YANG Data Model for BGP about RPKI
draft-ietf-idr-bgp-rpki-yang-01
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (idr WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Yisong Liu , Changwang Lin , Haibo Wang , JISHNU ROY , Di Ma | ||
| Last updated | 2026-01-19 | ||
| Replaces | draft-liu-idr-bgp-rpki-yang | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Yang Validation | 30 errors, 15 warnings | ||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-ietf-idr-bgp-rpki-yang-01
IDR Working Group Y. Liu
Internet Draft China Mobile
Intended status: Standards Track C. Lin
Expires: July 19, 2026 New H3C Technologies
H. Wang
Huawei
J. Roy
Juniper Networks, Inc.
D. Ma
ZDNS
January 19, 2026
YANG Data Model for BGP about RPKI
draft-ietf-idr-bgp-rpki-yang-01
Abstract
This document defines YANG data models for configuring and managing
BGP information about Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI).
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents
at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 19, 2026.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with
respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this
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document must include Revised BSD License text as described in
Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without
warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction...................................................2
1.1. Terminology...............................................3
2. Model Overview.................................................3
3. BGP Origin AS Validation YANG Module...........................4
3.1. Tree View.................................................4
3.2. Yang Module...............................................9
4. BGPSec YANG Module............................................20
4.1. Tree View................................................20
4.2. Yang Module..............................................23
5. BGP ASPA YANG Module..........................................29
5.1. Tree View................................................29
5.2. Yang Module..............................................32
6. Security Considerations.......................................39
7. IANA Considerations...........................................40
7.1. IETF XML Registry........................................40
7.2. YANG Module Names Registry...............................41
8. References....................................................41
9. References....................................................42
9.1. Normative References.....................................42
9.2. Informative References...................................43
Contributors.....................................................43
Authors' Addresses...............................................44
1. Introduction
[RFC6810] and [RFC8210] describes a protocol to deliver Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) prefix origin data and router keys
from a trusted cache server to a router, referred to as RPKI-Router
protocol. [I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis] updates [RFC8210].
[RFC6811] validates the origination Autonomous System (AS) of BGP
routes based on the Validated ROA Payload (VRP) received from the
RPKI cache server. [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification] makes use of
Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) objects in the
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to verify the Border
Gateway Protocol (BGP) AS_PATH attribute of advertised routes.
[RFC8635] describes that the public key is published in the Resource
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Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) and sent to the router via the RPKI
to Router protocol for verifying the signature of BGPsec
announcements.
This document defines YANG [RFC7950] data models for configuring and
managing BGP information about RPKI.
The YANG data models in this document conform to the Network
Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA) [RFC8342].
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. Model Overview
Three YANG data models are defined in this document to augment BGP
YANG model [I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-model].
The ietf-bgp-origin-as-validation.yang data model provides the
methods for configuring BGP origin AS validation.
o Origin AS validation parameters for BGP routes.
o Origin AS validity states of BGP routes.
The ietf-bgp-sec.yang data model provides the methods for
configuring BGPSec.
o BGPSec parameters for BGP routes.
o BGPSec validity states of BGP routes.
The ietf-bgp-aspa.yang data model provides the methods for
configuring BGP AS PATH Verification Based on ASPA.
o BGP ASPA parameters for BGP routes.
o AS PATH validity states of BGP routes.
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3. BGP Origin AS Validation YANG Module
3.1. Tree View
The complete tree of the ietf-bgp-origin-as-validation.yang data
model is represented as following. See [RFC8340] for an explanation
of the symbols used.
