Nonviolence

A concise open-access textbook intended for an undergraduate audience, which brings together essential selections from Gandhi on nonviolence with supplementary materials, including: a preface; boxes providing examples, historical notes, extended explanations, and related philosophical work; overviews of post-Gandhian developments in nonviolence; diagrams, tables, and photos; discussion questions; reading and viewing suggestions; and a glossary.

Politically motivated damage to public property is often accused of “wasting taxpayers’ money.” Here, we scrutinise this complaint pertaining to the vandalism of morally problematic statues and monuments. We argue that spending public funds on establishing and maintaining public property must itself be justified. The justification must refer to worthy purposes fulfilled by public property. This justification we contend, will also explain the special moral status public property typically enjoys – a claim against private interference. When, however, certain pieces of (...) public property fail to serve worthy purposes, they can fall under a category we call worse-than-worthless things – expensive financial burdens that morally require removal or replacement. Morally problematic commemorations are often worse-than-worthless things. In such cases, activists who vandalise objectionable commemorations are not guilty of wasting public funds. Rather, the establishment, maintenance, and restoration of such artefacts are the offenders. We believe that our account of worse-than-worthless things yields further insights into a wide range of socio-political issues. (shrink)

Many have attempted to justify certain acts of disruptive climate activism by appealing to, at least in part, their effectiveness. Accordingly, they help raise awareness, assure others that many will participate in the collective action, pressure politicians, call for change in governmental policies, and/or directly frustrate environmentally damaging industries. But what if the climate disaster is inevitable? What if climate protests and resistance are futile? Should this be the case, we cannot appeal to the instrumental value realized to justify the (...) costs (or even harm) imposed by activists, as those would be gratuitous costs (or harm). Nevertheless, we believe that futile climate activism can be justified as fitting protest, that is, as a form of fitting expression against serious disregard for the lives of others. Violent climate resistance can satisfy the conditions of correct directedness, type appropriateness, proportionality, and adequacy, and is thus called for in situations of futility. The conditions of fitting protest may have further implications for protests that aim to bring about political or social change. (shrink)

Erica Chenoweth & Maria J. Stephan’s data in Why Civil Resistance Works suggest that nonviolent resistance is much more effective than violent resistance. In that same data, however, they show that campaigns of violent resistance have been much more common than those of nonviolent resistance — and while nonviolent resistance has recently overtaken violent resistance, this has been alongside greater toleration of violence within nonviolent campaigns (which Chenoweth and Stephan argue should make those campaigns less effective.) This gives us a (...) puzzle of apparently senseless violence, which may lead some to infer on rational choice grounds that Chenoweth and Stephan’s case is not as strong as it appears, and that this violence is not actually senseless. -/- I offer a different rational choice explanation for this finding, which is compatible with Chenoweth and Stephan’s broader analysis. As they argue, the fact that it is much easier to participate in nonviolent resistance makes such campaigns more effective. Yet this advantage for nonviolent campaigns over violent campaigns reverses when we consider the positions of potential violent campaigns and potential nonviolent campaigns that have not yet gotten off the ground. In that strategic position, the costliness of participation in violence makes its preparation a costly signal for a movement’s seriousness. This makes it easier for such campaigns to get off the ground by helping them secure their most committed potential recruits. After outlining this explanation, I offer some practical ways that potential nonviolent resistance campaigns can make participation costlier in their early stages so that they can more easily signal seriousness and reach the level of a full-scale campaign. (shrink)

Butler’s concept of nonviolence aims at questioning narratives that validate violence. In this paper, I evaluate the efficacy of her analysis by examining the most cogent instance of violence justification, i. e., the institution of self-defense. I show that her argumentation largely concerns the abusive invocation of self-defense rather than its legitimatory kernel. However, Butler offers two novel arguments that hold promise for challenging the justification of violence via the idea of self-defense.

