Abstract

This paper proposes a hypothetical constitutional model for the Philippines that would abolish the existing bicameral Congress and replace the Senate and House of Representatives with a single National Parliament. The proposed system would combine unicameral legislative government with a parliamentary executive, proportional representation, strengthened judicial review, independent constitutional commissions, comprehensive campaign-finance regulation, political-dynasty restrictions, transparent public procurement, beneficial-ownership disclosure, whistleblower protection, citizen recall, and stronger anti-corruption institutions. The proposal rests on the premise that eliminating one legislative chamber does not, by itself, eliminate corruption. Concentrating legislative power in a unicameral Parliament could create new risks if adequate checks and balances were not established. The central objective is therefore not institutional simplification for its own sake, but the creation of a system in which political power is distributed, government transactions are transparent, corruption is independently investigated, and citizens retain meaningful mechanisms of accountability. Empirical research on Philippine public procurement finds a statistically significant association between political-clan concentration and corruption risk (Davis, Mendoza & Yap, 2024), which motivates this paper's emphasis on distributing power rather than merely restructuring it. This revision additionally reframes the proposal's institutional architecture using the author's Universal Balance–Feedback Framework (UBFF), treats the anti-dynasty provision as an enforceable, index-based rule rather than an aspirational statement, and adds falsifiable evaluation criteria and a discussion of the political economy of charter change.