Asia Policy

Red Star over the Pacific: China's Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy is part of the growing body of literature that examines China's expanding naval capabilities. Based on an extensive survey of Chinese language sources regarding the role of navies and maritime power, Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes conclude that China will pursue a maritime future and posit that Chinese decisionmakers will follow the logic of Alfred Thayer Mahan, even if they do not necessarily hew to his specifics (or "grammar") (p. 18). Thus, the authors laud the Chinese for "an impressive synthesis of strategic theories from foreign and indigenous sources," with Mahan providing the "geopolitical logic" and Mao providing the specific "strategies and tactics" (p. 30). But while an intriguing hypothesis, the authors' approach neglects to address the possibility that China may be pursuing policies that are at times consistent with Mahan but not motivated by his writings at all.

The authors note in the foreword that by 2004 they had begun to notice that Chinese strategists were regularly citing Mahan, which suggests that these strategists were "studying and internalizing his writings in anticipation of China's entry into the nautical domain" (p. ix). If so, to the authors, better understanding what kinds of military and non-military strategies, operations, and tactics China might develop was imperative, given that they might well be applied against the United States. In short, the volume is dedicated to trying to understand "how an aspiring or established sea power thinks about strategy [as] indispensable to forecasting how it will fare on the high seas" (p. 3). To this end, Yoshihara and Holmes discuss the growth of Chinese maritime thinking, examine potential approaches by the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to fleet tactics, discuss the possible role of antiship ballistic missiles, survey U.S. maritime strategy in Asia, and analyze the growth of imperial German naval power as a possible parallel to China's experience (and argue that China will not follow the same path).

The book astutely notes that Chinese thinking on sea power is likely to differ, often fundamentally, from that of Western counterparts, given that the intellectual struggle over ideas often extends into realms such as geography [End Page 142] and geopolitics that are no longer fashionable in the West (p. 42). The authors warn that Western observers should avoid projecting their own assumptions onto Chinese strategic thinkers. Instead, by examining Chinese strategic theory on its own terms, Western analysts could acquire "an instrument to track China's maritime rise, complementing more traditional techniques of net assessment" (p. 43).

An examination of Chinese sources leads Yoshihara and Holmes to conclude that China is pursuing a deliberate turn to sea power along Mahanian lines of logic, although not necessarily adhering to Mahanian approaches (e.g., seeking a decisive fleet engagement), or "grammar." To support their argument, they rely on Chinese texts rather than Western analyses and cite an impressive array of Chinese literature on naval and maritime power. Indeed, one of the great strengths of this book is the authors' explicit discussion of their methodology and research methods.

It is, perhaps, a mark of how far the debate on China's growing maritime power has progressed, and the rapidity of that growth, that at times the volume seems to be making almost indisputable arguments. The idea that China will develop a strong navy, or that Beijing is intent on developing an aircraft carrier, is now widely accepted, whereas just a few short years ago many scoffed at the prospect.¹

Yet essential aspects of that growth are left unexamined. For example, the authors argue that Chinese strategists are budding disciples of Mahan, who they maintain saw "peacetime commerce…[as] the true path to national prosperity and greatness" (p. 9). Yet the volume includes only the most cursory discussion of the sinews of China's sea power, such as its merchant marine or the major shipbuilding industries that remain state-owned enterprises. More problematic is the lack of clarity over whether China is pursuing an explicitly Mahanian strategy or whether the authors are imposing a Mahanian framework on China's activities. Is Mahan a motivation for China's growing maritime capabilities or a justification?

For the authors, it is clearly the former. They cite a range of writings that show a significant Chinese interest in exploiting the seas. In their view, China is not simply expanding its navy but is following a maritime-oriented strategy along Mahanian lines. Indeed, the authors seem to imply that there has been a steady progression in China's emphasis on the sea, as though a maritime grand strategy is at work. But this turn to sea power occurs within a particular [End Page 143] geopolitical context—the end of the Cold War. Prior to that fundamental reordering of the international system, China was largely economically self-sufficient and militarily focused on the Soviet Union to its north. Naval forces, and maritime capabilities more broadly, were slighted because China did not need sea power, either for trade or for national defense.

