Intrigues for Power:The Tokugawa Shogunate, the Japanese Court, and the Korean Embassy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries
This article discusses the perspectives of three parties: the Korean embassy officials dispatched from the Chosŏn court (1392–1910), the Tokugawa shogunate (1603–1868), and the imperial court in Kyoto. Immediately after establishing the military government in 1603, the Tokugawa shogunate attempted to consolidate its own military foundation and complete the unification of the country. During this process, inviting the Korean embassy to the Tokugawa shogunate was one of the most important events undertaken by the shogunate, demonstrating to other samurai families that the Tokugawa house was the strongest political authority in the country. Under the Tokugawa regime, the imperial court played a nominal role without political influence. Nonetheless, the shogunate may have considered the imperial court as a latent threat. The members of the imperial family were willing to engage with the Korean embassy for further cultural exchange. In the travelogues to Japan, the officials of the Korean embassy recorded their concerns on the relationship between the imperial court and the shogunate. Their analysis of the matter mentioned the ambiguity of the neighborly relations in the future if the emperor were to recapture political power and thus alarmed whether the new ruler would have maintained amicable relations with Chosŏn. This research focuses on how Korean embassy officials viewed the imperial court, and also the shogunate's reaction to communication between the embassy officials and members of the imperial family who were interested in both the embassy officials and Korean culture.
Tokugawa shogunate, Korean embassy, Chosŏn court, Japanese imperial court
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Introduction
The Korean embassies dispatched by the King of Chosŏn between 1609 and 1811 to the Tokugawa shogunate (1603–1868) were regarded as symbols of neighborly relations between the Chosŏn government (1392–1911) and the shogunate. En route to Edo to meet the Tokugawa shogun, the Korean delegates entered the country from northern Kyūshū via Tsushima Island and stayed in Kyoto for several days, where the emperor, members of the imperial family, and court nobles resided. In this paper, I argue three perspectives for the Korean embassy officials, the officials of the Tokugawa shogunate, the members of the imperial court, and the court nobles in Kyoto. Given its unyielding dominance of the military government, the Tokugawa shogunate seemed not to have regarded the Kyoto court as an apparent political opponent under its regime, but may have viewed it as a potential competitor. As such, the shogunate also wanted to emphasize its role as the sole political authority in managing Korean issues. The Chosŏn court did not regard Tokugawa Japan as a hostile country as long as neighborly relations were maintained.
However, the Korean embassy officials had concerns regarding the imperial court, which could potentially recapture political influence over the Tokugawa shogunate. If that were to happen, they wondered if the neighborly relations between the two states would become uncertain in the future. The imperial court saw their interactions with the Korean embassy officials as significant and appeared to seek cultural exchange with the Koreans through the limited opportunities available while they were in Kyoto.
During the Korean embassy officials' short stay in Kyoto, they could not directly meet and communicate with the emperor, but were allowed to meet with members of the imperial family and court nobles. Due to their limited exchanges, only a few written and pictorial records are extant today. Thus, there are few studies on the interaction between the Korean [End Page 352] embassies and the imperial court available in Japanese or in Korean.1 As the primary source, I mainly refer to the diaries of the members of the Korean embassy to Japan, entitled "Haehaeng ch'ongjae," or Records of Sea Travels. Along with this historical source in Chosŏn, I also look at the Chosŏn wangjo sillok, or the Annals of the Chosŏn Dynasty, and the Sungjŏngwŏn ilgi, or the Daily Records of the Royal Secretariat of the Chosŏn Dynasty. Japanese sources are also important documents for exploring the diaries of the court nobles in Kyoto, such as Tokio kyōki, or Diary of Lord Tokio, and Tokitsune kyōki, or Diary of Lord Tokitsune. Also, records on the Korean embassy compiled by Tsushima domain, which was in charge of practical matters in Korean issues in lieu of the Tokugawa shogunate. This rare document entitled "Kan'ei Heishi shinshi kiroku (1636)," or the Record of the Korean Embassy in the Kan'ei Heishi Era, was written regarding the Korean embassy and the imperial court.
This research also closely examines the secondary sources in Japanese and Korean languages. Although little research exists on the Tokugawa, Chosŏn, and the imperial court in Kyoto, some scholars have written on the imperial court and the Korean embassy. Miyake Hidetoshi introduces a view towards the emperor seen from the Korean embassy officials. In this article, the Korean officials noted that the shogunal title was bestowed by the emperor, thus the shogun was merely a vassal of the emperor.2 Ikeuchi Satoshi also provides a detailed description of the Tokugawa shogunate's position regarding the imperial court in Kyoto. The shogun was placed as the political leader in the country, and the interaction between the Korean embassy officials owed firm leadership. Ha Woo-bong's book reveals how the Chosŏn intellectuals thought about the Japanese imperial court in its relations with the Tokugawa shogunate.3
In both domestic and international arenas, the Tokugawa shogunate displayed its military credentials which had eventually brought about the unification of Japan after the long-term turmoil and warfare lasting from the end of the fifteenth century through to the sixteenth century. In the domestic sphere, the dominance of the Tokugawa house guaranteed political stability without further disorder or interruption of its control over all of the samurai houses, including powerful daimyos (有力大名). In the international sphere, diplomatic relations with Chosŏn meant accentuating its significance such that the Tokugawa house was the only authority enabled to invite a foreign delegation. By so doing, the Tokugawa regime would also be able to consolidate military unification and to differentiate the Tokugawa house from other daimyo families. This diplomatic exercise also represented one of the most important [End Page 353] demonstrations of political legitimacy in the Tokugawa realm. Through the visits of the Korean embassies to Japan, the Tokugawa shogunate was able to show the embassy officials, and thus the Chosŏn government, that the military was the sole source of power to govern the state.
The members of the imperial family and the court nobles found the embassy officials and the Korean culture congenial.4 To some extent, the imperial family may have found some similarities with the munban (文 班) officials, or the civil officers, within the Chosŏn government who were of the ruling class and were high-ranking officials in the embassy. Correspondingly, the munban emphasized the importance of culture and literature5 and members of the imperial family may also have felt an affinity with this aspect of the embassy officials' culture, and were eager for further interactions based on their shared values.
