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Autocrats in crisis mode: Strategic favoritism during economic shocks

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  • Jose Morales-Arilla

    (School of Government and Public Transformation, Tecnológico de Monterrey)

Abstract

This paper introduces a theory of autocratic redistribution and repression during economic downturns. It predicts that negative shocks induce autocrats to favor supporters in order to limit the scope of protests to opposition groups. I provide evidence on economic outcomes and policy responses to shocks from three different settings. Firstly, I focus on the Venezuelan blackouts of 2019. Nicolás Maduro’s autocratic regime protected supporter regions affected by power losses through selective rationing, containing economic consequences, protests and repression to affected opposition areas. In contrast, Hugo Chávez’s still democratic government responded to the 1999 Vargas floods with reconstruction efforts that did not engage in political discrimination, leading to balanced economic consequences across the state. Finally, I show that national droughts in Sub-Saharan Africa magnify eco-nomic differences favoring leaders’ home regions, but only under autocracies rule. These findings show how regime type can shapen the response to economic shocks.

Suggested Citation

  • Jose Morales-Arilla, 2025. "Autocrats in crisis mode: Strategic favoritism during economic shocks," Working Paper Series of the School of Government and Public Transformation 15, School of Government and Public Transformation, Tecnológico de Monterrey.
    • Handle: RePEc:gnt:wpaper:15
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development

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