In parts one and two of this three-part series, I developed a framework for ahimsic (nonviolent) communication (AC) as an alternative to the standard communicative norm of civility. The framework presented for AC offers various categories of resistance to violence, including nonviolent forms of negotiation, compromise, protest, verbal force, verbal distraction, argumentation, and communicative satyagraha (Gandhian nonviolence applied to communication). I also provided a range of real-life examples of successful AC resistance, including the stories of Derek Black, Daryl Davis, James (...) Lawson, and Antoinette Tuff. These examples demonstrate that AC “works” even against neo-Nazis, KKK grand wizards, angry punch-throwing bikers, and active school shooters. In this third and final installment, I will explain why AC works—better than any form of violent communication (VC). My main claim is that AC derives strategic power from its moral power. As various components of my argument are drawn from the nonviolence tradition more generally, what follows will double as a primer on the morality of nonviolence. However, we will also see significant differences in how we must adapt nonviolent strategy and morality to the case of communication. (shrink)

When it comes to contentious conversations, the call for civility is commonplace. Rarely do we hear a call for nonviolence in communication. This is unfortunate, since nonviolence is a better standard than civility (a standard I critiqued in part one of this three-part series). Part of the problem is that a framework for communicative nonviolence has not (to my knowledge) been fully developed. Mohandas (“Mahatma”) Gandhi, the “father of nonviolence,” is widely known for nonviolence, but primarily in the realm of (...) noncommunicative action. However, there is a natural line of development in that direction from elements in his thought: Gandhi derives his commitment to nonviolence ("ahimsa" in Sanskrit) from his "law of Truth," which directs us to follow “Truth in thought, Truth in speech, and Truth in action." Inspired by Gandhi among others, Marshall B. Rosenberg developed what he termed "Nonviolent Communication" (NVC). Valuable though NVC is, it is most applicable to particular conversational contexts. It is but one part of a broader nonviolent framework, which I’ll call "ahimsic communication" (AC) to distinguish it from NVC. In this second installment of the series, I develop a framework for AC. (shrink)

How should we talk to children about war? The basic story we tell them is that the world is split into good guys and bad guys, and that sometimes we have to kill the bad guys for the sake of justice. These stories of heroic killing teach children to train their attention on violence, and to interpret that violence as just or good. I show how this basic story – which also motivates much of our philosophical thinking about the morality (...) of war and killing, mostly notably just war theory – makes it difficult for us to consider and evaluate pacific alternatives. If we are to give children the space to develop their imagination, so that they can more genuinely engage with the possibilities of nonviolence and peace, then we must learn to tell a different story. (shrink)

Similar to all relationships, power is a dominating factor for inflicting, but also preventing, violence and harm in the family unit. Domestic violence in particular is infused with strong power dynamics that cannot simply be eradicated through the law or formal structures of justice and therapy. This chapter examines the role of restorative justice in rebalancing power among family members experiencing domestic abuse putting an emphasis on gender-based violence. Through original research and normative analysis, this chapter argues for a consensual (...) model of restorative justice, which provides complementary avenues for social justice. Restorative justice is not in opposition to the criminal and civil justice systems, but an alternative route based on the values of power sharing, dignity, equality and respect. When applied according to these principles and in conjunction with the law, the vicious circle of power, harm and abuse within the family can be addressed. (shrink)

This book examines the nature, prevention, and treatment of violence within families. It reviews the definition of contemporary families, emphasizing various structures, including nuclear families, reconstituted families, gay and lesbian families, and recent immigrant families. In addition, the volume describes the nature of and risk factors for family violence from the perspectives of both victims (e.g., infants, children, seniors) and perpetrators (e.g., adolescent family members, women). It identifies the implications and explores strategies for prevention, treatment, and services. In addition, the (...) volume directly addresses practice and evidence-based interventions for individual perpetrators, family interventions, interventions for victims and systemwide interventions (e.g., those involving the courts, police, and national policy). Chapters review the best available quality evidence from randomized controlled trials, systematic reviews, meta-analyses, research syntheses, and evidence-based recommendations from expert panels and government agencies. Case studies illustrate the application of evidence-based practice to violence within the family to demonstrate the effectiveness of the intervention. (shrink)

