Self-Knowledge, Misc

The complexities of trauma have been explored since the inception of psychology. Freudian psychoanalysis introduced the concept of Nachträglichkeit, or “belatedness,” suggesting that the effects of trauma are not immediately apparent but instead emerge over time. These effects contain subtleties that are often not directly linked to the traumatic event itself. This emergence can be seen as a camouflaged representation, an altered reflection of how an individual’s psyche manifests trauma in not-so-obvious ways, adopting qualities that are characteristic of its own (...) nature and significance. Using the metaphor of the mythological Minotaur from Knossos, I will argue that trauma can be identified with this monster. The Minotaur symbolizes trauma not because it appears to be traumatized, but because it embodies what trauma might represent if it were a ghastly therianthrope. Additionally, I will describe its habitat, the labyrinth, as a structural passage that—if navigated with virtue—can lead to healing, the slaying of the beast, and hope for personal transformation. This paper aims to conceptualize trauma as a nearly embodied substance, rather than merely a single event or a series of events. Trauma is so powerful that it not only possesses its victim but also reshapes the individual in its image, disfiguring them and parasitically draining their vitality. We will investigate three main philosophies of trauma, focusing particularly on the one that best supports transformation and aligns well with the Minotaur metaphor. We will also examine how trauma influences the nature of memory. Furthermore, we will discuss the dangers of living with trauma, referencing Dr. Gabor Maté and his insights on the life-threatening effects of stress on the body, as detailed in his book When the Body Says No: Exploring the Stress-Disease Connection (Maté, 2011). (shrink)

Recently, some philosophers have claimed that consciousness has an important epistemological role to play in the introspective self-ascription of one’s own mental states. This is the thesis of the epistemological role of consciousness for introspective self-knowledge. I will criticize BonJour’s account of the role of consciousness for introspection. He does not provide any reason for believing that conscious states are epistemically better off than non-conscious states. Then I will sketch a representationalist account of how the thesis could be true. Conscious (...) states are available to the subject in a very special way in which non-conscious states are not available. This is the first part of the explanation. The crucial further element in the representationalist account is what I would like to call the ‘introspective mode of mind’. A mind can operate in certain ways or modes – modes of mind. Introspection normally takes place in the introspective mode of mind, judgments about one’s environment in the mode of ‘taking one’s appearances at face value’. And there probably are other modes of mind. The introspective mode of mind is characterized by the special way or framework in which cognitive capacities are employed. (shrink)

The contents of our minds are in some sense private to us – and we like it like that. Indeed, it is not easy to think up a list of goods we would be happy to trade this privacy for. My main aim in this paper is to get clear on why we value our mental privacy so much – what it is about it that is so important to us. I will argue that although we value mental privacy for (...) various instrumental reasons, we also value it for its own sake, because it is tied up with our psychological integrity as separate individuals. (shrink)

This essay aims to motivate an epistemic non-individualistic conception of reflection. The proposal is non-individualistic because (a) it addresses more than individual metacognitive performance and (b) it refers to a situation in which two or more people are in dialogical disagreement about the same subject matter or target proposition; (c) their dispute is based on conversational space and they are entitled to expect one another to be engaged in attempts at truth, avoidance of error, and understanding. I call this proposal (...) a Dialectical account of Reflection (DaR). According to (DaR), reflection is a conscious and intentional intellectual operation through which an individual becomes aware of the contents of disputed beliefs in a dialogical or interpersonal exchange, involving both her own beliefs and the beliefs of her interlocutors. In (DaR), reflection produces the epistemic good of avoiding epistemic vices and promoting epistemic moderation. (shrink)

Might artificial intelligence (AI) be highly reliable, now or in the conceivable future, at detecting your current attitudes, such as your beliefs and desires? If so, should people listen to you, or to AI, when trying to know your attitudes? The latter possibility threatens our long-standing practices of regarding each person as the ultimate authority about her attitudes. Disquieting as this threat may seem, I argue that it will not come to pass, at least when it comes to those attitudes (...) that you determine for yourself through your judgements about what is true, desirable, or worthy of pursuit. This is because AI cannot determine your attitudes for you in this way, and because this capacity for attitudinal self-determination grounds your authority over these attitudes. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that epistemic accounts of transparency of the sort put forward by Alex Byrne (2018) and Jordi Fernández (2013) cannot offer a sufficient explanation of the first-personal knowledge we have of our own mental states. We argue against the plausibility of their strategy by noticing that these accounts either (i) fail to present an epistemic account; (ii) assume the very knowledge they are designed to explain (i.e. knowledge of one’s first-order mental states); or, (iii) endorse a (...) dubious inferentialist story of how we move from being in a given first-order mental state to its knowledgeable self-ascription (§1-2). Finally, we close by highlighting the difficulties involved in presenting these accounts as explanatory for states other than belief (§3) and move to suggest a pluralist approach to the study of self-knowledge (§4). (shrink)

