Regional Infrastructure Renaissance through the China-Africa Partnership: A Trans-Continental Appraisal.” International Journal of China Studies African Infrastructure Renaissance, vol. 7, no. 3, Dec. 2016, pp. 271–300.
  18. ^ a b c Sortijas, Steve. “Tanzania's New National Stadium and the Rhetoric of Development.” Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies, vol. 33, no. 2-3, 2007, pp. 25–35.
  19. ^ a b c d Chiyemura, F., Gambino, E. & Zajontz, T. Infrastructure and the Politics of African State Agency: Shaping the Belt and Road Initiative in East Africa. Chin. Polit. Sci. Rev. (2022). doi:10.1007/s41111-022-00214-8
  20. ^ a b c d e f Lee, C. (2009). Raw Encounters: Chinese Managers, African Workers and the Politics of Casualization in Africa's Chinese Enclaves. The China Quarterly, 199, 647-666. doi:10.1017/S0305741009990142
  21. ^ a b c d e f g Shinn, David H.; Eisenman, Joshua (2023). China's Relations with Africa: a New Era of Strategic Engagement. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-21001-0.
  22. ^ IISS, 1972-73, p. 40
  23. ^ a b "Fourteenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna" (PDF). The Hague, Netherlands. 3–15 June 2007. p. 38. Archived from the original (PDF) on 19 September 2013. Retrieved 19 June 2014.
  24. ^ a b Lungameni, Loide (September 2013). "Trafficking of Ivory From Eastern Africa to Asia" (PDF). Transnational Organized Crime in Eastern Africa: A Threat Assessment. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna. Retrieved 19 June 2014.
  25. ^ a b c Lawi, Joel. "Corruption in High Office Nourishes Poaching". Tanzania Daily News. TSN Media. Archived from the original on 19 June 2014. Retrieved 19 June 2014.
  26. ^ Russo, Christina. "A Young Chinese Conservationist Discusses His Country's Role in the Ivory Trade". A Voice for Elephants. National Geographic. Archived from the original on June 6, 2014. Retrieved 19 June 2014.
  27. ^ a b Lawi, Joel. "Foreign Nationals Warned Against Poaching". Tanzania Daily News. TSN Media. Archived from the original on 19 June 2014. Retrieved 19 June 2014.
  28. ^ Kapama, Faustine. "Chinese Poacher Fails to Pay Sh9bn Fine, Jailed 20 Years". Tanzania Daily News. TSN Media. Retrieved 19 June 2014.
  29. ^ Levin, Dan (2013-03-01). "From Elephants' Mouths, an Illicit Trail to China". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2020-04-24.
  30. ^ Embassy of China in Dar es Salaam
  31. ^ Embassy of Tanzania in Beijing
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