“Violence” and “nonviolence” are, increasingly, misleading translations for the Sanskrit words hiṃsā and ahiṃsā—used by Gandhi as the basis for his philosophy of satyāgraha. I argue for rereading hiṃsā as “maleficence” and ahiṃsā as “beneficence.” These two more mind-referring English words capture the primacy of intention implied by Gandhi’s core principles. Reflecting a political turn in moral accountability detectable through linguistic data, both the scope and the usage of the word “violence” have expanded dramatically, making it harder to convincingly characterize (...) people and actions as “nonviolent.” New terminology could clarify the distinction between hiṃsā and ahiṃsā, and, thereby, prevent misunderstandings of Gandhi. Training in beneficence would reflect Gandhi’s psychological path to reducing avoidable harm: ego-detachment, universal love, and seeking truth by experiment. NOTE: An extended, unpublished version, with additional arguments and evidence, is also available on PhilPapers as "The Primacy of Intention and the Duty to Truth: A Gandhi-Inspired Argument for Retranslating Hiṃsā and Ahiṃsā, with Connections to History, Ethics, and Civil Resistance". (shrink)

The book forms part of the Peace Psychology Book Series by Spring, Series Ed.: Christie, Daniel J. ISSN: 2197-5779. ​ Despite the clear connections between psychology, restorative justice, and peace across national and institutional contexts, there has been little direct engagement between the field of peace psychology and the growing theory, implementation, and research of restorative justice. ​ This timely collection of chapters written by international experts bridges the gap between peace psychology and restorative justice. The Editors combined their respective (...) fields of expertise to start a much-needed debate on the potential but also risks that are associated when implementing restorative justice in the peace psychology field. The volume highlights how psychological theory and research can inform and evaluate the potential of restorative practices in formal and informal educational settings as well as the criminal justice space. The chapters cover both negative and positive peace across levels while introducing the reader to various case studies from across the world. All in all, the book explores how restorative justice can promote positive peace through its connection fostering dialogue, empathy, forgiveness, and other key psychological elements of peace. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the ethics of nonviolent protest when a violent response is either foreseen or intended. One central concern is whether protesters, who foresee a violent response but persist, are provoking the violence and whether they are culpable for any eventual harms. A second concern is whether it is permissible to publicize the violent response for political advantage. I begin by distinguishing between two senses of the term provoke: a normative sense where a provocateur knowingly imposes an (...) unjustified risk of a violent response, and a descriptive sense where the respondent feels provoked. I argue that, when the risk of a violent response is justified, the protesters are not provocateurs but akin to nonculpable, entrapping agents who create an opportunity for the regime to respond with disproportionate violence. The regime’s response can disclose its brutality or criminality and this can be fairly publicized for political advantage. When nonviolent protesters create an unjustified risk of violence either because the injustice they oppose is insufficient to justify the risk of a violent response or because the risked harms are disproportionate with the likely political advantages derived from the protest, they are partially culpable provocateurs. However, I argue these partially culpable provocateurs can still permissibly publicize the disproportionate violence of the regime so as to shape public opinion. (shrink)

This chapter interrogates the intersections between wealth, violence, and justice by considering two very different cases: refugees who have had their wealth taken from them, and political activists who are considering using Robin-Hood-style tactics to protest economic injustice. Ordinarily, the involuntary loss of wealth that refugees suffer, while it is viewed as an injustice, is not considered a violent injustice. However, when the involuntary redistribution of wealth is brought up in the context of resolving long-standing economic injustices, opponents cry out (...) that such redistribution would be, not only unjust, but an act of violence. This raises an interesting question: how should we view the involuntary loss, or redistribution, of wealth? Disregarding for the moment whether such involuntary losses of wealth are justified or unjustified—which might well depend on the circumstances and context—it is worth considering whether they are instances of violence. If they are, then refugees have suffered more violence than we normally recognize. If they are not, then Robin-Hood-style tactics (absent the bows and arrows) may be allowed for those who wish to engage in non-violent resistance against economic injustice in all its forms. (shrink)