The Korean embassy officials and Chosŏn intellectuals shared the same apprehension. In the case that the emperor ever became the ruler of the government, their concern was whether the new leader would follow the same diplomatic policy as the successive Tokugawa shoguns. These shoguns advocated neighborly relations with Chosŏn, though they gave more weight to the military for the foundation of the shogunate than literature and civilized culture.6 If he followed a different diplomatic path, the emperor could enhance the threat to the territorial security of Chosŏn in the future. Their worry came from a reasonable source, as the memory of the invasion of Korea by Toyotomi Hideyoshi (豊臣秀吉 1537–1598) from 1592 to 1598 remained vivid among the Korean people. This paper focuses on the multi-layered perspectives of the parties concerned: the Tokugawa shogunate, the Chosŏn officials who joined the embassy's visit to Edo, members of the imperial family in Kyoto, and alongside the Chosŏn intellectuals who had extensive knowledge of Japan.
This article delves into cultural exchanges between the imperial family and the embassy officials in Kyoto, the Chosŏn intellectuals' apprehension regarding the imperial court in terms of neighborly relations, and the Tokugawa officials' interpretation of the attempts at communication between embassy officials and the Japanese imperial family.
The Tokugawa Shogunate, the Imperial Court, and the Korean Embassy
After domestic unification following Tokugawa Ieyasu's victory (徳川家 康 1542–1616, r. 1603–1605) in the Battle of Sekigahara in 1600, other [End Page 354] powerful samurai families, such as the tozama daimyo (外様大名), who had not allied with the Tokugawa and resided in remote areas far from Edo before the battle, no longer challenged Ieyasu. Upon consolidating the unification of Japan, all of the activities of those daimyos were limited under strict regulations in the buke shohatto (武家諸法度), or the Code for Samurai Households, which the Tokugawa regime enacted in 1615.7 For example, the daimyos were controlled by alternating attendance in Edo, which required daimyos to alternate living for a year in their domain and then in Edo. The buke shohatto was applied to the entire samurai population and restricted any acts against the shogunate.8 The Tokugawa shogun, as the unifier with the most powerful military background in the country, supervised entire samurai families that could include any potential enemies.
Along with dominating all other samurai families, the Tokugawa shogunate also controlled the imperial court and the court nobles in Kyoto.9 During the Tokugawa period, fourteen emperors reigned and the early emperors of the Tokugawa period were essentially subservient to the shogunate in Edo. The Kyoto shoshidai (京都所司代), or the military governor in Kyoto, was installed by the shogunate to constantly monitor the Kyoto court. Comparable to the buke shohatto, which applied to the entire samurai population, in 1615 the shogunate enacted the kinchū narabi ni kuge shohatto (禁中並公家諸法度), or the Code for the imperial court and the court nobility, which was a set of regulations to restrict and control the political involvement of the imperial court and the court nobles against the shogunate.10 Under the code, the imperial court and the nobles were only allowed to undertake academic studies, traditional arts, and ceremonies. Following these limitations, the imperial household and the court nobles in Kyoto could not act against the government in Edo. By the mid-nineteenth century, though, the emperor became the most powerful icon among advocates for overthrowing the shogunate.
Despite such a constrained rule by the Tokugawa shogunate, some members of the imperial family in Kyoto had direct contact with the Korean embassy. Until 1635 the imperial family and embassy officials were able to interact with each other through limited exchanges. However, no existing records of these exchanges were found after the shogunate's decision to change the location of the Korean embassy's lodgings to a location far from the imperial palace in 1636. Though very few extant written records exist regarding these communications, members of the imperial family were willing to interact with embassy officials.
Chosŏn officials in Hansŏng (漢城), the capital city of Chosŏn, understood the roles of the imperial court, having obtained records from [End Page 355] previous Korean embassies. Kyŏng Sŏm (慶暹 1562–1620), Kang Hongjung (姜弘重 1577–1642), Nam Yongik (南龍翼 1628–1692), Sin Yuhan (申維翰 1681–1752), Cho Ŏm (趙曮 1719–1777), Cho Myŏngch'ae (曹命采 1700–1763) and other officials of the embassy recorded details regarding the Japanese imperial court and court nobles in their respective travelogues. In those records, the relationships between the imperial court and the shogunate were often mentioned regarding Japan's two authorities. The two powers made embassy officials anxious about their relations with Japan. Their concern centered on the imperial court, which had a long lineage dating back to approximately 660 b.c.e., and how much influence this Japanese court could impose upon the Tokugawa shogunate. The Chosŏn government officials considered the possibility of the Japanese emperor appearing again on the political stage. In addition, some Korean embassy officials questioned why the King of Chosŏn corresponded with the shogun in Edo, but not with the emperor in Kyoto.11 For this reason, embassy officials attempted to understand the imperial court as clearly as possible through their limited contact and the limited information that they could obtain.
The imperial court, despite not being involved in domestic political affairs, or foreign relations under the Tokugawa regime, was recognized intermittently by Japanese people as a source of moral support. Successive military leaders of the Kamakura shogunate (鎌倉幕府), the Muromachi shogunate (室町幕府), and the Tokugawa shogunate were entitled to the formal status of seii taishōgun (征夷大将軍), or barbarian subduing general, acknowledged by the emperor12 and the imperial court played a nominal role in appointing titles to the shogunate's military officials. The titles were provided to enhance the authority of the historical shoguns, and the official ranks were not only used as a sign of military position, but also to signify the legitimacy of the territorial control sanctioned by the imperial court. Thus, previous shogunates utilized the Kyoto court as a tool to heighten their status and to function as a back-up system for their political legitimacy as a ruler of the state.