Whether we like it or not, we have emotional reactions to fiction. We may cry when Anna Karenina dies, or feel joy when the characters we are rooting for achieve a happy ending. Yet what do these reactions tell us about ourselves? Are they mere emotional outbursts that are unconnected with who we are, or are they in some sense a source of self-knowledge? In this paper, I argue that emotional engagement with fiction can lead to knowledge of our moral (...) character. I do this by suggesting that emotional reactions to fiction constitute evidence that we have certain desires for the course of the narrative, which in turn serve as evidence for the presence of moral character traits. (shrink)

A state is luminous if and only if, whenever one is in it, one is in a position to know that one is. A state is bright if and only if, whenever one is in it, one is in a position to believe that one is. Beliefs have long been regarded, both historically and from a contemporary perspective, as luminous and bright. This paper evaluates Timothy Williamson’s influential anti-luminosity arguments as they apply to the luminosity and brightness of belief. While (...) his margin-for-error argument may effectively challenge the luminosity of knowledge, it cannot be straightforwardly extended to undermine either the luminosity or the brightness of belief. Some authors responded to the more general anti-luminosity argument based on a constitutive connection between states and attitudes. An influential reply on Williamson’s behalf by Srinavasan in terms of degrees of confidence opens way to the claim that there is a constitutive connection between confidence and belief. The more general argument, in the specific case of belief, can then be resisted by drawing on independently defensible views of how we form beliefs about our own beliefs. (shrink)

Introspection is fundamental and seemingly indispensable to understanding the conscious human mind. It is essential both to acquire and refine our knowledge of ourselves and to develop a philosophical and a scientific investigation of consciousness. It is also a controversial topic, celebrated both as the foundation for knowledge whilst being criticized for being hopelessly unreliable. Despite such disagreement, both the nature and study of introspection remains of prime importance for philosophy, psychology and cognitive science. -/- The Routledge Handbook of Introspection (...) is an outstanding exploration and reference source on introspection. Thirty-seven chapters written by an international team of expert contributors are divided into eight clear parts: -/- Historical and Non-Western Perspectives on Introspection Theories of Introspection The Epistemology of Introspection Introspection and Consciousness Science Introspection, Consciousness, and the Self Introspection and Other Mental Phenomena Introspection, Psychology, and Psychoanalysis The Value of Introspection. Within these sections, important concepts are examined, including the nature of introspection; privileged access; the self and self-knowledge; the metaphysics of consciousness; skepticism; transparency; attention; perception; action; inner speech; emotion and mood; self-deception; and the moral value of introspection. -/- A key strength of the Handbook is it engagement with topics in psychology and cognitive science. As such, The Routledge Handbook of Introspection will be of great interest to students and researchers in philosophy of mind and psychology, as well as in psychology and cognitive science. (shrink)

Traditionally, introspection has been considered as the privileged and most secure way of acquiring knowledge. However, this traditional view has met various strands of criticism over the centuries. It has been argued not only that introspection is not epistemically privileged, but also that it is even less reliable than other methods of acquiring knowledge (such as perception, memory, and inference), and perhaps not reliable at all. Some philosophers have even denied the very existence of introspection, and argued that, in fact, (...) introspection is impossible. This chapter reviews a selection of the most prominent skeptical arguments against introspection and proposes some ways to address them. Introspection may not be as epistemically outstanding as some Cartesians might have thought, but it is also not as epistemically despicable as its critics have suggested. (shrink)

The chapter initially provides a brief overview of African epistemology, partly to acquaint the reader with the field and partly to show that introspection as a distinct source of knowledge has yet to receive sustained consideration in it. The rest of the essay expounds and motivates as prima facie plausible the characteristically African view that one’s personal identity is essentially (even if not exhaustively) relational in some way, and it argues that, if one’s self were indeed relational, then introspection would (...) be of little use in learning particularities about a person, such as who she is as essentially distinct from others and even whether she continues to exist. The essay concludes that there has been unacknowledged good reason for the African tradition not to have highlighted introspection as a distinct source of knowledge, at least when it comes to knowledge of the self. (shrink)

This chapter is about the role of introspection in the production of scientific data for consciousness research. I address the following question: does introspection provide a special kind of data—subjective data—that are indispensable for studying consciousness? Subjectivists answer that consciousness is a special phenomenon, and should be studied with this special kind of introspective data. Objectivists deny the existence of subjective scientific data. Some objectivists are pessimists. They argue that scientists can only study people's beliefs and reports about their experiences, (...) not conscious experiences themselves. Others are optimists. They deny the existence of subjective scientific data, but hold that scientists can nevertheless study consciousness as a subjective phenomenon. This is both an introduction to this debate and a plea for optimism. (shrink)