Most accounts of the influences on Gandhi's philosophy and tactics of nonviolent action do not give enough credit to the role that women in the British suffrage movement played in inspiring and guiding him. The article explains how, despite his specifically mentioning on occasion that he is NOT copying their tactics, he actually does repeat many of them in his 1913 satyagraha campaign in South Africa. And on many occasions he does credit them with inspiring him and his movement. In (...) the early years (1906-1912) Gandhi repeatedly suggested to men in his movement that they copy the brave determination of the British suffragettes, but he did not counsel Indian women to follow their example. Women in his own movement longed to court arrest since 1908, but were only allowed by Gandhi to participate in 1913. It's important to recognize the many ways in which women's leadership were crucial to the success of campaigns that Gandhi is given credit for, including the women's speech making, raising funds, suggesting tactics, as well as their bravery and willingness to endure suffering and even death in prison. (shrink)

The words "violence" and "nonviolence" are increasingly misleading translations for the Sanskrit words hiṃsā and ahiṃsā -- which were used by Gandhi as the basis for his philosophy of satyāgraha. I argue for re-reading hiṃsā as “maleficence” and ahiṃsā as “beneficence.” These two more mind-referring English words – associated with religiously contextualized discourse of the past -- capture the primacy of intention implied by Gandhi’s core principles, better than “violence” and “nonviolence” do. Reflecting a political turn in moral accountability detectable (...) through linguistic data, both the scope and the usage of the word “violence” have expanded dramatically. The expanded scope of “violence” reflects greater consciousness of the various forms that serious harm can take, but also makes it harder to convincingly characterize people and actions as “nonviolent.” New translations could clarify the distinction between hiṃsā and ahiṃsā, and thereby prevent some misunderstandings of Gandhi. Training in beneficence would reflect Gandhi’s psychological path to reducing avoidable harm: detachment from the ego, learning to love universally, and seeking truth by experiment. (shrink)

The introduction aims to provide the context for the book’s topic of comparative restorative justice by meeting three objectives. First, it puts three common denominators between comparative criminal and restorative justice in a historical continuum. Without understanding the journey that has led us talking about comparative restorative justice today, we run the risk of seeing its emerging study only partially. Second, the chapter attempts to define comparative restorative justice using a consensual conceptual model. Subsequently, it presents six comparators within restorative (...) justice. The chapter argues that they have been presented in the extant literature in the form of faultlines, when, in reality, they are merely comparative expressions of the diverse restorative justice norm and practice. These comparative axes have been missed in research and policy analysis. This misdirection can only be addressed and our understanding and implementation of restorative justice can only be improved, if the study of comparative restorative justice is further developed. The chapter claims that this volume takes the first collective step towards this direction, as its various contributions provide context for these comparative axes within the restorative justice field and study. (shrink)

Review of Laura J. Shepherd's anthology, Building Peace: Feminist Perspectives.

A religion with Buddhism's particular moral philosophies of non-violence and asceticism and with its *functional* polytheism in practice should not generate genocidal nationalist violence. Yet, there are resources within the Buddhist canon that people can draw from to justify violence in defense of the religion and of a Buddhist-based polity. When those resources are exploited, for example in the context of particular Theravāda Buddhist practices and the history of Buddhism and Buddhist identity in Burma from ancient times through its colonial (...) and contemporary periods, it perpetuates an ongoing tragedy that is less about religion than about ethno-nationalism. (shrink)