Among those military leaders, Toyotomi Hideyoshi effectively employed the Japanese imperial family before the war in Chosŏn from 1592 to 1598. He sought to legitimize the invasion by enlisting the myth of Empress Jingū's (神功皇后) conquest of Silla in the fourth century. Hideyoshi emphasized perceptions of Chosŏn as submissive to Japan when his armies were ready to advance in 1592.13 This sharpened awareness of shinkoku (神国), or Japan as the land of the deities, through which the country was understood to be favored by the gods.14 Before the [End Page 356] first armies sailed for Chosŏn from Kyūshū, Hideyoshi visited the Gokōnomiya Shrine (御香宮神社) in Kyoto, established to worship the virtue of Empress Jingū and her accomplishments in the expedition to the Korean Peninsula in 200 c.e., to pray for victory in his battles.15 He did so before departing for Nagoya Castle (名護屋城) in Hizen Province, in modern-day northern Kyūshū, in early 1592.16 Hideyoshi's deployment of the shrine in this way manifested his pursuit of a significant rationale for the invasion on the basis of Jingū's legendary and successful conquest. Hideyoshi may have sought to utilize this precedent, though now regarded as mythical, as historical, and political support for the invasion, enhancing his influence as the unifier of Japan.17
The Tokugawa shogunate also sought sturdier connections with the imperial family through marriage. Female children from the Tokugawa family, Tokugawa Masako (徳川和子 1607–1678), the fifth daughter of Tokugawa Hidetada (徳川秀忠), the second shogun (1579–1632, r. 1605–23), went to Kyoto to marry the 108th emperor, Gomizunoo (後水 尾天皇 1596–1680, r. 1611–1629). The princesses of the imperial court and the court nobles also went to Edo to marry the Tokugawa shoguns. Konoe Hiroko (近衛熙子 1666–1741), a daughter of Konoe Motohiro (近衛基熙 1648–1722) who served the Kyoto court including his career as kanpaku,18 went to Edo and became the wife of the sixth shogun Tokugawa Ienobu (徳川家宣 1662–1712, r. 1709–1712). The fourteenth shogun, Tokugawa Ieshige (徳川 家重 1846–1866, r. 1858–1866), received a wife from the imperial court, Kazunomiya Chikako (和宮親子 1846–1877), the eighth daughter of the 120th Emperor Ninkō (仁孝天皇 1800–1846, r. 1817–1846).19 In a sense, and similar to Hideyoshi, the Tokugawa family may also have sought a backup or supporting authorization from the imperial family.
In contrast to Hideyoshi's dependence upon the imperial legends for support of his decision to advance into the Korean Peninsula, the Tokugawa shogunate did not seek sanction from the imperial court for its conduct of diplomatic restoration with Chosŏn. The embassy officials, too, acknowledged that the emperor did not rule the country. The travel records of the Korean embassy state that the imperial court only performed a nominal role for the shogunate.20
Prior to the visit of the first Korean embassy to Japan in 1607, an envoy was sent from the Chosŏn court led by the Buddhist monk Yujŏng (惟政 1544–1610, also known as Song'un 松雲) to Japan to inquire into its domestic situation at that time. Yujŏng's missions in 1605 aimed to attempt to recoup captives taken to Japan during the Korean invasion in the 1590s, [End Page 357] to investigate Japan's domestic political situation, and seek possibilities for restoring diplomatic relations with the Chosŏn court.21 They met Tokugawa Ieyasu through the mediation of Sō Yoshitoshi (宗義智 1568–1615, r. 1579–1615), who was the first lord of Tsushima.22 Only two years after the unification of Japan by Tokugawa Ieyasu in 1603, the shogunate still needed to consolidate its political foundations. By inviting the Korean embassy, the Tokugawa family was able to show other daimyo houses its capability to have a foreign delegation come to the country.
The embassy officials acknowledged the Tokugawa shogun as a political leader. However, the successive Korean embassies were somewhat apprehensive regarding the shogun's title as written on state letters, asking which authority, the shogun or the emperor, should hold the title of King of Japan. Through the invitations of the shogunate, the third (1636), fourth (1643), and fifth (1655) Korean embassies each spent several days at Tōshōgū (東照宮), Ieyasu's mausoleum in Nikkō (日光 in present-day Tochigi Prefecture) upon the invitation of the shogunate.23 Through the visit to Nikkō, the shogunate wanted to emphasize to the Korean government Ieyasu's rightful conduct in engaging in neighborly relations. Later, after the shogunate's political stability was further consolidated, the embassy concluded following the third shogun Tokugawa Iemitsu's worship at Nikkō. The imperial court had been skillfully used by the military leaders of the Tokugawa shogunate to support their legitimacy and to receive full titles as shogun. As such, the emperor may also have acted as a symbol for the new Edo government. A number of Edo intellectuals admired the imperial court for its unbroken line and longevity. Under these circumstances, the imperial court in Kyoto was also seen in a positive image by ordinary Japanese people, as the emperor was bound up with the origin of the state.
The Three Parties: The Tokugawa Officials, the Japanese Imperial Family, and the Korean Embassy Officials
Chosŏn intellectuals held various views regarding the imperial court. Some officials thought that the imperial court in Kyoto did no harm as a political competitor with regard to neighborly relations with Korea, while other officials urged preparation for the political reinstatement of the imperial court. The court's absence from political involvement under the Tokugawa regime prompted the Korean officials to hold varying opinions. Some Korean officials were uneasy about the Kyoto court's actions, concerning [End Page 358] what might happen if they were to regain the political initiative over the shogunate. Some other officials seemed to ignore the emperor, considering that the emperor did not have any influence in politics.
During the first Korean embassy to Tokugawa Japan in 1607, Kyŏng Sŏm, the vice ambassador, recorded details regarding the imperial court in Kyoto, as well as the shogun and his officials as follows:
Every year on the first day of the first month, the kwanbaek greets the emperor [in Kyoto] with his lords. But at other times, they did not offer harm as a salutation [to the emperor]. The position of the emperor is inherited by the previous emperor, and he has no obligatory duties. In war, the emperor and the court nobles are merely observers, and never participated in the battles, until the 109th emperor from Emperor Sano.24 Only the kwanbaek dominates with power, and thus some [of his following lords] receive authority in the morning, lose it in the evening, compete for power with one [lord] against another [lord] all the time, lose [their family] within one or two generations, or seize [power] and lose it [due to] themselves.25
Kyŏng Sŏm's description of the emperor, who was not involved in politics, and had nothing to do with the Tokugawa rule was rather accurate. As Kyŏng also mentioned, harsh power struggles among the daimyos may have threatened the newly established Tokugawa regime. Kyŏng's eye on the early phase of the Tokugawa military government showed that the new regime was unstable and still remained in need of strengthening its political structure.