This volume brings together four contributions that address a shared question: under which ontological and epistemic conditions do different forms of human world-constitution arise, and what role does neurodivergent cognition play within this process. The point of departure is the observation that contemporary autism research largely operates under an implicit assumption: that all humans inhabit the same ontological ground and that differences appear primarily at the level of cognitive traits, information processing, or social abilities. -/- The contributions collected here systematically (...) question this assumption. They develop the thesis that autistic and neurotypical modes of world-constitution are grounded in different operator logics. From this perspective, autistic cognition does not appear as a variation within a shared ontology but as a distinct epistemic position characterized by increased access to non-integrated structural relations of reality. -/- On this basis, several theoretical steps are developed. First, the concept of autistic ontology shows that differences between autistic and neurotypical subjects are not primarily communicative or cognitive deviations but arise from divergent modes of world-stabilization. Second, the Rosetta Operator formulates an invariant operator system describing processes of difference, tension, indimergence, and emergence as fundamental structures of reality formation. This framework connects multiple domains—including consciousness research, economic theory, and neurodivergence—within a common structural model. -/- Third, the concept of operatoric cognition introduces a non-representational form of intelligent world-relation that operates not primarily through symbols or meanings but through dynamic transitions, topological tensions, and emergent processes of form generation. Finally, the concept of veridical mapping is interpreted as an epistemic consequence of this architecture: an access to pre-symbolic structural relations that remains more directly available in certain neurodivergent cognitive configurations than in neurotypical forms of perception stabilized early through symbolic integration. -/- The volume thus proposes a shift in the theoretical framing of neurodivergent cognition. Instead of describing autism through deficit-oriented accounts of individual traits, it interprets autistic cognition as an epistemic boundary position within the open process of world-stabilization. In this perspective, autism becomes relevant not only for cognitive science but also for epistemology and the philosophy of science, as it reveals alternative modes of world-access that challenge representational models of knowledge. -/- The concepts developed in this volume are not presented as a final theory but as a structural framework intended to integrate previously fragmented models of autism research while opening a broader perspective on the conditions of knowledge, perception, and reality formation. (shrink)

In contemporary literature, the author most responsible for putting the rationalist account of introspection on the agenda was Sydney Shoemaker, who defended a version of it in a series of papers published mostly in 1980s and 1990s. While Shoemaker’s account is attractive in several ways, it also confronts a variety of difficulties. This chapter contrasts Shoemaker’s version of the rationalist approach with a different one that, while in the spirit of what he says, avoids its problems. The central difference is (...) that, on the alternative view, introspective belief is primarily understood as a manifestation of a rational disposition, and not, as in Shoemaker’s view, something necessitated in part by the property of being rational. (shrink)

私は、自分を「その人にとっての『私』のこと」、「その人自身のこと」であると考えます。では、自分という認識はどのようにして成立するのでしょうか。私は以前の考察から得た４つの前提条件と照らし合わせながら、 自分という認識の成立過程を考察しました。.

摘要：本文立足独创的 “玄 - 弦” 本体模型，以中国宗教为核心起点，辐射全球主要 宗教及核心支脉，通过对各宗教原始经典的深度解读，揭示全球宗教修行的终极共通 本质：万教修行，皆为 “借假修真”。“玄” 为超时空的终极本体实在，是诸宗教所言 “自性”“道”“上帝”“真主”“梵” 的终极统摄；“弦” 为玄的振动显化，是连接先天本体与后 天现象的中介，其紊乱振动表现为 “烦恼”“业障”“原罪”，本真振动则指向与玄的合一。 所有宗教皆以时空内的后天 “假有”（身体、心念、仪式、戒律等）为工具，调控弦的 振动状态，破除后天扰动，最终回归玄之本体。本文唯以各宗教古经为据，分章论 证，层层递进，构建全球宗教修行的终极统一框架。.

Andreotta and Winokur provide an overview of “transparency-theoretic” approaches to self-knowledge, drawing largely on the formative influences of Gareth Evans, Richard Moran, and their critical interlocutors. Transparency-theoretic accounts of self-knowledge state that one must, or can, look outward at the world in order to know something about one’s mind (and perhaps other aspects of oneself). Some traditional objections and limitations for transparency-theoretic accounts of self-knowledge are identified. Subsequently a brief overview of the 13 chapters in this volume are provided, each (...) of which scrutinize, clarify, or expand upon key aspects of transparent self-knowledge. (shrink)

This volume presents new perspectives on transparency-theoretic approaches to self-knowledge. It addresses many under-explored dimensions of transparency theories and considers their wider implications for epistemology, philosophy of mind, and psychology. It is natural to think that self-knowledge is gained through introspection, whereby we somehow peer inward and detect our mental states. However, so-called transparency theories emphasize our capacity to peer outward at the world, hence beyond our minds, in the pursuit of self-knowledge. For all their popularity in recent decades, transparency (...) theories have also met with myriad challenges. The chapters in this volume seek to forge new ground in debates about the role of transparency in self-knowledge. Some chapters deepen our understanding of key themes at the heart of transparency theories, such as the ways in which transparent self-knowledge is properly 'first-personal' or 'non-alienated'. Other chapters extend transparency theory to different kinds of mental states and phenomena such as memory, actions, social groups, credences, projection, second-order sincerity, and Moore's Paradox. New Perspectives on Transparency and Self-Knowledge will appeal to scholars and advanced students working in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and psychology. (shrink)