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module: ietf-bgp-origin-as-validation
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:global
/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv4-unicast:
+--rw origin-as-validation
+--rw enabled? boolean
+--rw eligible-prefix-policy? leafref
+--rw redistribution-as? inet:as-number
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:global
/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv6-unicast:
+--rw origin-as-validation
+--rw enabled? boolean
+--rw eligible-prefix-policy? leafref
+--rw redistribution-as? inet:as-number
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:rib
/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv4-unicast
/bgp:neighbors/bgp:neighbor/bgp:adj-rib-in-pre:
+--ro statistics
+--ro validation-state-unverified? yang:gauge32
+--ro validation-state-unknown? yang:gauge32
+--ro validation-state-invalid? yang:gauge32
+--ro validation-state-valid? yang:gauge32
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:rib
/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv6-unicast
/bgp:neighbors/bgp:neighbor/bgp:adj-rib-in-pre:
+--ro statistics
+--ro validation-state-unverified? yang:gauge32
+--ro validation-state-unknown? yang:gauge32
+--ro validation-state-invalid? yang:gauge32
+--ro validation-state-valid? yang:gauge32
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:rib
/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv4-unicast
/bgp:neighbors/bgp:neighbor/bgp:adj-rib-in-post:
+--ro statistics
+--ro validation-state-unverified? yang:gauge32
+--ro validation-state-unknown? yang:gauge32
+--ro validation-state-invalid? yang:gauge32
+--ro validation-state-valid? yang:gauge32
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augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:rib
/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv6-unicast
/bgp:neighbors/bgp:neighbor/bgp:adj-rib-in-post:
+--ro statistics
+--ro validation-state-unverified? yang:gauge32
+--ro validation-state-unknown? yang:gauge32
+--ro validation-state-invalid? yang:gauge32
+--ro validation-state-valid? yang:gauge32
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:rib
/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv4-unicast/bgp:loc-
rib:
+--ro statistics
+--ro validation-state-unverified? yang:gauge32
+--ro validation-state-unknown? yang:gauge32
+--ro validation-state-invalid? yang:gauge32
+--ro validation-state-valid? yang:gauge32
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:rib
/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv6-unicast/bgp:loc-
rib:
+--ro statistics
+--ro validation-state-unverified? yang:gauge32
+--ro validation-state-unknown? yang:gauge32
+--ro validation-state-invalid? yang:gauge32
+--ro validation-state-valid? yang:gauge32
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:rib
/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv4-unicast
/bgp:neighbors/bgp:neighbor/bgp:adj-rib-out-pre:
+--ro statistics
+--ro validation-state-unverified? yang:gauge32
+--ro validation-state-unknown? yang:gauge32
+--ro validation-state-invalid? yang:gauge32
+--ro validation-state-valid? yang:gauge32
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:rib
/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv6-unicast
/bgp:neighbors/bgp:neighbor/bgp:adj-rib-out-pre:
+--ro statistics
+--ro validation-state-unverified? yang:gauge32
+--ro validation-state-unknown? yang:gauge32
+--ro validation-state-invalid? yang:gauge32
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+--ro validation-state-valid? yang:gauge32
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:rib
/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv4-unicast
/bgp:neighbors/bgp:neighbor/bgp:adj-rib-out-post:
+--ro statistics
+--ro validation-state-unverified? yang:gauge32
+--ro validation-state-unknown? yang:gauge32
+--ro validation-state-invalid? yang:gauge32
+--ro validation-state-valid? yang:gauge32
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:rib
/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv6-unicast
/bgp:neighbors/bgp:neighbor/bgp:adj-rib-out-post:
+--ro statistics
+--ro validation-state-unverified? yang:gauge32
+--ro validation-state-unknown? yang:gauge32
+--ro validation-state-invalid? yang:gauge32
+--ro validation-state-valid? yang:gauge32
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:rib
/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv4-unicast
/bgp:loc-rib/bgp:routes/bgp:route:
+--ro origin-as-validity? origin-as-validity-state
+--ro validity-invalid-reason? route-validity-invalid-reason
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:rib
/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv6-unicast
/bgp:loc-rib/bgp:routes/bgp:route:
+--ro origin-as-validity? origin-as-validity-state
+--ro validity-invalid-reason? route-validity-invalid-reason
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:global
/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:route-selection-options:
+--rw origin-as
+--rw enabled? boolean
+--rw allow-invalid? boolean
+--rw allow-not-found? boolean
+--rw eligible-prefix-policy? leafref
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:neighbors
/bgp:neighbor/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi
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/bgp:ipv4-unicast:
+--rw send-origin-as-validity? boolean
+--rw export-origin-as-validation
| +--rw enabled? boolean
| +--rw allow-not-found? boolean
| +--rw eligible-prefix-policy? leafref
+--rw statistics
+--rw validation-state-unverified? yang:gauge32
+--rw validation-state-unknown? yang:gauge32
+--rw validation-state-invalid? yang:gauge32
+--rw validation-state-valid? yang:gauge32
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:neighbors
/bgp:neighbor/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi
/bgp:ipv6-unicast:
+--rw send-origin-as-validity? boolean
+--rw export-origin-as-validation
| +--rw enabled? boolean
| +--rw allow-not-found? boolean
| +--rw eligible-prefix-policy? leafref
+--rw statistics
+--rw validation-state-unverified? yang:gauge32
+--rw validation-state-unknown? yang:gauge32
+--rw validation-state-invalid? yang:gauge32
+--rw validation-state-valid? yang:gauge32
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:peer-groups
/bgp:peer-group/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi
/bgp:ipv4-unicast:
+--rw send-origin-as-validity? boolean
+--rw export-origin-as-validation
+--rw enabled? boolean
+--rw allow-not-found? boolean
+--rw eligible-prefix-policy? leafref
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:peer-groups
/bgp:peer-group/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi
/bgp:ipv6-unicast:
+--rw send-origin-as-validity? boolean
+--rw export-origin-as-validation
+--rw enabled? boolean
+--rw allow-not-found? boolean
+--rw eligible-prefix-policy? Leafref
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3.2. Yang Module
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-bgp-origin-as-validation@2022-10-18.yang"
module ietf-bgp-origin-as-validation {
yang-version "1.1";
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:"
+ "ietf-bgp-origin-as-validation";
prefix "oav";
import ietf-yang-types {
prefix "yang";
reference
"RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types.";
}
import ietf-inet-types {
prefix "inet";
reference
"RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types";
}
import ietf-routing {
prefix "rt";
reference
"RFC 8349, A YANG Data Model for Routing Management
(NMDA Version).";
}
import ietf-bgp {
prefix "bgp";
reference
"RFC XXXX: YANG Model for Border Gateway Protocol (BGP-4)";
}
import iana-bgp-types {
prefix "bt";
reference
"RFC XXXX: YANG Model for Border Gateway Protocol (BGP-4)";
}
import iana-bgp-rib-types {
prefix "brt";
reference
"RFC XXXX: YANG Model for Border Gateway Protocol (BGP-4)";
}
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import ietf-routing-policy {
prefix rt-pol;
reference
"RFC 9067: A YANG Data Model for Routing Policy Management.";
}
organization
"IETF SIDROPS Working Group";
contact
"TBD";
description
"This module describes configuration of the BGP origin AS
validation.