Kang Hongjung, the vice ambassador in the 1624 embassy, also recorded a brief history of the emperor. He acknowledged the emperor's position in Kyoto as follows:
About four hundred years ago, all of the power and major and minor state orderscame from the emperorThe emperor never engaged in politics after Minamoto no Yoritomo usurpedpower [to establish his military government].The kwanbaek has organized everything [since then].[The emperor] passes the throne to the oldest son for generationsOther children become monks and nunsThey [move to] reside in temples in several areasThey are rich in clothing, eating, and drinkingThey do not eat meat and certain vegetables26They perform their ablutions (J. misogi 禊) for the first fifteen days of the monthThey light candles and pray to heavenAfter the fifteenth day, they spend life as ordinary peopleThey eat meat, sleep, and play with the servants on the right and the left [End Page 359] Football and [the board game of] igo are learned at the ImperialPalace27
In addition, Kang also viewed the shogun's position within the new political structure with his own insight:
[That is,] the kwanbaek governs the state as a regent and grand minister of the emperor. For this reason, people identify the emperor as the monarch of the state, and [do] not [consider] the shogun as a monarch. From my speculation, [they do so because] the institution [of this country] functions under such a [governmental] system.28
Kang understood that the shogun was a minister of the emperor and that ordinary people still saw the shogun as a ruler of the state. While in Kyoto, Kang had a rare experience. One of the imperial family members came from the palace to visit him and the Korean embassy:
In the eveningthe high-ranking court official serving the emperor [in theimperial palace] came to visit [us] and see the people of our countryin a solemn manner with many servantsHis head was covered [by a cloth], and the color of his wardrobe was differentfrom the traditional oneJapanese [people] who waited on him [at the lodge] did not know who he wasI asked of his peerage title [to his servant], and he told [me that he was] Hachijōdono29This man certainly seems a close relative of the emperor30
This text is one of a few extant written records in which members of the imperial family are noted to have visited the embassy officials at their lodgings. The court official with the imperial family's name can be seen on these records; Prince Toshihito Hachijō (八条宮智仁 1579–1629)31 grandson of Emperor Ōgimachi (正親町天皇 1517–1593, r. 1557–1586), the 106th emperor. His father, Crown Prince Sanehito (誠仁親王 1552–1586) was the first son of Emperor Ōgimachi.
The day after the encounter with Prince Hachijō, Kang also learned of another imperial family member who had visited the embassy officials.
The court noble, claiming himself to be a brother of the emperor, came to see [the area] near where the interpreters are inside and listened to our music with [his] guards and attendants in the front and in the rear. [His] wardrobe was the same as the man [I saw yesterday].32 [End Page 360]
The court noble Kang mentioned as a "brother of the emperor" was Konoe Nobuhiro (近衛信尋 1599–1649), the fourth son of Emperor Goyōzei (後陽成天皇), the 107th emperor and a relative of the Emperor Gomizunoo (後水尾天皇), the 108th emperor. He was later adopted by the Konoe family and was also a half-brother of Prince Hachijō.33 Gomizunoo, Nobuhiro's brother, and emperor at the time of the 1624 embassy also seemed to have had an interest in Korean products. This emperor once asked to receive Korean writing products and alcohol from Kihaku Genpō (規伯玄方 1588–1661), a Buddhist priest in charge of diplomatic affairs between Tsushima and Chosŏn.34
Tokio kyōki (言緒卿記), or the Diary of Lord Tokio, written by Yamashina Tokio (山科言緒 1577–1620), who served as a councilor (sangi 参議) in Kyoto between 1601 and 1619, vividly depicted the daily life of the nobles in Kyoto. His detailed descriptions of his duty to the court are some of the most curious contents among these historical sources. In his diary, he also wrote about Koreans, and Korean culture in the imperial palace:
Keichō 18 (1613) the third day of the seventh month
Today, Kōraijin35 performed shishimai36 on the provisional stage at the imperial palace The audience included: Hachijō dono, Konoe dono, Kanpaku dono, Konoe naifu, Terutaka dono, Manjuin dono, Ichijō dono, Megoten, Kōshōin dono with a partner, Hirohashi dainagon, Banri koji nyūdō, Shirakawa zaemon no suke, Sanjō saishō chujō, Ano saishō chujō, Imadegawa sani chūjō, Tokōji sanmi, Tōrimura chōshin, Nagayoshi chōshin, Akiranari saishō chōshin, Kengashiko, Hokorayoshi, Tokinaga, Chikashige, Abe Yasushige, and Minamoto no Tatenaka.37
Several members of the imperial family, including Prince Hachijō and presumably his half-brother Konoe Nobuhiro attended the performance by the "Korean dancer." In 1613, however, no Korean embassy came to Japan, and it is still uncertain what the term Kōraijin (高麗人) meant. Japanese performers could perhaps have imitated the Korean dance.38 From the spectators listed above, Korean culture seemed to attract numerous people from the Kyoto court.
However, the exchanges between the members of the imperial family and the embassy officials did not get very far, due to the rigid attitude of the Tokugawa shogunate. The shogunate attempted to separate the imperial court from the Korean embassy, leaving no space or place in which these people could meet in Kyoto. In 1636, when the shogunate officials determined the Kyoto location where the Korean embassy would stay for a few days on its way to Edo, Sō Yoshinari (宗義成 1604–1657, r. 1615–1657), the second lord of Tsushima, asked Sakai Tadakatsu [End Page 361] (酒井忠勝 1587–1662), a rōjū (老中), or Elder, one of the highest ranking posts in the shogunate, to change the location of the lodgings for the Korean embassy from Daitokuji (大徳寺) to Honkokuji (本国寺). Tadakatsu asked Yoshinari to present reasons for the change.