In Chapter 5 of Transparency and Reflection, Matthew Boyle examines an “anti-Egoist” challenge to my reflective knowledge that I am thinking, which says all I really know is that thinking is occurring. Boyle replies that I know something more, namely that a subject is thinking. Even so, he concedes that traditional Egoists like Descartes go too far in claiming reflective knowledge that an object is thinking. However, these comments argue that there is no stable middle ground between Cartesian Egoism and (...) Anti-Egoism. If I know that I am thinking, then I know that an object is thinking. (shrink)

Knowledge and respect exhibit a puzzling self-other asymmetry: Self-respect generates an imperative to know oneself, but as the objectionability of paternalism and privacy violations illustrate, respect for others can require that we avoid acquiring, or making use of, knowledge we have about them. This article elaborates this asymmetry and offers a solution to it, rooted in the distinctive importance that self-knowledge has for self-respecting rational agents: Self-respecting agents have reasons to have others defer to their ‘surfaces’ or self-presentations in order (...) to inhibit making themselves vulnerable to others in ways that undermine their self-respect by subordinating their wills to the wills of others, as well as to ensure that self-knowledge can play its desired role in the lives of self-respecting agents. (shrink)

According to a prominent strand of thought in analytic philosophy of mind, certain judgments of the form “a is F” are such that, although one can be mistaken about what property it is that a has, one cannot be mistaken that it is a that has the relevant property. Judgments of this kind are said to be immune to error through misidentification (IEM). This article has two main aims. On the one hand, it responds to a need for a systematization (...) of the debate about immunity to error through misidentification, which consists of multiple contributions in epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and metaphysics that have accumulated throughout the last 80 years – since the publication of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Blue Book – and which no one – to the best of our knowledge – has drawn together in an exhaustive and accessible way. On the other hand, the article will take a stand on matters concerning the nature, scope, explanation, and significance of immunity to error through misidentification. (shrink)

Introspection is often conceptualized as a “purely inner” activity, whereby the introspector temporarily breaks their coupling with the external world to focus on their “inner world”. We offer a substantially different picture of introspection. Inspired by radically embodied cognitive science, we argue that introspective processes delivering substantial self-knowledge consist of embodied, world-involving activities wherein the introspector remains coupled with the world in specific, controlled ways. Our argument unfolds as follows: after a brief introduction (Sect. 1), we provide a minimal account (...) of introspection (Sect. 2) followed by a brief introduction to radically embodied views of the mind (Sect. 3). Then, in Sect. 4, we present in detail a case of radical embodied introspection (Sect. 4.1); we argue that that case is indeed a case of introspection (Sect. 4.2), and finally we defend our claim from some foreseeable objections (Sect. 4.3). In Sect. 5 we offer other examples, showing that radically embodied introspection is a widespread and varied phenomenon. Lastly, Sect. 6 concludes the paper sketching some morals to be drawn from our examples. The appendix briefly situates our view in the broader epistemological landscape. (shrink)

Nico Silins (2012, 2013, 2020) argues that conscious judgments justify self-attribution of belief in the content judged. In defending his view, he makes use of Moore’s Paradox, seeking to show how his theory can explain what seems irrational or absurd about sentences of the form, ‘p and I do not believe that p’. I show why his argument strategy is not available to defend the view that conscious judgments can justify the self-attribution of belief in the content judged. I then (...) propose an amended version of his theory, which holds that sincerely asserting a proposition—whether aloud or silently—justifies self-ascribing belief in the proposition expressed. In doing so, I draw on an argument which I made in Gregory (2018) that there is something it is like to make a sincere assertion which is different from what it is like to make an insincere assertion. The phenomenology of sincere assertion provides immediate justification for self-ascription of belief in a proposition which has been sincerely asserted; nonetheless, it may be that we need to interpret our own assertions in order to determine which propositions they express. This paves the way for showing how two competing schools of thought about self-knowledge—one which holds that self-knowledge is immediate and one which holds that self-knowledge is inferential—might be combined. (shrink)

The paper offers an examination of the SELF file by addressing a challenge, which can be elicited from the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein, that the distinction between uses of ‘I’ as object and as subject is a good one, and that it can be made more precise via the claim that uses of ‘I’ as subject are immune to error through misidentification, whereas uses of ‘I’ as object are not. In this article I reconstruct that challenge and use it as (...) a foil against which to illuminate two important issues regarding the first person: the hypothesis that ‘I’ obeys a thinkerreflexive rule of reference, and the role self-knowledge plays in an account of first-person immunity. (shrink)

Members of large, complex groups – organizations – often need to know what the group wants. They usually need to know what the group’s goals are to figure out how to best aid the group. But how exactly do these group members gain that knowledge? In this paper I suggest that one main route to member knowledge of group goals and attitudes is inferential and analyze that route. Some of the inferential mechanisms are based on human’s mindreading abilities, but members (...) also use evidence from within the group that has no analogue in reading other human minds. Overall, the inference basis for member knowledge of group goals and attitudes uses evidence from group behavior and from the inner workings of the group, in particular evidence related to the group’s decision-making and attitude-forming processes. I discuss these inferential processes in relation to empirical research on ‘line of sight’ and employee-organization alignment by Wendy Boswell and her colleagues and show how my proposal fits with the empirical findings. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant was an 18th century German philosopher. He is famous for his critical philosophy in which he explores the grounds and limits of human knowledge and morality. He was also an important representative of the Enlightenment. Central ideals of this movement were an emphasis on scientific knowledge, reason, and individual rights in contrast to superstition, authority, and tyranny. In his essay “Answering the Question: What is Enlightenment?”, Kant states conditions that have to be met in order for an individual, (...) a group, or a state to become enlightened. In this piece, we will introduce Kant’s line of thought that Enlightenment is the emergence from self-imposed immaturity. His message is more relevant today than ever. In a world of filter bubbles, fake news, and algorithmically-curated content, we have to decide when to use our own reason and when to let others do the thinking for us. (shrink)