This YANG model conforms to the Network Management
Datastore Architecture (NMDA) as described in RFC 8342.
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to
the license terms contained in, the Revised BSD License set
forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX;
see the RFC itself for full legal notices.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL
NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED',
'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when,
they appear in all capitals, as shown here.";
reference "RFC XXXX";
revision 2022-10-18 {
description
"Initial Version";
reference
"RFC XXXX, YANG Data Model for RPKI to Router Protocol";
}
identity ineligible-orgin-as {
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base brt:ineligible-route-reason;
description
"Route was ineligible due to origin as validation";
}
typedef route-validity-invalid-reason {
type enumeration {
enum ineligible-orgin-as {
description
"Route was ineligible due to origin as number mismatch";
}
enum ineligible-max-len {
description
"Route was ineligible due to prefix maximum length
mismatch";
}
}
description
"Origin AS validation state invalid reason of BGP routes.";
}
typedef origin-as-validity-state {
type enumeration {
enum not-found {
description
"No VRP Covers the Route Prefix.";
}
enum valid {
description
"At least one VRP Matches the Route Prefix.";
}
enum invalid {
description
"At least one VRP Covers the Route Prefix, but no VRP
Matches it.";
}
enum disabled {
description
"BGP origin AS validation is not enabled.";
}
}
description
"Origin AS validation state of BGP routes.";
reference
"RFC 6811, BGP Prefix Origin Validation.";
}
grouping origin-as-validation-config {
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description
"Origin AS validation of BGP prefix.";
container origin-as-validation {
leaf enabled {
type boolean;
default "false";
description
"Whether origin-AS validation of BGP prefix is enabled.";
}
leaf eligible-prefix-policy {
type leafref {
path "/rt-pol:routing-policy/rt-pol:policy-definitions/"
+ "rt-pol:policy-definition/rt-pol:name";
}
description
"A reference to a routing policy which can be used to
restrict the prefixes for which Origin AS validation
is enabled.";
}
leaf redistribution-as {
type inet:as-number;
description
"Uses this AS number in the origin-AS validation for
redistributed routes since they have no AS-PATH.";
reference
"RFC 8481, Clarifications to BGP Origin Validation Based
on Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI).";
}
description
"Origin AS validation of BGP prefix.";
}
}
grouping origin-as-selection-option {
description
"Origin AS option for BGP route selection.";
container origin-as {
leaf enabled {
type boolean;
default "false";
description
"When enabled allows the origin AS validity states to be
taken into consideration in the best-path calculation.";
}
leaf allow-invalid {
type boolean;
default "false";
description
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"When enabled allows the route with 'invalid' origin AS
to be taken into consideration in the best-path
calculation.";
}
leaf allow-not-found {
type boolean;
default "true";
description
"When enabled allows the route with 'not-found' origin
AS to be taken into consideration in the best-path
calculation.";
}
leaf eligible-prefix-policy {
type leafref {
path "/rt-pol:routing-policy/rt-pol:policy-definitions/"
+ "rt-pol:policy-definition/rt-pol:name";
}
description
"A reference to a routing policy which can be used to
restrict the prefixes for which Origin AS option
is enabled for BGP route selection.";
}
description
"Origin AS option for BGP route selection.";
}
}
grouping origin-as-validity-advertisement {
description
"Advertisement of Origin Validation State Extended
Community to neighbor(s).";
leaf send-origin-as-validity {
type boolean;
default "false";
description
"If set to true, send the origin AS validity to the
neighbor(s) using Origin Validation State Extended
Community";
reference
"RFC 8097, BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended
Community.";
}
leaf eligible-prefix-policy {
type leafref {
path "/rt-pol:routing-policy/rt-pol:policy-definitions/"
+ "rt-pol:policy-definition/rt-pol:name";
}
description
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"A reference to a routing policy which can be used to
restrict the prefixes for which Origin Validation
State Extended Community is advertised.";
}
}
grouping export-origin-as-validation-config {
description
"Export Origin AS validation of BGP prefix.";
container export-origin-as-validation {
leaf enabled {
type boolean;
default "false";
description
"When enabled allows the origin AS validity states to be
taken into consideration in BGP export.";
}
leaf allow-not-found {
type boolean;
default "false";
description
"When enabled allows the route with 'not-found' origin
AS to be sent to the neighbor.";
}
leaf eligible-prefix-policy {
type leafref {
path "/rt-pol:routing-policy/rt-pol:policy-definitions/"
+ "rt-pol:policy-definition/rt-pol:name";
}
description
"A reference to a routing policy which can be used to
restrict the prefixes for which Origin AS validity
states are considered in BGP export.";
}
description
"Export Origin AS validation of BGP prefix.";
reference
"RFC 8893, Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Origin
Validation for BGP Export.";