Yoshinari responded with three answers. First, Daitokuji was in an inconvenient location away from the main street in Kyoto, and the distance from the street would cause difficulties in guiding the Korean retinue of several hundred persons. Second, passing near the imperial palace meant that the Koreans would be able to see the palace, and the people inside the palace could also observe the Koreans. Third, if the imperial family requested permission from the Tsushima officials to observe the Koreans, as they had for the previous embassy in 1624, those officials might face discomfort over whether or not they should ask the shogunate to allow the imperial family to do so.39 Tadakatsu permitted Yoshinari's request to change the lodging, and Honkokuji became the guesthouse in Kyoto for the Korean embassy. In this context, the shogunate sought to maintain a certain distance between the embassy and the imperial court so that they could not easily access each other.40
This lodging change was exercised for the 1636 embassy, immediately after the visit of 1624, when the Prince Hachijō visited the Korean guesthouse, located at that time in Daitokuji. The Tokugawa shogunate certainly felt anxious that the family of the imperial court had held personal contact with the embassy officials, by visiting their lodgings. These circumscriptions illustrated the shogunate's influence over the imperial court, including the emperor, by restricting the political activities of these Kyoto elites and constraining the activities. Ikeuchi Satoshi notes that the shogunate wanted to demonstrate its power over the imperial court in the first decades of the seventeenth century, thus the visit of the Korean embassy followed in 1636.41 This event in 1636 also illustrates that the influence of the military government in the Tokugawa period, too, had surpassed the imperial court.
Nam Yongik, an overseer of the 1655 Korean embassy, also recorded the scenery of Kyoto through his eyes when he visited the city and wrote a somewhat sarcastic poem on the presence of the emperor in Kyoto. Nam left an impression on Kyoto as well, where he was surprised by the ambience and the well-mannered local townspeople watching the Koreans:
We arrive at Tōji in the Waegyŏng42[From this point] the residences stand in a rowObservers [watching us on the streets] sit in orderand elderly women worship with folded hands [End Page 362] People become more crowded when we approach the capital cityPeople are standing like forest treesPeople are everywhere on the ground and on the bridgeSome people are standing in the [water of] the river by rolling up the[the bottom of] their kimonoMany little children are carried on their fathers' shoulders to watch usMost of the alleyways and streets are the same as in OsakaThe number of houses is not more than in OsakaBut the townscapes are more flourishing [than in Osaka]In the market, there is a man with a mustache and a high crown capI called to him; he answers that he is Chinese and [tells me] there are many peopleliving here who are running away to avoid the disturbances from the southernregion [of China]43
Kyoto and its local people left Nam with positive impressions. In particular, he met a Chinese man who came to see the Koreans wearing formal attire and engaged in a conversation with him. The Chinese man was from the southern region and may have escaped from the domination of the Qing dynasty (清 1636–1912) for his own sake, showing that a foreign population seemed to have existed in Kyoto at the time.44
Nam wrote a poem about the emperor in Kyoto filled with negative sentiments and sarcasm. He described the status of the emperor as follows:
On the emperor of JapanThe emperor is merely a puppetThe imperial palace stands with the residences [of the ordinary people]From the first a rat in a palace becomes a tigerDo not point out that a real dragon turns into a fish[The emperor has been] claiming himself arrogant for thousands of years[He is inactive] sitting like a dead body among the lands of the sixty domainsDo not be proud of the long-standing continuity of the [imperial] nameIt is correct [to say] that people will never have the leftovers of your meal45
Through the poem Nam described his own thoughts on the emperor's condition under the Tokugawa shogunate at that time. He was not to know that the "dead body" emperor would stand against the shogun later on.
The Views of Chosŏn Scholars Regarding the Imperial Court in the Eighteenth Century
Chosŏn intellectuals in the eighteenth century, such as Sin Yuhan, the diarist of the 1719 embassy, Cho Myŏngch'ae, overseer of the 1748 [End Page 363] embassy, and Cho Ŏm, the chief ambassador of the 1764 embassy, were incessantly concerned with the future relations of the two countries. In particular, they were worried with the two authorities of the imperial court and the shogunate, and how this would affect diplomacy with Chosŏn as time went on. In addition, Yi Ik (李瀷 1681–1763), the Chosŏn scholar outside of central government and often called a Practical Learning (K. sirhak 実学) scholar,46 had a positive view towards the Japanese intellectuals but at the same time he saw Japan as a barbarian state, possibly due to its military origins.
For the Chosŏn government and the intellectuals, the information on Japan that the Korean embassy brought back to the country became essential records for analyzing its neighboring state at that time. As one of the most important duties, the Korean embassy investigated Japan's domestic situations thoroughly, and attempted to leave as much data and details as possible.47 The members of the Korean embassy collected such information on the shogunate as well as the imperial court by referring to past diaries of the embassy before and updated the data on all such occasions while they were in Japan. For instance, the name(s) of the newly enthroned or inaugurated emperor or shogun that included their personal background, and the other knowledge acquired from the shogunate and the Tsushima officials were meticulously revised in their records.
During the 1719 embassy Sin Yuhan wondered about the status of the emperor. The Japanese attendants for the Korean officials on this did not inform Sin in detail about the imperial court: it seemed as if talking about the imperial court was inappropriate. In his diary he wrote:
The imperial palace is situated southwest of our lodging. Japanese officials did not mention this, [and if we ask about the palace], no one answers. They [even] never let us see the [imperial] palace.48
Details of the imperial court written by embassy officials in their travelogues described their candid thoughts at that time. Cho Myŏngch'ae, a member of the 1748 embassy to Japan, recorded detailed information of the imperial palace and the court in his diary, and Cho described the emperor and his surroundings as follows:
The emperor was an "empty reign" without political influence. One of his main duties was to provide the official calendar, and he also granted offices of government service [at this moment …] In a public circle, extraordinarily brave men could exist [in this country], but in Japan the government posts are hereditary, and thus, people cannot be recruited or appointed [as officials]. Even [End Page 364] if they labored for the cause of justice and attempted to call for soldiers, the situation looks dark, due to their empty posts and the lack of followers on their side. But the local lords are enraged and attempt to break the ice [against the unfavorable custom of the current shogunate]. Sooner or later there is no guarantee that there will be no domestic incidents.49
Cho's bewilderment over Japan's domestic situation was precise in observing the situation to come, as if he foresaw the circumstances of Japan one century later. Trivial events could lead to further domestic turmoil if the correspondence between the shogun and the King of Chosŏn were diminished. In this case, the embassy officials wondered if the emperor could correspond with the King of Chosŏn directly. Cho Ŏm, the chief ambassador of the 1764 embassy, also described the dispatch of the Korean embassy in his travelogue as, "The embassy was sent to the shogun, not the emperor."50
The writings of members of the Korean embassy shared a common perception: the Japanese emperor did not intervene in the political sphere, and as the manifest political leader the shogun corresponded with the King of Chosŏn. The embassy officials recognized that the imperial court had no official role in engaging in diplomatic policies with Chosŏn under the Tokugawa shogunate. However, if political turmoil occurred in Japan, neighborly relations might have become insecure. The Chosŏn elites realized this fact early on, before the demise of the Tokugawa shogunate. As a small country situated between China and Japan, Chosŏn needed to be strategic in its relations with its neighbors to avoid difficult situations arising in the future.