Compelling voices charge that the theological notion of “sacrifice” valorizes suffering and fosters a culture of violence by the claim that Christ’s death on the Cross paid for human sins. Beneath the ‘sacred’ violence of sacrifice, René Girard discerns a concealed scapegoat-murder driven by a distortion of human desire that itself must lead to human self-annihilation. I here ask: can one speak safely of sacrifice; and can human beings somehow cease to practice the sacrifice that must otherwise destroy them? Drawing (...) on Gregory the Great (ca. 540–604), I propose an understanding of sacrifice that both distinguishes Christian sacrifice from sacred violence and accounts for how to overcome the roots of the sacred violence identified by Girard. I make four claims: First, Girard recognizes two kinds of sacrifice—one, the scapegoat murder, overcomes community rivalries by unanimous imitation of an accuser, shifting blame onto a third party who is collectively murdered; the other sort of sacrifice practices renunciation and forgiveness in imitation of God. These I respectively designate the “Satanic” (Girard’s term) and the “theomimetic” (mine). Second, I analyze the intrinsic instability that keeps the Satanic from sustaining the societal order and unity that it promises. Third, by a constructive reading of Gregory the Great, I posit that satanic sacrifice overlooks and indeed exacerbates the root of human covetousness—a failure to love. Fourth, Gregory’s teaching on the imitation of Christ enables us to expand on Girard’s account of the theo¬mimetic sacrifice of renunciation, to clarify how this latter might not only oppose but also systematically subvert the Satanic by healing the disorder out of which mimetic rivalry and scapegoating first take their rise. (shrink)

Reinhold Niebuhr crafted a compelling theologically based theory of political realism, which became the basis for a withering critique of pacifism. Martin Luther King, Jr was influenced by Niebuhr’s Augustinian realism in his own political theology and practice. However, King lived and thought from a different perspective, had more apocalyptic expectations of divine intervention in history, and embraced pacifism. I argue that Niebuhr fell short of his own realist vision through his idealistic faith in US democracy, and that King’s political (...) theology better enacts Niebuhrian realism. I suggest King achieves this largely because his theology is a liberation theology grounded in pacifist praxis in solidarity with the oppressed. By rejecting Niebuhr’s acceptance of American violence and basing his theology on lived confrontation with American violence, King makes Niebuhr’s political realism possible. This reading of King and Niebuhr illustrates the value of pacifism and theology for political theory and practice. (shrink)

Although Indic perspectives toward nature are now well documented, climate engineering discussions seem to still lack the views from Indic or other non‐Western sources. In this article, I will apply some of the Hindu and Jain concepts such as karma, nonviolence (Ahiṃsā ), humility (Vinaya ), and renunciation (Saṃnyāsa ) to analyze the two primary climate geoengineering strategies of solar radiation management (SRM) and carbon dioxide removal (CDR). I suggest that Indic philosophical and religious traditions such as Hinduism, Buddhism, and (...) Jainism offer ethical concepts to call for humility in all acts of climate engineering leading to a favoring of CDR over SRM and a favoring of lifestyle changes (particularly vegetarianism) over both. I demonstrate these concepts by introducing the five great elements from the Hindu philosophy, two Hindu legends from Hindu mythology, the Indic ethical ideas of karma, renunciation, and humility, and the moral authority of Gandhi. (shrink)

It is widely believed that some wars are just, and that the paradigm case of a just war is a defensive war. A familiar strategy used to justify defensive war is to infer its permissibility from the case of self-defensive killing. I show, however, that the permission to defend oneself does not justify killing, but instead calls for nonviolent resistance. I conclude that on the account of self-defense I develop, the appropriate way to respond to a war of aggression is (...) not by prosecuting a defensive war, but by engaging in a form of nonviolence I call pacific resistance. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss virtue ethics in relation to the rejection of the use of lethal violence. I argue that, given how I apply virtue ethics, a person of good character will have a very strong intrinsic desire to avoid the killing of another human being, so that only in rare circumstances where the alternative to violence is immensely evil would the use of violence to prevent the evil be the morally appropriate choice for the person to make. I (...) first give a brief summary of a neo-Aristotelian version of virtue ethics. Then I explain why I think that a virtuous agent would be strongly averse to killing human beings. I go on to show that this does not mean that such an agent would never use violence on others, only that she would be very reluctant to do so. The circumstances in which she would do so are rare, but cannot be ruled out. For instance, virtuous agents may in very limited cases kill in self-defense despite a strong aversion to killing. The circumstances in which killings take place are found most of all in war, so I close by discussing where the virtue ethics approach to war is positioned in relation to just war theory and pacifism. (shrink)