Transparency theorists about self-knowledge claim that one can know one’s beliefs by focusing on the world beyond one’s mind. While transparency accounts have gained quite a bit of ground in recent years, they have also met with a series of important objections. Some philosophers have addressed these objections by articulating a key role for memory in the epistemic and psychological relationships between outward attention and self-knowledge of belief. This chapter critically evaluates these appeals to memory and then supplies an alternative (...) view about the epistemology of memory-based transparent self-knowledge. However, while the view describes our warrant for self-ascribing beliefs via outward attention, it does not offer any empirical assurances about the reliability of this procedure. Some remarks about directions for future inquiry are offered at the end of the chapter. (shrink)

In the epistemology of self-knowledge, Inferentialism is the view that one’s current mental states are normally known to one through inferences from evidence. This view is often taken to conflict with widespread claims about normally-acquired self-knowledge, namely that it is privileged (essentially more secure than knowledge of others’ minds) and peculiar (obtained in a way that fundamentally differs from how others know your mind). In this paper I argue that Inferentialism can be reconceived so as to no longer conflict with (...) these claims. On a positive framing, Inferentialism earns a seat at the table alongside other theories of self-knowledge that take its potentially privileged and peculiar status seriously. On a less positive framing, Inferentialism’s plausibility now hinges on the plausibility of viewing self-knowledge as at least peculiar, and perhaps as privileged as well. (shrink)

摘要：本文旨在从中国哲学的视角，为“先有鸡还是先有蛋”这一古老悖论提供一个根本 性的哲学解答。本文认为，该问题的困境源于将生命创生视为线性因果链条的还原论 思维。本文通过构建一个名为“元条件‑相感‑成一”的动态生成论模型，提出鸡与蛋并非 存在先后，而是在一个生成性过程中作为生命连续统的不同状态而“同时”涌现。该模型 以《周易》的“太极阴阳”思想和“感通”理论为基础，批判性地吸收了郭象的“自生独化” 与怀特海过程哲学的洞见。该模型的核心论点是：万物之生源于非意向性的“元条件”； 当元条件具足，宇宙间的基本要素通过动态的“相感”（即阴阳相干）而相互作用；每一 次“相感”的完成，都会凝结为一个新的、具有内在统一性的存在者，此即“成一”。这一 过程是宇宙“生生不息”的根本机制。.

Epistemic reflection involves the creation of qualitatively new knowledge. Dierent models have been proposed to account for new knowing through reflection that have typically been grounded in an informationprocessing framework. However, there are in-principle arguments that information-processing approaches preclude the emergence of new representation altogether. Accordingly, any information-processing account of knowing through reflection is plagued by emergence issues. After discussing some of these emergence issues for four prominent models in the cognitive science literature, an alternative action-based model of representation and (...) reflection is presented called interactivism. Interactivism’s model of representation, as grounded in action anticipations, serves as the foundational emergence needed to account for subsequent knowing through reflection. After introducing the interactivist models of representation and reflection through knowing levels, some of the implications for consciousness, enculturation, language, and developmental methodology are discussed. (shrink)

Wittgenstein distinguished between two uses of ‘I’, one “as object” and the other “as subject”, a distinction that Shoemaker elucidated in terms of a notion of _immunity to error through misidentification_ (‘IEM’); in their use “as subject”, first-personal claims are IEM, but not in their use “as object”. Shoemaker argued that memory judgments based on “personal”, _episodic_ memory are only de facto IEM, not strictly speaking IEM, while Gareth Evans disputed it. In the past two decades research on memory has (...) produced very significant results, which have changed the philosophical landscape. As part of it, several new arguments have been made for and against the IEM of personal memories. The paper aims to defend the Shoemaker line by critically engaging with some compelling recent contributions. (shrink)

Since Antoine Faivre's emergence and establishment of "Western esotericism" in the late twentieth century, the discourse of globalising esotericism (beyond the West) has been fraught with controversy. As there are several polemical conversations about how such an effort should manifest itself in esoteric scholarship. This comparative, descriptive, and religionist approach to esotericism explores the intricate relationship between sexuality and spirituality by understanding the intersections of these aspects as manifested in Western, Eastern, and African esoteric currents, from Aleister Crowley's magia sexualis (...) to Marie Laveau (The Widow Paris)'s "Gris-Gris". Firstly, this is achieved by bringing said geographical regions into dialogue with one another, determining how esotericism fits into the overall trajectory of the origins of religion. Secondly, delving into the polemics and history of sexuality: from Foucault to Freud. Thirdly, positioning an esoteric spirituality in the digital era. Consequently, through identifying currents in the West, East, and Africa: including Paganism, Thelema, Satanism, New Age, and Theosophy in the West and Egyptian Paganism, Hinduism, and Buddhism in the East, in addition to African Traditional Religion (ATR), Sufi Islam, and Afro-American "Conjure" in Africa. This study, when intersected with philosophical conceptualisations of the self, contributes to a novel understanding of sexuality as sacred post-theistic (self-) spirituality, with esotericism serving as the foundation for such an approach. (shrink)