}
}
grouping origin-as-validity-statistics {
description
"Origin-AS validation statistics.";
container statistics {
leaf validation-state-unverified {
type yang:gauge32;
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description
"The number of routes with validation state as
unverified.";
}
leaf validation-state-unknown {
type yang:gauge32;
description
"The number of routes with validation state as
unknown.";
}
leaf validation-state-invalid {
type yang:gauge32;
description
"The number of routes with validation state as
invalid.";
}
leaf validation-state-valid {
type yang:gauge32;
description
"The number of routes with validation state as valid.";
}
description
"Statistical data for Origin-AS validation states.";
}
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:global"
+ "/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv4-unicast" {
description
"Origin AS validation augmentation of BGP IPv4 Unicast
Address Family.";
uses origin-as-validation-config;
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:global"
+ "/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv6-unicast" {
description
"Origin AS validation augmentation of BGP IPv6 Unicast
Address Family.";
uses origin-as-validation-config;
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:rib"
+ "/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv4-unicast"
+ "/bgp:neighbors/bgp:neighbor/bgp:adj-rib-in-pre" {
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description
"Augmentation of BGP IPv4 Unicast route statistics.";
uses origin-as-validity-statistics;
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:rib"
+ "/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv6-unicast"
+ "/bgp:neighbors/bgp:neighbor/bgp:adj-rib-in-pre" {
description
"Augmentation of BGP IPv6 Unicast route statistics.";
uses origin-as-validity-statistics;
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:rib"
+ "/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv4-unicast"
+ "/bgp:neighbors/bgp:neighbor/bgp:adj-rib-in-post" {
description
"Augmentation of BGP IPv4 Unicast route statistics.";
uses origin-as-validity-statistics;
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:rib"
+ "/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv6-unicast"
+ "/bgp:neighbors/bgp:neighbor/bgp:adj-rib-in-post" {
description
"Augmentation of BGP IPv6 Unicast route statistics.";
uses origin-as-validity-statistics;
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:rib"
+ "/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv4-unicast"
+ "/bgp:loc-rib" {
description
"Augmentation of BGP IPv4 Unicast route statistics.";
uses origin-as-validity-statistics;
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:rib"
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+ "/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv6-unicast"
+ "/bgp:loc-rib" {
description
"Augmentation of BGP IPv6 Unicast route statistics.";
uses origin-as-validity-statistics;
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:rib"
+ "/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv4-unicast"
+ "/bgp:neighbors/bgp:neighbor/bgp:adj-rib-out-pre" {
description
"Augmentation of BGP IPv4 Unicast route statistics.";
uses origin-as-validity-statistics;
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:rib"
+ "/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv6-unicast"
+ "/bgp:neighbors/bgp:neighbor/bgp:adj-rib-out-pre" {
description
"Augmentation of BGP IPv6 Unicast route statistics.";
uses origin-as-validity-statistics;
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:rib"
+ "/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv4-unicast"
+ "/bgp:neighbors/bgp:neighbor/bgp:adj-rib-out-post" {
description
"Augmentation of BGP IPv4 Unicast route statistics.";
uses origin-as-validity-statistics;
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:rib"
+ "/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv6-unicast"
+ "/bgp:neighbors/bgp:neighbor/bgp:adj-rib-out-post" {
description
"Augmentation of BGP IPv6 Unicast route statistics.";
uses origin-as-validity-statistics;
}
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augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:rib"
+ "/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv4-unicast"
+ "/bgp:loc-rib/bgp:routes/bgp:route" {
description
"Origin AS validity augmentation of BGP IPv4 Unicast
route.";
leaf origin-as-validity {
type origin-as-validity-state;
description
"Origin AS validity of BGP IPv4 Unicast prefix";
}
leaf validity-invalid-reason {
type route-validity-invalid-reason;
description
"Reason for marking a BGP IPv4 Unicast prefix as
invalid";
}
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:rib"
+ "/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv6-unicast"
+ "/bgp:loc-rib/bgp:routes/bgp:route" {
description
"Origin AS validity augmentation of BGP IPv6 Unicast
route.";
leaf origin-as-validity {
type origin-as-validity-state;
description
"Origin AS validity of BGP IPv6 Unicast prefix";
}
leaf validity-invalid-reason {
type route-validity-invalid-reason;
description
"Reason for marking a BGP IPv6 Unicast prefix as
invalid";
}
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:global"
+ "/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi"
+ "/bgp:route-selection-options" {
when "derived-from-or-self(../bgp:name, 'bt:ipv4-unicast') or "