Interest in pacifism—an idea with a long history in philosophical thought and in several religious traditions—is growing. The Routledge Handbook of Pacifism and Nonviolence is the first comprehensive reference designed to introduce newcomers and researchers to the many varieties of pacifism and nonviolence, to their history and philosophy, and to pacifism’s most serious critiques. The volume offers 32 brand new chapters from the world’s leading experts across a diverse range of fields, who together provide a broad discussion of pacifism and (...) nonviolence in connection with virtue ethics, capital punishment, animal ethics, ecology, queer theory, and feminism, among other areas. This Handbook is divided into four sections: (1) Historical and Tradition-Specific Considerations, (2) Conceptual and Moral Considerations, (3) Social and Political Considerations, and (4) Applications. It concludes with an Afterword by James Lawson, one of the icons of the nonviolent American Civil Rights movement. The text will be invaluable to scholars and students, as well as to activists and general readers interested in peace, nonviolence, and critical perspectives on war and violence. (shrink)

Pacifism is often painted into a corner as an absolute rejection of all violence and war. Such a dogmatic and negative formulation of pacifism does leave us with pacifism as a morally problematic position. But pacifism is not best understood as a negative claim. Nor is pacifism best understood as a singular or monistic concept. Rather, there is a “pacifist tradition” that is grounded in an affirmative claim about the importance of nonviolence, love, community building, and peaceful conflict resolution. This (...) more positive conception of pacifism aims to transform social and political life. When understood in this way, pacifism is a robust and useful critical social theory. This paper explores the philosophy of pacifism in an attempt to reconceptualize pacifism as a tradition of normative critical theory. The paper argues that pacifism ought to be understood on analogy with other critical theories—such as feminism; that pacifism should be understood in terms of the “pacifist tradition”—along lines familiar from interpretations of the “just war tradition”; and that pacifism should be seen as offering interesting themes and ideas that are worthy of philosophical attention. (shrink)

Peace, Culture, and Violence examines deeper sources of violence by providing a critical reflection on the forms of violence that permeate everyday life and our inability to recognize these forms of violence. Exploring the elements of culture that legitimize and normalize violence, the essays collected in this volume invite us to recognize and critically approach the violent aspects of reality we live in and encourage us to envision peaceful alternatives. Including chapters written by important scholars in the fields of Peace (...) Studies and Social and Political Philosophy, the volume represents an endeavour to seek peace in a world deeply marred by violence. Topics include: thug culture, language, hegemony, police violence, war on drugs, war, terrorism, gender, anti-Semitism, and other topics.. (shrink)

Three Quaker elders, all scholar activists, have just published two important works for anyone studying nonviolence, works that are framed very differently but which complement each other well. One is a new work by the estimable George Lakey, who has trained nonviolent resisters around the world in many countries for decades, and whose thinking has always been structural, strategic, and careful. The other work is by Alice and Staughton Lynd, two historians whose activism education stretches far back to teaching in (...) the Freedom Summer schools of Mississippi in 1964 and even earlier. The Lynds have just published the third edition of their Nonviolence in America: A Documentary History. (shrink)

We tend to think that mass atrocities and attempted genocides call for humanitarian intervention by other states. (Nonviolent intervention if possible, military intervention if need be.) In this chapter, I discuss these two related claims in turn. What, if anything, justifies humanitarian intervention in certain states by other states? Ought such interventions, if justified, be pacifist in nature, or is it legitimate in some cases to intervene violently? To discuss these questions, I draw primarily on principles and arguments found in (...) just war theory, pacifism, international relations, and analytic political philosophy more generally. (shrink)

Focusing on what he considers “one of the most important and enduring expressions of twentieth-century political imagination and action and one ever more important in the struggles of the present century,” Howard Caygill’s On Resistance: A Philosophy of Defiance provides a thorough and challenging look into the concept of resistance. Recognizing that ‘resistance’ itself resists conceptualization, Caygill develops a clear means to understanding its nature, its usage in a variety of writings and situations over the past century and a half, (...) and a logic for how to sustain proactive resistance in the face of total domination or contemporary technologies. (shrink)