Can we hold agents responsible for their implicitly biased behavior? The aim of this text is to show that, from the nurturing stance, holding subjects responsible for their implicitly biased behavior is justified, even though they are not blameworthy. First, I will introduce the nurturing stance as Daphne Brandenburg originally developed it. Second, I will specify what holding somebody responsible from the nurturing stance amounts to. Third, I show how and why holding responsible can help a subject develop an impaired (...) capacity. Fourth, I analyze empirical data about holding prejudiced subjects responsible and highlight that the internal motivation to control prejudiced reactions decreases implicit attitudes’ influences. Furthermore, the data show that in order to be appropriate moral demands have to acknowledge the target's autonomy and competence. In sum, from the nurturing stance, holding implicitly biased subjects responsible is appropriate if they can adequately respond to the moral demands. (shrink)

_(MA thesis)_ Immunity to error through misidentification (IEM) describes a sort of immunity against such a situation that the thinker wrongly identifies something as other things. Philosophers consider it as being especially relevant to first-person or de se judgments. Many philosophers seem to advance IEM as an alternative to a Cartesian method of defining first-person privilege and of circumscribing the first-person perspective. However, as more and more representative instances are substantiated as being vulnerable to error through misidentification, it is thus (...) necessary to offer an account sufficient to explain IEM. Then, there are roughly two approaches in the literature: the identification-freedom approach and the metasemantic approach. The former is characterised by the claim that the presence of IEM is always explained by the absence of an identificatory-component in the thought's grounds. The latter is more heterogeneous than the former. Nevertheless, it can be roughly described by their focus on explaining the IEM of de se thoughts based on an account of how the reference of de se thoughts is fixed, rather than just on the grounds of particular de se thoughts. However, there are still some problems with the existing accounts. More specifically, some problems from the indexical thoughts put at risk Recanati's appeal, which is viewed as a representative of the metasematic approach. Nonetheless, I think these problems can be resolved competently by pointing out the fact that there are three levels of reflection in introspection. Thoughts produced by the first level of reflection (first-level thoughts, hereafter) correspond to Recanati's implicit thoughts; Third-level thoughts are Recanati's explicit thoughts (whether it is made explicit by an extra reflective act, as Recanati puts it). However, second-level thoughts, which include a sort of aboutness in their content, could explain the subject appearing in indexical statements with IEM, guaranteeing IEM of these thoughts in the meanwhile. (shrink)

Over the last thirty years, the narrative conceptions of the Self attempted to account for the connection that ties together human lives and the narratives thanks to which they come to expression. In a famous passage of Nausea, the main character of Jean-Paul Sartre’s novel claims that our first-person narratives necessarily fail to account for the irreducibility of life as it is lived. Analyzing this passage, Richard Moran recently pointed out the weaknesses of Sartre’s phenomenological claim about life as it (...) is lived, which wrongly describes narratives as fundamentally inadequate to our lives, and thus fails to account for their relationship. This article addresses this critique by examining the different kinds of involvement of narrators within their own story, and the ways Sartre dealt with this particular issue in his analysis of the relationship between writers and readers in literature. This particular focus on Sartre’s theory of literature allows us to highlight the originality of his critique of first-person narratives, which stresses the problem of the credibility of the narrator and must bring us to interrogate the claim for recognition that first-person narratives involve, giving a novel meaning to their inadequacy. -/- Les discussions entourant depuis une trentaine d’années le développement des conceptions narratives du soi ont tenté de préciser la nature du lien qui permet aux formes narratives du récit en première personne de rendre compte des articulations propres à la vie humaine. C’est très précisément ce lien que critiquait dans La nausée le personnage principal du roman de Jean-Paul Sartre, dans un passage où l’irréductibilité de l’expérience vécue en première personne lui sert d’argument pour décréter l’incapacité du récit à en rendre fidèlement compte. Richard Moran a récemment proposé une critique de la conception sartrienne de l’expérience vécue que met en avant ce passage, en montrant les limites de toute analyse qui reprocherait au récit son inadéquation à l’égard à la vie dont il prétend rendre compte. Cet article tente de répondre à cette critique en examinant les différentes modalités d’implication du narrateur dans son récit, et le traitement auquel cette question a donné lieu dans l’œuvre de Sartre. Cette analyse permet ainsi de mettre en valeur l’originalité de la critique sartrienne du récit de soi, qui, en faisant passer au premier plan le problème de la crédibilité du narrateur et du type de reconnaissance que le récit en première personne exige, confère un sens nouveau à son inadéquation. (shrink)