+ "derived-from-or-self(../bgp:name, 'bt:ipv6-unicast')" {
description
"This augmentation is valid for IPv4 and IPv6 Unicast.";
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}
description
"augmentation of BGP route selection options";
uses origin-as-selection-option;
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:neighbors"
+ "/bgp:neighbor/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi"
+ "/bgp:ipv4-unicast" {
description
"augmentation of Origin Validation State Extended
Community advertisement for IPv4 Unicast neighbor";
uses origin-as-validity-advertisement;
uses export-origin-as-validation-config;
uses origin-as-validity-statistics;
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:neighbors"
+ "/bgp:neighbor/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi"
+ "/bgp:ipv6-unicast" {
description
"augmentation of Origin Validation State Extended
Community advertisement for IPv6 Unicast neighbor";
uses origin-as-validity-advertisement;
uses export-origin-as-validation-config;
uses origin-as-validity-statistics;
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:peer-groups"
+ "/bgp:peer-group/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi"
+ "/bgp:ipv4-unicast" {
description
"augmentation of Origin Validation State Extended
Community advertisement for IPv4 Unicast peer group";
uses origin-as-validity-advertisement;
uses export-origin-as-validation-config;
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:peer-groups"
+ "/bgp:peer-group/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi"
+ "/bgp:ipv6-unicast" {
description
"augmentation of Origin Validation State Extended
Community advertisement for IPv6 Unicast peer group";
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uses origin-as-validity-advertisement;
uses export-origin-as-validation-config;
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
4. BGPSec YANG Module
4.1. Tree View
The complete tree of the ietf-bgp-sec.yang data model is represented
as following. See [RFC8340] for an explanation of the symbols used.
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module: ietf-bgp-sec
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:global
/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv4-unicast:
+--rw bgpsec-validation
+--rw enabled? boolean
+--rw eligible-prefix-policy? leafref
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:global
/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv6-unicast:
+--rw bgpsec-validation
+--rw enabled? boolean
+--rw eligible-prefix-policy? leafref
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:rib
/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv4-unicast
/bgp:loc-rib/bgp:routes/bgp:route:
+--ro bgpsec-validity? bgpsec-validity-state
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:rib
/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv6-unicast
/bgp:loc-rib/bgp:routes/bgp:route:
+--ro bgpsec-validity? bgpsec-validity-state
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:global
/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:route-selection-options:
+--rw bgpsec
+--rw enabled? boolean
+--rw allow-invalid? boolean
+--rw eligible-prefix-policy? leafref
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:neighbors
/bgp:neighbor/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi
/bgp:ipv4-unicast:
+--rw export-bgpsec-validation
+--rw enabled? boolean
+--rw eligible-prefix-policy? leafref
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:neighbors
/bgp:neighbor/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi
/bgp:ipv6-unicast:
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+--rw export-bgpsec-validation
+--rw enabled? boolean
+--rw eligible-prefix-policy? leafref
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:peer-groups
/bgp:peer-group/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi
/bgp:ipv4-unicast:
+--rw export-bgpsec-validation
+--rw enabled? boolean
+--rw eligible-prefix-policy? leafref
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:peer-groups
/bgp:peer-group/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi
/bgp:ipv6-unicast:
+--rw export-bgpsec-validation
+--rw enabled? boolean
+--rw eligible-prefix-policy? leafref
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4.2. Yang Module
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-bgp-sec@2022-10-18.yang"
module ietf-bgp-sec {
yang-version "1.1";
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:"
+ "ietf-bgp-sec";
prefix "sec";
import ietf-routing {
prefix "rt";
reference
"RFC 8349, A YANG Data Model for Routing Management
(NMDA Version).";
}
import ietf-bgp {
prefix "bgp";
reference
"RFC XXXX: YANG Model for Border Gateway Protocol (BGP-4)";
}
import iana-bgp-types {
prefix "bt";
reference
"RFC XXXX: YANG Model for Border Gateway Protocol (BGP-4)";
}
import iana-bgp-rib-types {
prefix "brt";
reference
"RFC XXXX: YANG Model for Border Gateway Protocol (BGP-4)";
}
import ietf-routing-policy {
prefix rt-pol;
reference
"RFC 9067: A YANG Data Model for Routing Policy Management.";
}
organization
"IETF SIDROPS Working Group";
contact
"TBD";
description
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"This module describes configuration of BGPsec.
This YANG model conforms to the Network Management
Datastore Architecture (NMDA) as described in RFC 8342.