Long about 2014 or 2015 Andrew Fiala was negotiating the title of a handbook project. Meanwhile, in March of 2016, editors of The Acorn were deliberating a revised subtitle for the journal. Both projects landed on the same key terms: pacifism and nonviolence. A zeitgeist was afoot. In this volume, we present Fiala’s framing of philosophical pacifism. Exemplary virtues still by and large belong to the warrior (nor are we here to dismiss the warrior’s honor as such.) Yet, as Steven (...) Steyl reports, the mid-20th Century revival of virtue ethics was accompanied by overt hostility to pacifism. If we are to take a courageous turn towards pacifism, we must learn to see how the history of nonviolence asserts compelling examples of virtue that deserve deep philosophical engagement on their own terms. On the surface, Tommy Curry’s American Book Award winning The Man-Not may appear to lie far afield from philosophical studies in pacifism and nonviolence. But closer engagement with the work teaches us things we did not know about the virtue of compassion. In Curry’s work we learn what it means to care deeply and unapologetically for the persons and livelihoods of Black men in America. (shrink)

In Strangers in Our Midst, David Miller develops a philosophical position that is intended to guide the complex decisions that liberal democratic states face regarding immigration policy. While it is not likely that Miller’s arguments will convince anyone who is principally committed to the kind of open borders that truly enable the free movement of people across them, Miller has much to offer to those who are either (a) trying to make sense of the position of people who object to (...) unrestricted migration or (b) are searching for a principled yet more restrictive position that to the extent possible does justice to as many of the people who have stakes in immigration policy, including not only potential immigrants, refugees, as well as economic migrants, but also the people who already live in and are attached to their nations and states. Miller also attempts to do justice to states in their relations with each other. (shrink)

Although Gene Sharp was a pacifist, he was also, in the last few decades of the 20th century, the initial framer of a new methodology of political and social struggle, which is now often referred to as civil resistance. Organizers of successful people’s movements in Poland, Czechoslovakia, South Africa, Mali, Ukraine, Tunisia and a score of other countries in the last thirty years pushed out rights-violating rulers and did so without resort to violence.

Gene Sharp passed away on January 28, 2018, two days before the anniversary of the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi. His influence in the field of nonviolence has been immense, and much of the work in nonviolence that has been done in the last forty years has had to address Sharp’s work. The direction in which Sharp took the field of nonviolence differed from that of Gandhi. Gandhi based his life around a metaphysics and an ethic that, for him, dictated his (...) nonviolent practices. Sharp preferred to emphasize the practical benefits of nonviolent practices in the field of politics, and he believed that tying nonviolent political action to a metaphysical, religious, or ethical view would reduce the numbers of people likely to adopt such methods. (shrink)

Todd May seeks to provide a philosophical introduction to nonviolence, particularly to campaigns of nonviolent resistance. He claims his book is the first with such a focus. Regardless, if one looks beyond the mainstream literature, a lot of work, including on this topic, has been done over the last several decades by philosophers who are seeking to advance nonviolence and social justice. Nevertheless, as a contribution to more traditional philosophical discussions, May’s book is noteworthy in its themes and arguments. This (...) book could work well in a class on nonviolence or social justice. The text is accessible, is well reasoned logically, and is informed both historically and philosophically. (shrink)

The often heard (and justified) lament that academics do not adequately communicate their ideas to the broader general public has been particularly applicable to those theorists, like scholars of nonviolence, who work on the pressing moral issues facing our world. This work, ultimately the result of co-editor Predgrag Cicovacki’s deep and abiding interest in Jainism, does much to counter such impressions. Comprised of two volumes and forty-six chapters, Nonviolence as A Way of Life brings together insights from a notable international (...) array of fifty-four writers on peace and nonviolence. These writers, who represent 12 countries and 5 continents, have their contributions formally segmented into three parts—history, theory, and practice--even though considerable overlap on these matters is understandably present. The various commentaries are ultimately (albeit loosely) tied together by their discussing issues of nonviolence explicitly under the rubric of the ancient Jain notion of ahimsa. (shrink)

Islam has come to be associated with hatred and terrorism, which has resulted in many thinking that Islam (and all Muslims) are fundamentally violent. Chaiwat Satha-Anand’s collection of revised essays featured in Nonviolence and Islamic Imperatives attempts to undermine such a narrative and reframe Islam in terms of peace and nonviolence. To achieve this goal, Satha-Anand argues that Islam’s core values require nonviolence and supports his argument by providing examples from the Prophet Muhammad and contemporary Muslims.