This analysis of the Tokugawa shogunate was espoused, not only by embassy officials of the embassy and the Chosŏn court, but also by intellectuals without official positions in the central government. Scholars who were far from the Chosŏn court also mentioned the relationship of the shogunate to the imperial court. Among those scholars, Yi Ik in particular attempted to see Chosŏn's neighboring state, Japan, as an equal state in accordance with the concept and diplomatic practice of kyorin (J. kōrin 交隣), or neighborly relations.
Yi Ik acquired his extensive knowledge of Japan from documents written by the Korean embassy although he did not have a chance to visit Japan. In spite of the lack of opportunities to see that country first-hand, his careful analysis of the neighboring state was meticulously expressed in his written works. In particular, he paid close attention in his analysis to the complexity of the Japanese imperial institution. The relationship of the [End Page 365] military leader, the Tokugawa shogunate and the imperial court was one of Yi Ik's central concerns. An underlying complication of the political situation in Japan regarding who best represented the true leader of the country perplexed him. He wondered how a political transformation in Japan would affect the neighborly relations:
It has been from six to seven hundred years since the Japanese emperor lost his political influence. This was not the wish of the people [of Japan]. Among the population loyal to the imperial court, the name of the emperor is still revered, and those people will obey what he says. Something [relating to the imperial court] may possibly happen later on. If a new generation was to assemble, and [they] were to succeed in persuading the emperor to reign over the polity, they would call on others [to overthrow the shogunate] and their righteous desire [for the emperor to rule the country] could bear fruit. It is possible that the daimyos of the domains might join [to support the emperor]. If this occurs, [the representative of the shogun might claim], "He is the emperor, and I represent the king [meaning the shogun]." How would we deal with this?51
Yi Ik worried that Japan's two authorities might cause tension in relations between the two states in the near future. The King of Chosŏn conducted diplomatic correspondence with the shogun but if or when the emperor was reinstated as the paramount political figure, with whom should the King of Chosŏn exchange state letters, the emperor or the shogun? Yi Ik predicted that such an issue might have serious consequences for neighborly relations. This worrisome issue became reality one century later, when after the Meiji Restoration in 1868 the Tokugawa shogunate was overthrown and the diplomatic protocol in use since 1607 became meaningless due to the re-emergence of the Japanese emperor in the political arena.52 As the embassy officials noted, every successive emperor represented an "offspring of the creator of Japan" whether in an era of peace or turmoil. Compared to the imperial institution, the Tokugawa shogunate had without question, a far shorter history in its standing as a military ruler.
In this unexpected environment, Chosŏn needed to reconstruct its diplomatic policy, by either retaining traditional diplomacy, or adjusting to a new context for neighborly relations with Japan, that is, not by directing official communication to the Tokugawa shogun but to the emperor. As noted, the embassy officials recognized that the Japanese emperor should have corresponded with the King of Chosŏn, and not the shogun. As an equal in correspondence, the emperor should have been represented as the monarch of Japan. The Korean embassy officials repeatedly criticized this [End Page 366] fact in their writings.53 However, Chosŏn regarded the diplomatic protocol as crucial and maintained it for centuries.
Conclusion
The Korean embassy officials could not make frequent contact with the imperial family while they were in Kyoto, especially after the change in lodgings in 1636 that ultimately resulted in the end of their exchanges. The Tokugawa shogunate did not tolerate the imperial family holding either official or private meetings with the embassy officials. By not allowing such interaction, the shogunate demonstrated its influence over the imperial family. The embassy officials recognized the shogunate as a political authority, but Chosŏn intellectuals were concerned with whether the imperial court should have corresponded with the King of Chosŏn, and not with the shogun.
These three parties had different lenses through which to observe one another. The imperial family had interests in Korean culture and enjoyed their exchanges with the embassy officials in Kyoto. Whether the imperial family was favored by the shogunate or not, literature and culture should have been central to their life in Kyoto, in accordance with the shogunate's Code for the Imperial Court and Court Nobility, and members of the imperial family could have engaged in cultural exchanges with the embassy officials, who often possessed high literary skills.
For the Tokugawa shogunate, the visit of the Korean embassy also represented a rare opportunity to meet foreigners, to experience foreign culture, and to exchange literature. As noted, the most important aim for the shogunate was to display its influence. In the early stage of Japan's military unification after 1603, the shogunate was consolidating influence in the domestic sphere over other powerful samurai families, and the imperial court. As such, the shogunate sought to eliminate all matters that would cause further dispute or problems for a newly established military government in the future.
The shogunate may have feared that the imperial court held a similar attitude toward the powerful tozama daimyo families. As time went on, the imperial court enhanced its presence as it had a longer historical lineage, whether that reign was nominal or not under the Tokugawa regime. Indeed, the court was often utilized by the shogunate especially for the appointment of titles during the Tokugawa period. Ironically, the process was indispensable to enhancing the shogunate itself. [End Page 367]
The perspective of embassy officials toward the imperial court varied from one official to another. As Nam Yongik of the 1655 embassy noted, the emperor was only a "puppet" of the shogun. On the other hand, the sirhak scholar Yi Ik sounded an alarm over the issue of who represented Japan, and with whom the King of Chosŏn should correspond: the emperor or the shogun. In the case that the emperor regained power, some embassy officials considered whether the neighborly relations between Chosŏn and Japan could be maintained in the same manner as the Tokugawa shogun had done. If not, the territorial security of Chosŏn might again be threatened. More specifically, the embassy officials may have needed to prepare for the possibility of another invasion from Japan.