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to
the license terms contained in, the Revised BSD License set
forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX;
see the RFC itself for full legal notices.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL
NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED',
'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when,
they appear in all capitals, as shown here.";
reference "RFC XXXX";
revision 2022-10-18 {
description
"Initial Version";
reference
"RFC XXXX, YANG Data Model for RPKI to Router Protocol";
}
identity ineligible-bgp {
base brt:ineligible-route-reason;
description
"Route was ineligible due to bgpsec";
}
typedef bgpsec-validity-state {
type enumeration {
enum valid {
description
"The BGPsec UPDATE message is valid.";
}
enum invalid {
description
"The BGPsec UPDATE message is invalid.";
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}
enum disabled {
description
"BGPsec validation is not enabled.";
}
}
description
"BGPsec validation state of BGP routes.";
reference
"RFC 8205, BGPsec Protocol Specification.";
}
grouping bgpsec-validation-config {
description
"BGPsec validation of BGP prefix.";
container bgpsec-validation {
leaf enabled {
type boolean;
default "false";
description
"Whether BGPsec validation of BGP prefix is enabled.";
}
leaf eligible-prefix-policy {
type leafref {
path "/rt-pol:routing-policy/rt-pol:policy-definitions/"
+ "rt-pol:policy-definition/rt-pol:name";
}
description
"A reference to a routing policy which can be used to
restrict the prefixes for which BGPsec validation
is enabled.";
}
description
"BGPsec validation of BGP prefix.";
}
}
grouping bgpsec-selection-option {
description
"BGPsec option for BGP route selection.";
container bgpsec {
leaf enabled {
type boolean;
default "false";
description
"When enabled allows the BGPsec validity states to be
taken into consideration in the best-path calculation.";
}
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leaf allow-invalid {
type boolean;
default "false";
description
"When enabled allows the route with 'invalid' BGPsec
to be taken into consideration in the best-path
calculation.";
}
leaf eligible-prefix-policy {
type leafref {
path "/rt-pol:routing-policy/rt-pol:policy-definitions/"
+ "rt-pol:policy-definition/rt-pol:name";
}
description
"A reference to a routing policy which can be used to
restrict the prefixes for which BGPsec option
is enabled in BGP route selection.";
}
description
"BGPsec option for BGP route selection.";
}
}
grouping export-bgpsec-validation-config {
description
"Export BGPsec validation of BGP prefix.";
container export-bgpsec-validation {
leaf enabled {
type boolean;
default "false";
description
"When enabled allows the BGPsec validity states to be
taken into consideration in BGP export.";
}
leaf eligible-prefix-policy {
type leafref {
path "/rt-pol:routing-policy/rt-pol:policy-definitions/"
+ "rt-pol:policy-definition/rt-pol:name";
}
description
"A reference to a routing policy which can be used to
restrict the prefixes for which BGPsec validity
states are considered in BGP export.";
}
description
"Export BGPsec validation of BGP prefix.";
}
}
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augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:global"
+ "/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv4-unicast" {
description
"BGPSec augmentation of BGP IPv4 Unicast Address Family.";
uses bgpsec-validation-config;
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:global"
+ "/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv6-unicast" {
description
" BGPSec augmentation of BGP IPv6 Unicast Address Family.";
uses bgpsec-validation-config;
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:rib"
+ "/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv4-unicast"
+ "/bgp:loc-rib/bgp:routes/bgp:route" {
description
" BGPSec augmentation of BGP IPv4 Unicast route.";
leaf bgpsec-validity {
type bgpsec-validity-state;
description
"BGPsec validity of BGP IPv4 Unicast prefix";
}
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:rib"
+ "/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv6-unicast"
+ "/bgp:loc-rib/bgp:routes/bgp:route" {
description
"BGPSec augmentation of BGP IPv6 Unicast route.";
leaf bgpsec-validity {
type bgpsec-validity-state;
description
"BGPsec validity of BGP IPv6 Unicast prefix";
}
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:global"
+ "/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi"
+ "/bgp:route-selection-options" {
when "derived-from-or-self(../bgp:name, 'bt:ipv4-unicast') or "
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+ "derived-from-or-self(../bgp:name, 'bt:ipv6-unicast')" {
description
"This augmentation is valid for IPv4 and IPv6 Unicast.";
}
description
"augmentation of BGP route selection options";
uses bgpsec-selection-option;
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:neighbors"
+ "/bgp:neighbor/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi"
+ "/bgp:ipv4-unicast" {
description
"augmentation of BGPSec for IPv4 Unicast neighbor";
uses export-bgpsec-validation-config;
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:neighbors"
+ "/bgp:neighbor/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi"
+ "/bgp:ipv6-unicast" {
description
"augmentation of BGPSec for IPv6 Unicast neighbor";
uses export-bgpsec-validation-config;
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:peer-groups"
+ "/bgp:peer-group/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi"
+ "/bgp:ipv4-unicast" {
description
"augmentation of BGPSec for IPv4 Unicast peer group";
uses export-bgpsec-validation-config;
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:peer-groups"
+ "/bgp:peer-group/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi"
+ "/bgp:ipv6-unicast" {
description
"augmentation of BGPSec for IPv6 Unicast peer group";
uses export-bgpsec-validation-config;
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
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5. BGP ASPA YANG Module
5.1. Tree View
The complete tree of the ietf-bgp-aspa.yang data model is
represented as following. See [RFC8340] for an explanation of the
symbols used.