Epicurus, Marcus Aurelius, Mahatma Gandhi, Alain Locke, Howard Thurman, and Dr. Huey Newton comprise central figures of concern in three feature articles of this issue. The fourth feature takes us on a climate march through Washington, D.C. where the central figure of concern is a broken global relationship. In addition, we offer book reviews that take up applications of nonviolence to counter-terrorism, of ethics to immigration, of pacifism to war, and cosmopolitanism to peacebuilding.

In Common Ground, Anthony Neal examines the role that the ideas of consciousness and consciousness-raising play in the writings of Howard Thurman and Huey Newton. He examines these ideas from a broadly Afrocentric framework in which the concerns, interests, and perspectives of Africans--whether they reside on the continent or live in the African diaspora--are the legitimate and central subjects of scholarly study. This approach warrants Neal’s interpretation of Thurman’s and Newton’s writings as fitting within the “African Freedom Aesthetic,” in which (...) the aesthetic expressions of transcendence, transformation, human consciousness, and collective will have become the means by which Africans living under oppressive conditions during the modern period could work to liberate themselves from those conditions. (shrink)

In the final years of legal apartheid, the small community of Quakers in Cape Town, South Africa sought to apply their tradition of political and theological nonviolence to the systematic injustice...

The duties that Gandhi believed we should follow came chiefly from the Jain religion, whose main precept is ahimsa—perhaps the only word I understood in the second musical piece performed for us earlier by Sudha Ragunathan. Ahimsa means non-harm or nonviolence, for which we gather here today. Another important precept for Gandhi and the Jains is Truth. But it is important to understand why Gandhi himself attached so much importance to these precepts of nonviolence and Truth. Gandhi said, "God is (...) Truth, Truth is God." And he meant that quite literally. He believed that God comprised all of reality, that reality comprised Truth, and that to understand all of reality was to realize God. He believed that we should pursue God, pursue Truth. (shrink)

In a world riven with conflict, violence and war, this book proposes a philosophical defense of pacifism. It argues that there is a moral presumption against war and unless that presumption is defeated, war is unjustified. Leading philosopher of non-violence Robert Holmes contends that neither just war theory nor the rationales for recent wars defeat that presumption, hence that war in the modern world is morally unjustified. A detailed, comprehensive and elegantly argued text which guides both students and scholars through (...) the main debates clearly but without oversimplifying the complexities of the issues or historical examples. (shrink)

Alongside Bindhu Puri’s The Tagore-Gandhi Debate on Matters of Truth and Untruth and Predrag Cicovacki’s Gandhi’s Footprints (see further discussion in this issue) can be placed Anuradha Veeravalli’s Gandhi in Political Theory: Truth, Law, and Experiment as a significant contribution to the aim of showing the academic bona fides of Gandhian philosophy. Though technically, Veeravalli’s explicit emphasis is on understanding Gandhi as a political theorist and not as a philosopher per se, the philosophical import of her attempts to explicate the (...) profound theoretical and experimental underpinnings of Gandhi’s work is undeniable. (shrink)

Sara Trovato’s Mainstreaming Pacifism: Conflict, Success, and Ethics provides a thorough and engaging argument for why pacifism is an effectual means for creating social-political justice and peace. Standing up to claims that pacifists are politically passive and accepting of injustice, Trovato shows that the peace of pacifism is compatible with the fight for justice. By showing that pacifists can consistently retain their ideals while fighting for justice, Trovato offers an alternative to effective means of violence. In her words, “violence can (...) effectively be replaced with other effectual forms, or combinations of effectual forms.”. (shrink)