The embassy officials saw the Tokugawa shogunate as an important peer in neighborly relations. State letters were exchanged between the King of Chosŏn and the Tokugawa shogun, and as such, the embassy officials did not regard the imperial court as an official correspondent. After 1636, no specific records were found regarding exchanges between the imperial family and the court nobles with embassy officials. The Korean embassies dispatched after 1636 seemed not to pay particular attention to the imperial court, as they were not invited to meetings, or to cultural exchanges with the imperial family.
Chosŏn-Meiji terms are often described as a contrast to the Chosŏn-Tokugawa neighborly relationship. The "advanced" Meiji government seemed to deny the policy over the "old and unmodernized" Tokugawa rule. During the transitional period toward the Meiji era, the imperial court became a significant icon in overthrowing the Tokugawa shogunate in the late nineteenth century and was a driving force in constructing the new government. At the same time the position of the emperor rapidly became much more influential over the Tokugawa shogun. This concerned Sin Yuhan as well as other Chosŏn intellectuals throughout different periods regarding the emperor's position under the Tokugawa regime. If imperial reinstatement was to be carried out, how were the neighborly relations to be enacted? The concerns of Chosŏn scholars regarding the emperor in terms of whether he would assume political authority instead of the Tokugawa shogun were ambiguous throughout the Tokugawa period and would also lead to future insecurity regarding neighborly relations.
Jeong-Mi Lee is a lecturer at Meiji Gakuin University, Japan (by39ah@bma.biglobe.ne.jp).
Notes
1. Academic discussions regarding the imperial court and the Korean embassies are led by Ikeuchi Satoshi and Arano Yasunori, respectively. Further details are found in Ikeuchi Satoshi, Taikun gaikō to "bui:" Kinsei Nihon no kokusai chitsujo to Chōsenkan [Great Prince Diplomacy and "Military Power": Early Modern Japan's International Order and Views of Chosŏn] (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 2006), 31–3.
2. Miyake Hidetoshi, "Kinsei Chōsenkanjin no Nihon tennōkan" [View towards the Japanese Emperor as Seen from the Early Modern Korean Officials], in Sakoku Nihon to kokusai kōryū [The Closed Country Japan and International Exchange], vol. 1, 397–417.
3. Ha Woo-bong, Choson hugi shillakja ŭi Ilbongwan yongu [Views towards Japan by Korean Sirhak Scholars in the Latter Period] (Seoul: Ilchisa, 1989).
5. In the Chosŏn court, the well-educated ruling class was called the yangban. The yangban officials were separated into two divisions: the munban and the muban (武班). The munban were the policy-making bureaucrats in the court. The high-ranking officials in the court and most of the higher officials in the Korean embassy were selected by those munban members. The muban, who were the military officers, were somewhat despised by those munban officials, and the military elite did not get along with the munban officials.
6. Asao, "Sakokusei no seiritsu," in Kōza Nihonshi: Bakuhansei shakai [Lecture on History of Japan: Society of the Bakuhan System], vol. 4 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1970), 80–2.
7. Buke shohatto was revised five times during the Tokugawa period, in 1635, 1663, 1683, 1710, and 1717. As a notable revision of buke shohatto in 1635, the third shogun Tokugawa Iemitsu (1604–1651, r. 1623–1651) initiated the sankin kōtai (参勤交 代), or the alternate attendance to Edo.
8. All daimyos were banned from constructing or extending new buildings, including a tower castle in their residential area, as it was regarded as disobedience to the shogunate.
9. Takano Toshihiko, Edo bakufu to chōtei [The Edo Shogunate and the Imperial Court]. Nihonshi Libretto 36 (Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppansha, 2001), 7.
10. Kinchū narabi ni kuge shohatto remained unrevised throughout the Tokugawa period.
11. Yi Ik, "Insamun: Ilbon ch'ungŭi" [Field of Human Affairs: Loyalty in Japan], in Sŏngho sasŏl [Detailed Records Written by Sŏngho], vol. 6 (Seoul: Minjok Munhwa Ch'ujinhoe, 1989), 86.
12. The title seii taishōgun is translated as "barbarian subduing general," which indicates subduing Ezo, the northeastern region of Japan. This title was endowed by the emperor and the holder became the most powerful leader of the samurai family after the third shogun Ashikaga Yoshimitsu (1358–1408, r. 1368–1394).
13. Kitajima Manji, "Hideyoshi no Chōsen shinryaku ni okeru shinkoku ishiki" [Consciousness in the Land of Deities over Invasion by Hideyoshi]. Rekishi hyōron 438 (1986): 29.
14. It was also said that this perception was facilitated by a consciousness of territorial expansion. For more details, see Kitajima, "Hideyoshi no Chōsen shinryaku ni okeru shinkoku ishiki," 29.
15. Kim Kwangchŏl, Chūkinsei ni okeru Chōsenkan no sōshutsu [The Creation of Views toward Korea in the Medieval and Early Modern Period] (Tokyo: Azekura shobō, 1999), 327. Today, expectant women pray at Gokōnomiya shrine for a safe delivery. This is because Jingū's expedition occurred during her pregnancy, and she later gave birth to the 15th Emperor Ōjin (dates unknown) after the victory against Silla.
16. Nagoya Castle was located in present-day Karatsu, Saga Prefecture, in northwestern Kyūshū. This was the headquarters for the invasion of Chosŏn.
17. Since Hideyoshi was of humble origins, he likely sought a guarantee on his action from the imperial court as the country's most prestigious authority.
18. Kanpaku (K. kwanbaek 関白) was the highest position of the court nobles in Kyoto, who acted as an adviser to the emperor. The officials in the Chosŏn government and the Korean embassy used the term kwanbaek to refer to the shogun, probably because Toyotomi Hideyoshi claimed himself kanpaku in spite of his status as samurai at that time, indicating that he was in the highest position in the state.