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module: ietf-bgp-aspa
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:neighbors
/bgp:neighbor:
+--rw peer-role? peer-role
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:peer-groups
/bgp:peer-group:
+--rw peer-role? peer-role
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:global
/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv4-unicast:
+--rw aspa-verification
+--rw enabled? boolean
+--rw eligible-prefix-policy? leafref
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:global
/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv6-unicast:
+--rw aspa-verification
+--rw enabled? boolean
+--rw eligible-prefix-policy? leafref
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:rib
/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv4-unicast
/bgp:loc-rib/bgp:routes/bgp:route:
+--ro aspa-verification-state? aspa-verification-state
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:rib
/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv6-unicast
/bgp:loc-rib/bgp:routes/bgp:route:
+--ro aspa-verification-state? aspa-verification-state
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:global
/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:route-selection-options:
+--rw aspa
+--rw enabled? boolean
+--rw allow-invalid? boolean
+--rw allow-unknown? boolean
+--rw eligible-prefix-policy? leafref
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
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/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:neighbors
/bgp:neighbor/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi
/bgp:ipv4-unicast:
+--rw export-aspa-validation
+--rw enabled? boolean
+--rw eligible-prefix-policy? leafref
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:neighbors
/bgp:neighbor/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi
/bgp:ipv6-unicast:
+--rw export-aspa-validation
+--rw enabled? boolean
+--rw eligible-prefix-policy? leafref
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:peer-groups
/bgp:peer-group/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi
/bgp:ipv4-unicast:
+--rw export-aspa-validation
+--rw enabled? boolean
+--rw eligible-prefix-policy? leafref
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:peer-groups
/bgp:peer-group/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi
/bgp:ipv6-unicast:
+--rw export-aspa-validation
+--rw enabled? boolean
+--rw eligible-prefix-policy? leafref
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5.2. Yang Module
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-bgp-aspa@2022-10-18.yang"
module ietf-bgp-aspa {
yang-version "1.1";
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:"
+ "ietf-bgp-aspa";
prefix "aspa";
import ietf-routing {
prefix "rt";
reference
"RFC 8349, A YANG Data Model for Routing Management
(NMDA Version).";
}
import ietf-bgp {
prefix "bgp";
reference
"RFC XXXX: YANG Model for Border Gateway Protocol (BGP-4)";
}
import iana-bgp-types {
prefix "bt";
reference
"RFC XXXX: YANG Model for Border Gateway Protocol (BGP-4)";
}
import iana-bgp-rib-types {
prefix "brt";
reference
"RFC XXXX: YANG Model for Border Gateway Protocol (BGP-4)";
}
import ietf-routing-policy {
prefix rt-pol;
reference
"RFC 9067: A YANG Data Model for Routing Policy Management.";
}
organization
"IETF SIDROPS Working Group";
contact
"TBD";
description
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"This module describes configuration of the BGP AS PATH
Verification Based on ASPA.
This YANG model conforms to the Network Management
Datastore Architecture (NMDA) as described in RFC 8342.
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to
the license terms contained in, the Revised BSD License set
forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX;
see the RFC itself for full legal notices.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL
NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED',
'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when,
they appear in all capitals, as shown here.";
reference "RFC XXXX";
revision 2022-10-18 {
description
"Initial Version";
reference
"RFC XXXX, YANG Data Model for RPKI to Router Protocol";
}
identity ineligible-aspa {
base brt:ineligible-route-reason;
description
"Route was ineligible due to ASPA verification";
}
typedef peer-role {
type enumeration {
enum customer {
description
"The role of the BGP peer is customer.";
}
enum provider {
description
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"The role of the BGP peer is provider.";
}
enum lateral-peer {
description
"The role of the BGP peer is lateral peer.";
}
enum rs {
description
"The role of the BGP peer is Route Server (RS).";
}
enum rs-client {
description
"The role of the BGP peer is RS-client.";
}
enum mutual-transit {
description
"The role of the BGP peer is mutual-transit.";
}
}
description
"Roles of BGP peers.";
reference
"RFC XXXX, BGP AS_PATH Verification Based on Autonomous
System Provider Authorization (ASPA) Objects.";
}
typedef aspa-verification-state {
type enumeration {
enum valid {
description
"The ASPA verification outcome is valid.";
}
enum invalid {
description
"The ASPA verification outcome is invalid.";
}
enum unknown {
description
"The ASPA verification outcome is unknown.";
}
enum disabled {
description
"BGP ASPA verification is not enabled.";
}
}
description
"ASPA verification state of BGP routes.";
reference
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"RFC XXXX, BGP AS_PATH Verification Based on Autonomous
System Provider Authorization (ASPA) Objects.";
}
grouping aspa-config {
description
"ASPA verification of BGP prefix.";