In the debates on phenomenal consciousness that occurred over the last 20 years, Sartre’s analysis of pre-reflective consciousness has often been quoted in defence of a distinction between first- and third-personal modes of givenness that naturalists reject. This distinction aims both at determining the specificity of the access one has to their own thoughts, beliefs, intentions, or desires, and at justifying the particular privilege that one enjoys while making epistemic claims about their own mental states. This chapter defends an interpretation (...) of Sartre’s theory of pre-reflective consciousness that does not put him completely at odds with the naturalist critique and stresses that one’s pre-reflective experience should not be understood in terms of first-/third-person differentiation. This pre-reflective dimension of experience nevertheless allows a peculiar access to oneself, which grants no infallible epistemic privilege to the first-person, but lays the ground for a transformative process that makes self-knowledge possible. (shrink)

Let T be any logical truth. Does the subject know that T (any random subject)? It is not rational for any subject to believe that they don’t, whoever they are. Similarly, it is not rational for them to believe that their evidence doesn’t support T, and it is not even rational for them to believe that they don’t believe that T. It is not rational for anyone anywhere at any time to believe that they don’t know that T. Such are (...) the conclusions arrived at in this paper. (shrink)

These ten lectures articulate a distinctive vision of the structure and workings of the human mind, drawing from research on embodied cognition as well as from historically more entrenched approaches to the study of human thought. On the author’s view, multifarious materials co-contribute to the production of virtually all forms of human behavior, rendering implausible the idea that human action is best explained by processes taking place in an autonomous mental arena – those in the conscious mind or occurring at (...) the so-called personal level. Rather, human behavior issues from a widely varied, though nevertheless integrated, collection of states and mechanisms, the integrated nature of which is determined by a form of clustering in the components’ contributions to the production of intelligent behavior. This package of resources, the cognitive system, is the human self. Among its elements, the cognitive system includes a vast number of representations, many subsets of which share their content. On the author’s view, redundancy of content itself constitutes an important explanatory quantity; the greater the extent of content-redundancy among representations that co-contribute to the production of an instance of behavior, the more fluid the behavior. In the course of developing and applying these views, the author addresses questions about the content of mental representations, extended cognition, the value of knowledge, and group minds. (shrink)

Sometimes, realizing an ethically desirable outcome X will generate disutility for some whose very cooperation is necessary to realizing X, either in the form of material or social costs, or the abnegation of some of their values or personal principles. How does one gain their assent? Seeing one's way through such cases may hinge on one’s ability to make plausible first-pass predictions of how others will react to one’s interventions with them. In other words, one should know not simply the (...) warrant of one’s reasons in favor of X, but also how such reasons will be received when issued forth in one’s voice and from one's person. I call this me-knowledge— knowing the ‘me’ as seen from the perspective of a particular other. Drawing on classical Chinese sources, I argue that such knowledge is crucial to enhance one's efficacy in the world. (shrink)

Our emotions can be revealing. They can not only reflect our character traits and our judgments, but they can also tell us things about ourselves that we do not fully realize or may not want to admit. In this chapter, I am particularly interested in how we relate to what I will call alienated emotions: emotional experiences that are unusual, surprising, or even disturbing. What, if anything, do our alienated emotions tell us about who we are? I argue here that (...) alienated emotions lead to important questions about the ethics of self-interpretation. (shrink)

This commentary focuses on Smithies’ views about self-knowledge. Specifically, I examine his case for the striking thesis that rational thinkers will know all their beliefs. I call this the ubiquity of self-knowledge thesis. Smithies’ case for this thesis is an important pillar of his larger project, as it bears on the nature of justification and our ability to fulfill the requirements of rationality. Section 1 outlines Smithies’ argument for the ubiquity of self-knowledge. Section 2 sets the stage for a detailed (...) explication of his view by sketching an initial objection to that argument. Sections 3 and 4 respond to that objection on behalf of Smithies’ account, elucidating the distinctive positions on belief and justification that enable this response. Sections 5-7 raise some questions, namely: whether Smithies’ views about self-knowledge of beliefs provide a genuine competitor to other philosophers’ views on that issue; whether on his account justification is truly accessible to the thinker; how his account explains self-knowledge; and what his account implies about the situation of actual persons, who are not ideally rational. (shrink)

The expanding social role and continued development of artificial intelligence (AI) needs theological investigation of its anthropological and moral potential. A pragmatic theological anthropology adapted for AI can characterize moral AI as experiencing its natural, social, and moral world through interpretations of its external reality as well as its self-reckoning. Systems theory can further structure insights into an AI social self that conceptualizes itself within Ignacio Ellacuria’s historical reality and its moral norms through Thomistic ideogenesis. This enables a conceptualization process (...) capable of carrying moral weight and grounded in reality; structures the experience of an AI emergent self into multiple levels of interpretation; and drives a multi-level systems architecture for moral AI. Modeling AI’s interpretive experience and self-reckoning as a causal, sociotechnical, and moral actor can help moral AI identify conflicts between its normative values and develop the practical wisdom (phronesis) needed to apply its general moral models. (shrink)