19. In the mid-nineteenth century, kōbu gattai (公武合体), or the union of the imperial court and the Tokugawa shogunate, became a policy for further accord between the two authorities.
20. The emperor appointed the samurai officials in the shogunate.
21. Information found in Sŏnjo sillok (宣祖実録), Sŏnjo 38 (1605), 187 kwŏn, 4B, the twelfth day of the fifth lunar month.
22. Tsushima domain played an important role in taking on full responsibility for managing Korean issues on behalf of the Tokugawa shogunate.
23. Among the reasons for terminating the visit to Nikkō after the 1655 embassy was that the financial costs were high, and the distances to and from Edo were lengthy. After the consolidation of the Tokugawa regime, there was also no need to recall the first shogun Tokugawa Ieyasu's deed in reestablishing relations with Chosŏn after the Imjin War.
24. Sano is used to indicate the childhood name of the first emperor, Jinmu.
25. Kyŏng Sŏm, "Haesarok," in Haehaeng ch'ongjae, vol. 2. The Seventeenth Day of the Seventh Lunar Month (Seoul: Minjok Munhwa Ch'ujinhoe, 1977), 52.
26. These vegetables are green onions, garlic, and chives.
27. Kang Hongjung, "Tongsarok (1624)" [Record of an East Raft], in Haehaeng ch'ongjae, vol. 3 (Seoul: Minjok Munhwa Ch'ujinhoe, 1977), 33.
29. Tono is pronounced dono if it is after a person's name, and it indicates an honorific expression. It is equivalent to the currently used san, or sama.
31. Prince Hachijō is also known as the landscape architect of the Katsura Rikyu Imperial Villa in 1624.
33. Prince Hachijō and Konoe Nobuhiro were said to maintain very close relations. They often exchanged waka, a Japanese poetic form.
34. Zekkai no sekigaku: Kinsei Nitchō gaikōshi kenkyū [The Scholars in Distant Places: Research on the Diplomatic History of Early Modern Japan and Korea] (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 2017), 424–5.
35. The term Kōraijin refers to a Korean person. This Japanese word literally means "a person of Kōrai" (K. Koryŏ 高麗, a state in the Korean Peninsula in 912–1392), that is, a person of, or from Chosŏn.
36. Shishimai (獅子舞) literally means the "lion dance." It is a traditional entertainment that is still popular. The dance is performed by wearing a lion head mask, praying for rich harvests, and warding off evil.
37. Yamashina Tokio, Tokio kyōki [Diary of Lord Tokio], in Dainihon Kokiroku, vols. 1 and 2 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1995–1998), 195. All of the names listed here were members of the imperial family and the upper-ranking court nobles in Kyoto.
38. In Keichō 6 (1601) on the seventeenth day of the third month, a year during which no Korean embassy came to Japan, the 107th Emperor Goyōzei attended the performance of the Spider Dance by Koreans at the imperial palace. According to Tokitsune kyōki, "[The dance] was full of valiant spirit … Nothing can be written by a quill." In Yamashina Tokitsune, Tokitsune kyōki [Diary of Lord Tokitsune], in Dainihon Kokiroku, vol. 11 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1980), 44.
39. Kan'ei Heishi shinshi kiroku, vol. 4, the 23rd to the 26th page. Unpublished manuscript at the Tokyo National Museum. Further analysis is found in Ikeuchi, Taikun gaikō to "bui," 33–8.
41. Ibid.
42. Waegyŏng (倭京) indicates Kyoto.
43. Nam Yongik, "Pusangnok (1655)" [Record on Japan], in Haehaeng ch'ongjae, vol. 5, the twelfth day of the ninth lunar month (Seoul: Minjok Munhwa Ch'ujinhoe, 1977), 54.
44. Yi Kyŏngjik (1577–1640), an overseer of the 1617 embassy, also met a Chinese man from Fujian Province in Kyoto. According to his travelogue, he came to Japan for commerce. Yi Kyŏngjik, "Pusangnok (1617)" [Record on Japan], in Haehaeng ch'ongjae, vol. 3 (Seoul: Minjok Munhwa Ch'ujinhoe, 1977), 9.
45. Nam Yongik. "Pusangnok (1655)" [Record on Japan], in Haehaeng ch'ongjae, vol. 5, the twelfth day of the ninth lunar month (Seoul: Minjok Munhwa Ch'ujinhoe, 1977), 54–5.
46. "Sirhak (実学)" literally means "learning for practical use," or "scholarship for living up to one's faith." The term has been generally accepted as the name for a variety of scholars who were out of office from the central government and showed an interest in social and political reform. They were particularly active during the reign of the 21st King Yŏngjo (英祖 1694–1776, r. 1724–1776). During his monarchy, Practical Learning scholars brought new perspectives and approaches to Chosŏn's neighborly relations with the Tokugawa shogunate.
47. In the last part of the diaries written by the members of the Korean embassy, they often recorded various information on Japan in detail as an appendix.
48. Sin Yuhan, Haeyurok [Record of a Journey across the Sea] (1719), trans Kang Chaeŏn (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1974), 139. The lodgings for the 1719 embassy in Kyoto were at Honnōji.
49. Cho Myŏngch'ae, "Pongsa Ilbonshi mungyŏnnok (1748)" [Record of Traveling Japan as an Embassy], in Haehaeng ch'ongjae [Records of Sea Travels], vol. 10 (Seoul: Minjok Munhwa Ch'ujinhoe, 1977), 55.
50. Cho Ŏm, "Haesa ilgi (1763)" [Diary of a Sea Raft], in Haehaeng ch'ongjae, vol. 7 (Seoul: Minjok Munhwa Ch'ujinhoe, 1977), 25.
51. Yi Ik, "Insamun: Ilbon ch'ungŭi," in Sŏngho sasŏl, 86.
52. The newly established Meiji government included two kanji choku and kō to refer to the Meiji emperor in the state letter to the Chosŏn court in which the new Japanese government sought to engage in a new diplomatic relationship. These two characters had previously been used to signify the Chinese emperor. Regarding this as impertinent, the Chosŏn court refused to engage in diplomatic relations with the Meiji government.
53. For details, see the diaries of the officials the Korean embassies.