With the end of the Cold War, however, as well as with the fundamental economic reforms instituted by Deng Xiaoping (and reinforced in his 1992 "southern tour"), China necessarily became more dependent on the oceans. Its export-oriented economy and increasing reliance on imported resources to sustain that economy gave Beijing little choice but to develop its maritime capabilities. The creation and eventual expansion of special economic zones helped shift China's economic center of gravity to the coast. At the same time, Beijing's assessment of the "main strategic direction"—that is, the most likely direction of conflict—shifted from the north to the east.

Most Chinese writings on the need for sea power, therefore, have occurred after China was already dependent on the seas. Consequently, a concomitant shift in military policy is not necessarily Mahanian in nature—although such a shift does suggest an effort to reconcile defense efforts with larger strategic considerations following Mahan's exhortations.

The idea of a more Mahanian turn is further called into question when China's military development is seen in the context of the "new historic missions" of the People's Liberation Army (PLA).² Set forth by Hu Jintao, these missions charge the PLA with safeguarding China's national interests, not only at sea but also in the air, outer space, and cyberspace. Although China's maritime capabilities are increasing, its military advances have not only, or even primarily, been in this area. The Second Artillery, China's missile force, has seen a sustained expansion involving thousands of short-range missiles, and China's air force has also enjoyed a steady modernization of its assets, including both combat aircraft and surface-to-air missiles. This would seem to contradict Mahan's view of sea power as autonomous and inherently important in and of itself.

Similarly, it is unclear whether the PLA is in fact adopting a Mahanian view of maritime power. In spite of Beijing's interest in developing the PLA's naval capabilities, it is not at all clear that there is a singular or even predominant emphasis on naval power, such as Mahan supported and [End Page 144] Tirpitz and other Wilhelmine admirals advocated. Instead, the PLA, in its doctrinal development, has been moving steadily away from service-oriented operations toward joint operations. Indeed, in 1999 the PLA promulgated a new set of gangyao, a publication that falls between regulations and field manuals but also incorporates the concept of doctrine. The capstone of these gangyao was one governing joint operations, making it clear that, at least doctrinally, the PLA would seek to fight future conflicts jointly rather than by individual service.

This is not to argue that naval forces are not important in the PLA's conception of future wars. Indeed, the emphasis on the ability to conduct joint operations would suggest that Chinese naval forces will inevitably be improved, if only to lend maritime support to future joint operations. Rather, I am suggesting that naval forces are not important on their own. As with the new historic missions, the emphasis on joint operations would seem to challenge the very fundamentals of Mahanian thought, with its preferred focus on naval operations.

These considerations suggest that evolving conditions in China have led to a set of policies that are consistent with some aspects of a Mahanian policy but not necessarily motivated by Mahan. Rather, it would seem that Mahan is used to justify the shape of China's increasing dependence on the maritime sphere. In this regard, it is disappointing that the authors did not choose to incorporate a greater discussion of the evolving bureaucratic position of the PLAN. Until 2004, the Central Military Commission (CMC), which manages the PLA, had no service representation at all. Instead, the PLA was managed by the four general departments (the General Staff Department, General Political Department, General Logistics Department, and General Armaments Department)—all of which serve double duty for not only the entire Chinese military but Chinese ground forces as well.

The organization of the CMC is essential because it underscores the relatively low importance long accorded to the non–ground force services. Thus, until the commanders of the PLAN, PLA Air Force, and Second Artillery were included in the CMC in 2004, their bureaucratic voice had been muted. Conversely, now that the PLAN is part of the CMC, there may emerge a true maritime strategist in the Mahanian mold, generating a maritime strategy "with Chinese characteristics."

If so, Yoshihara and Holmes are quite possibly correct in their final analysis. China is expanding its maritime commerce capacity, as one part of a larger initiative to build "comprehensive national power." With its growing dependence on sea lanes, China almost inevitably will need to expand the PLA's [End Page 145] naval capabilities, both to protect the country's access to resources and markets and to deny opponents the ability to endanger that access. This strategy is very much consistent with Mahan's overall view of sea power. Thus, even if not inspired by Mahan, China's actions may well reach the same end-state.

At the same time, as the authors note, what eventually emerges will be a product of uniquely Chinese conditions and constraints rather than a replication of prior maritime forces and strategies from history. The lessons and experiences of the United States, Germany, and other powers provide only limited analogies at best. For all its frustrating aspects, then, Red Star over the Pacific is a useful contribution to the ongoing dialogue about the future of the Chinese navy.