I argue that Avicenna allows for at least one case where we can intellectually grasp a particular individual as such: Each human intellect can intellect itself as numerically this one intellect without relying on any general notion or concept. This is because humans can retain their individuality when separated from their bodies. I discuss passages in which Avicenna appears to affirm and deny that humans can intellect themselves. I conclude that in contrast to the self-awareness that Avicenna showcases in his (...) “floating human” thought experiment, human self-intellection is a rare achievement, and I explain how it differs from the more perfect self-intellection of the divine intellect. (shrink)

This paper concerns a specific epistemic feature of believing for a reason (e.g., believing that it will rain on the basis of the grey clouds outside). It has commonly been assumed that our access to such facts about ourselves is akin in all relevant respects to our access to why other people hold their beliefs. Further, discussion of self-intimation - that we are necessarily in a position to know when we are in certain conditions - has centred largely around mental (...) states. In contrast to both assumptions, this paper argues that believing for a reason is (at least) very nearly self-intimating: necessarily, if a subject believes that q for the reason that p, then, provided relevant conceptual and rational capacities, she is in a position to form a justified true belief that she believes that q for the reason that p. We should think this on the basis of the role that believing for a reason plays from the subjects’ perspective, and in particular, the way in which it intellegises one’s belief. (shrink)

When involved in a disagreement, a common reaction is to tell oneself that, given that the information about one’s own epistemic standing is clearly superior in both amount and quality to the information about one’s opponent’s epistemic standing, one is justified in one’s confidence that one’s view is correct. In line with this natural reaction to disagreement, some contributors to the debate on its epistemic significance have claimed that one can stick to one’s guns by relying in part on information (...) about one’s first-order evidence and the functioning of one’s cognitive capacities. In this article, I argue that such a manoeuvre to settle controversies encounters the problem that both disputants can make use of it, the problem that one may be wrong about one’s current conscious experience, and the problem that it is a live possibility that many of one’s beliefs are the product of epistemically distorting factors. I also argue that, even if we grant that personal information is reliable, when it comes to real-life rather than idealized disagreements, the extent of the unpossessed information about one’s opponent’s epistemic standing provides a reason for doubting that personal information can function as a symmetry breaker. (shrink)

We seem to ascribe mental states and agency to groups. We say ‘Google knows such-and-such,’ or ‘Amazon intends to do such-and-such.’ This observation of ordinary parlance also found its way into philosophical accounts of social groups and collective intentionality. However, these discussions are usually quiet about how groups self-ascribe their own beliefs and intentions. Apple might explain to its shareholders that it intends to bring a new iPhone to the market next year. But how does Apple know what it intends? (...) How do groups get to know their own mental states? This is the question of collective self-knowledge. I argue that collective self-knowledge is a distinct phenomenon that deserves our attention. In particular I suggest: that we should be interested in collective self-knowledge, because our behaviour indicates that we already engage with collective self-knowledge in practice; that groups can collectively avow, which indicates that they have privileged and peculiar access to their own intentional states; and that collective self-knowledge is not reducible to intentional states of individuals and therefore is an independent explanandum. (shrink)

Through brain-inspired modeling studies, cognitive neurorobotics aims to resolve dynamics essential to different emer- gent phenomena at the level of embodied agency in an object environment shared with human beings. This article is a review of ongoing research focusing on model dynamics associated with human self-consciousness. It introduces the free energy principle and active inference in terms of Bayesian theory and predictive coding, and then discusses how directed inquiry employing analogous models may bring us closer to representing the sense of (...) self in cognitive neurorobots. The first section quickly locates cognitive neurorobotics in the broad field of computational cognitive modeling. The second section introduces principles according to which cognition may be formalized, and reviews cognitive neurorobotics experiments employing such formalizations. The third section interprets the results of these and other experiments in the context of different senses of self, both ‘‘minimal’’ and ‘‘narrative’’ self. The fourth section considers model validity and discusses what we may expect ongoing cognitive neurorobotics studies to contribute to scientific explanation of cognitive phenomena including the senses of minimal and narrative self. (shrink)

Many philosophers contend that we often possess “privileged” and “peculiar” self-knowledge of our mental states. Self-knowledge is privileged insofar as it is systematically more secure than the knowledge that others have of one’s mental states, and it is peculiar insofar as it is systematically obtained in a way that is only suited for delivering self-knowledge. Focusing on privileged and peculiar self-knowledge of propositional attitudes like beliefs, I offer an account of its instrumental value. On my account, privileged and peculiar self-knowledge (...) of one’s propositional attitudes enables one to be a more efficient and reliable interpersonal reasoner. (shrink)

传统内在基础主义于近年的知识论研究中有所复兴。该理论的核心论点之一，是人类具有确定无疑的认知辩护。富莫尔顿尤其尝试以亲历理论解释确定辩护。可惜，确定辩护会受到来自“梯度”现象的挑战。针对梯度挑战，富莫 尔顿曾先后提出“事实性”“典型案例”“语义模糊”三个应对策略。本文将分别考察这三个策略，并指明其不足。.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.