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Arctic policy of China

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Arctic Policy of China outlines China's approach to foreign relations with Arctic countries as well as its plans to develop infrastructure, extend military capabilities, conduct research, and excavate resources within the Arctic Circle.[1]

In January 2018, China released its official Arctic Policy paper.[1] China has also focused on developing military projection capabilities of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) that would extend into the Arctic region.[2][3][1]

History

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In 1925 China signed the Spitsbergen Treaty,[4] which allows signatories' commercial activities on Svalbard.[5] Early Chinese media discussion of foreign nuclear missiles over Svalbard broadened in the 1980s to the Arctic's mineral, fishing, and transportation potential.[5]

Some of the earliest scientific involvements are the Polar Research Institute of China of Shanghai, whose initial field research date from the late 1980s, as the well as the creation of the Chinese Journal of Polar Research by the Chinese Academy of Sciences in 1988.[6] The first expedition took place in 1984 and there have been 26 in total (as of 2011).[7]

In 1996, China joined the International Arctic Science Committee.[8]

Since 1999 it has launched a series of research vessels including the Xue Long.[4]

In 2004 China built the Yellow River Station.[9] Concerns have been raised about potential dual use of the station.[10][9]

In 2010, Chinese leaders promote cautious Arctic policies so as to not provoke negative responses from the Arctic states. At the same time China is trying to position itself not to be excluded from access to the Arctic. China appears particularly wary of Russia's Arctic intentions, noting Russia's decision to resume bomber flights over the Arctic and planting of a Russian flag on the Arctic seabed, in August 2007.[11]

In March, 2012, there was no authoritative statement of policy from the Chinese government on the Arctic, although Chinese scientists and academics increasingly are active in the region, and suggesting policies for the nation.[12]

In August 2012, Xuě Lóng became the first Chinese vessel to traverse the Northeast Passage.[13] A second Chinese icebreaker is slated for launch in 2014.[14]

In May 2013, China becomes an observer of the Arctic Council.[15]

In 2018, COSCO made eight transits through the Arctic between Europe and China. Several of these were done by the Tian Hui, Tian You and Tian En.[16]

Since 2018, China's "diplomatic activism" in Greenland has waned due to a heightened scrutiny.[17]

Self-designation as a near-Arctic state

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In 2018, China declared itself a "near-Arctic state," though Chinese academics had used the term since at least 2012.[18][5] In 2019, then-United States Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated "There are only Arctic states and non-Arctic states. No third category exists — and claiming otherwise entitles China to exactly nothing."[19][20]

Meanwhile, the debate among scholars, media and the public is still ongoing as to what is China's place in the Arctic. Some public voices contend that the Arctic belongs to humankind and not to any one country or group of countries.[8]

Goals

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According to their official policy paper, China's goals are "to understand, protect, develop and participate in the governance of the Arctic, so as to safeguard the common interests of all countries and the international community in the Arctic, and promote sustainable development of the Arctic."[4]

Interest in Arctic resources

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In March 2010, Chinese Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo famously said: "The Arctic belongs to all the people around the world, as no nation has sovereignty over it... China must plan an indispensable role in Arctic exploration".[21] Between 88 and 95% of resources in the Arctic fall within one of the five Arctic Ocean coastal states' Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ's) and China is unlikely to challenge the provision within the Law of the Sea that creates the EEZ's. This, coupled with Chinese companies lack of Arctic expertise, suggest that China will partner with Arctic nations in resource extraction rather than act alone.[14] China's near-term Arctic focus is on liquified natural gas, which the region may have 30% of undiscovered supplies of.[5]

Arctic research

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China spends about as much as South Korea on Arctic research (much more than the United States).[14]

China is engaged in research on "Arctic geology, geography, ..., hydrology, meteorology, sea ice, biology, ecology, geophysics and marine chemistry. It monitors "local climatic and environmental changes" and collects data on "bio-ecological character and environmental quality". It also focuses on constructing "cooperative research (observation) stations" as well as making the icy waters easier to navigate via things like icebreakers.[4]

Xuelong

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The MV Xue Long or "Snow Dragon" is one such icebreaker vessel that conducts sundry geoscientific research. The MV Xue Long 2 is expected to hit waters in 2019. It is China's first homebuilt icebreaker. China plans to develop next a nuclear-powered icebreaker, to become the second country after Russia to do so.[16]

Joint efforts with Iceland

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The Polar Research Institute of China in collaboration with Iceland institutions opened the China-Iceland Arctic Science Observatory in northern Iceland.[16]

Polar Silk Road

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China plans to build new shipping routes through the Arctic via the Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road.[4] It is a joint Chinese-Russian initiative that was launched in 2018[16] as the "Polar Silk Road", a name first mentioned by a Russian minister at a 2011 meeting. International sanctions during the Russo-Ukrainian War caused Russia to seek Chinese technological and financial aid to develop the Yamal-Nenets region.[5]

Arctic shipping routes

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Among Arctic shipping routes, the maritime shipping distance from Shanghai to Hamburg is about 4,000 miles shorter via the Northeast Passage than the southern route through the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal.[14][15] A long-term goal for China is the Northern Sea Route, which by 2030 may be fully ice free—earlier than the Northwest Passage or Transpolar Sea Route—shortening shipping distance from China to the Netherlands by 23%. The route would reduce China's dependence on the Southern Sea Route, which has several chokepoints aligned with the United States.[5] China has the largest foreign embassy in Reykjavik, anticipating Iceland becoming an important transshipment hub.[22]

Chinese Arctic experts have pointed out the limitations of Arctic sea routes, including harsh conditions, more icebergs due to melting of Greenland's icecap, higher insurance premiums, lack of infrastructure and shallow depths.[8][15]

China has remained neutral on Canada's position that the Northwest Passage is in Canada's internal waters.[8]

Arctic Council permanent observer status

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China has been an observer of the Arctic Council since May 2013.[23][15] At the 2009 ministerial meeting in Tromsø, China requested Permanent Observer status. The request was denied at least partly because members could not agree on the role of Observer States. In 2011, the Arctic Council clarified its criteria for admission of observers, most notably including a requirement of applicants to "recognize Arctic States’ sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic" and "recognize that an extensive legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean including, notably, the Law of the Sea, and that this framework provides a solid foundation for responsible management of this ocean".[15] China's request was approved at the next Arctic Council ministerial meeting in May 2013.[14] Permanent observer status would allow presentation of their perspective, but not voting.

See also

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References

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  1. ^ a b c Ngila, Faustine (April 20, 2023). "China is cementing its position as an Arctic superpower through Russia". Quartz. Retrieved April 20, 2023.
  2. ^ Brady, Anne-Marie (December 10, 2019). "Facing Up to China's Military Interests in the Arctic". Jamestown Foundation. Archived from the original on April 7, 2020. Retrieved 2019-12-13.
  3. ^ Jüris, Frank (2020-03-07). "Handing over infrastructure for China's strategic objectives: 'Arctic Connect' and the Digital Silk Road in the Arctic". Sinopsis. Archived from the original on 2020-04-08. Retrieved 2020-05-09.
  4. ^ a b c d e "Full text: China's Arctic Policy". State Council of the People's Republic of China. Archived from the original on 2018-02-01. Retrieved 2018-01-31.
  5. ^ a b c d e f Dams, Ties; van Schaik, Louise; Stoetman, Adája (2020). Presence before power: why China became a near-Arctic state (Report). Clingendael Institute. pp. 6–19. JSTOR resrep24677.5.
  6. ^ Lasserre, Frédéric; et al. (2017). "China's strategy in the Arctic: threatening or opportunistic?" (PDF). Polar Record. 53 (1): 31. Bibcode:2017PoRec..53...31L. doi:10.1017/S0032247415000765. hdl:20.500.11794/876. S2CID 131750098. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2017-12-02. Retrieved 2020-05-12.
  7. ^ Spears, Joseph (2011). "A Snow Dragon in the Arctic". Asia Times. Archived from the original on 2014-01-03. Retrieved 2017-10-29.
  8. ^ a b c d Wright, David Curtis (2011). The Dragon Eyes the Top of the World: Arctic Policy Debate and Discussion in China (PDF). Naval War College. Retrieved November 10, 2024.
  9. ^ a b Tang, Jane (November 7, 2024). "How Chinese nationalism is sending jitters through the Arctic". Radio Free Asia. Retrieved November 10, 2024.
  10. ^ Tatlow, Didi Kirsten (2024-07-21). "China's expanding Arctic ambitions challenge the U.S. and NATO". Newsweek. Retrieved 2024-07-21.
  11. ^ "China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2013-02-20. Retrieved 2012-10-04.
  12. ^ FU.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Report Archived 2012-10-02 at the Wayback Machine
  13. ^ Icebreaker Xuelong concludes Arctic expedition Archived 2012-09-29 at the Wayback Machine China Daily
  14. ^ a b c d e "Snow dragons". The Economist. September 1, 2012. ISSN 0013-0613. Archived from the original on 2024-06-16. Retrieved 2024-11-11.
  15. ^ a b c d e Buixadé Farré, Albert; Stephenson, Scott R.; Chen, Linling; Czub, Michael; Dai, Ying; Demchev, Denis; Efimov, Yaroslav; Graczyk, Piotr; Grythe, Henrik; Keil, Kathrin; Kivekäs, Niku; Kumar, Naresh; Liu, Nengye; Matelenok, Igor; Myksvoll, Mari (2014-10-02). "Commercial Arctic shipping through the Northeast Passage: routes, resources, governance, technology, and infrastructure" (PDF). Polar Geography. 37 (4): 298–324. Bibcode:2014PolGe..37..298B. doi:10.1080/1088937X.2014.965769. ISSN 1088-937X.
  16. ^ a b c d Eiterjord, Trym Aleksander. "China's Busy Year in the Arctic". The Diplomat. Archived from the original on 2019-06-03. Retrieved 2019-06-03.
  17. ^ "China and Russia have chilling plans for the Arctic". The Economist. June 19, 2024. ISSN 0013-0613. Retrieved 2024-06-20.
  18. ^ "China defines itself as a 'near-arctic state', says SIPRI". Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 2012. Archived from the original on 2017-10-30. Retrieved 2017-10-29.
  19. ^ Lee, Matthew (2019-05-06). "US warns China, Russia against aggression in Arctic region". Associated Press. Archived from the original on 2024-09-06. Retrieved 2024-11-11.
  20. ^ Zellen, Barry Scott (2019-09-05). "China and the "Near-Arctic:" An Opportunity Lost Over 150 Years Ago". Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. Archived from the original on 2024-07-27. Retrieved 2024-11-11.
  21. ^ FU.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Report Archived 2012-10-02 at the Wayback Machine
  22. ^ "A warmer Arctic Ocean needs shipping rules". Financial Times. Archived from the original on 2022-12-23. Retrieved 2024-11-11.
  23. ^ European Parliament. "China's Arctic policy" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on 2019-05-22.
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