container aspa-verification {
leaf enabled {
type boolean;
default "false";
description
"Whether ASPA verification of BGP prefix is enabled.";
}
leaf eligible-prefix-policy {
type leafref {
path "/rt-pol:routing-policy/rt-pol:policy-definitions/"
+ "rt-pol:policy-definition/rt-pol:name";
}
description
"A reference to a routing policy which can be used to
restrict the prefixes for which ASPA verification
is enabled.";
}
description
"ASPA verification of BGP prefix.";
}
}
grouping aspa-selection-option {
description
"ASPA option for BGP route selection.";
container aspa {
leaf enabled {
type boolean;
default "false";
description
"When enabled allows the ASPA verification states to be
taken into consideration in the best-path calculation.";
}
leaf allow-invalid {
type boolean;
default "false";
description
"When enabled allows the route with 'invalid' ASPA
verification state to be taken into consideration in
the best-path calculation.";
}
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leaf allow-unknown {
type boolean;
default "true";
description
"When enabled allows the route with 'unknown' ASPA
verification state to be taken into consideration in
the best-path calculation.";
}
leaf eligible-prefix-policy {
type leafref {
path "/rt-pol:routing-policy/rt-pol:policy-definitions/"
+ "rt-pol:policy-definition/rt-pol:name";
}
description
"A reference to a routing policy which can be used to
restrict the prefixes for which ASPA option
is enabled in BGP route selection.";
}
description
"ASPA option for BGP route selection.";
}
}
grouping export-aspa-validation-config {
description
"Export AS PATH validation of BGP prefix.";
container export-aspa-validation {
leaf enabled {
type boolean;
default "false";
description
"When enabled allows the AS PATH validity states to be
taken into consideration in BGP export.";
}
leaf eligible-prefix-policy {
type leafref {
path "/rt-pol:routing-policy/rt-pol:policy-definitions/"
+ "rt-pol:policy-definition/rt-pol:name";
}
description
"A reference to a routing policy which can be used to
restrict the prefixes for which AS PATH validity
states are considered in BGP export.";
}
description
"Export AS PATH validation of BGP prefix.";
}
}
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augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:neighbors"
+ "/bgp:neighbor" {
description
"augmentation of BGP peer roles for neighbors";
leaf peer-role {
type peer-role;
description
"Role of the peer";
}
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:peer-groups"
+ "/bgp:peer-group" {
description
"augmentation of BGP peer roles for peer groups";
leaf peer-role {
type peer-role;
description
"Role of the peer group";
}
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:global"
+ "/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv4-unicast" {
description
"ASPA verification augmentation of BGP IPv4 Unicast
Address Family.";
uses aspa-config;
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:global"
+ "/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv6-unicast" {
description
"ASPA verification augmentation of BGP IPv6 Unicast
Address Family.";
uses aspa-config;
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:rib"
+ "/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv4-unicast"
+ "/bgp:loc-rib/bgp:routes/bgp:route" {
description
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"ASPA verification state augmentation of BGP IPv4
Unicast route.";
leaf aspa-verification-state {
type aspa-verification-state;
description
"ASPA verification state of BGP IPv4 Unicast prefix.";
}
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:rib"
+ "/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi/bgp:ipv6-unicast"
+ "/bgp:loc-rib/bgp:routes/bgp:route" {
description
"ASPA verification state augmentation of BGP IPv6
Unicast route.";
leaf aspa-verification-state {
type aspa-verification-state;
description
"ASPA verification state of BGP IPv6 Unicast prefix.";
}
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:global"
+ "/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi"
+ "/bgp:route-selection-options" {
when "derived-from-or-self(../bgp:name, 'bt:ipv4-unicast') or "
+ "derived-from-or-self(../bgp:name, 'bt:ipv6-unicast')" {
description
"This augmentation is valid for IPv4 and IPv6 Unicast.";
}
description
"augmentation of BGP route selection options";
uses aspa-selection-option;
}
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:neighbors"
+ "/bgp:neighbor/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi"
+ "/bgp:ipv4-unicast" {
description
"augmentation of AS PATH for IPv4 Unicast neighbor";
uses export-aspa-validation-config;
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
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+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:neighbors"
+ "/bgp:neighbor/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi"
+ "/bgp:ipv6-unicast" {
description
"augmentation of AS PATH for IPv6 Unicast neighbor";
uses export-aspa-validation-config;
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:peer-groups"
+ "/bgp:peer-group/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi"
+ "/bgp:ipv4-unicast" {
description
"augmentation of AS PATH for IPv4 Unicast peer group";
uses export-aspa-validation-config;
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols"
+ "/rt:control-plane-protocol/bgp:bgp/bgp:peer-groups"
+ "/bgp:peer-group/bgp:afi-safis/bgp:afi-safi"
+ "/bgp:ipv6-unicast" {
description
"augmentation of AS PATH for IPv6 Unicast peer group";
uses export-aspa-validation-config;
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
6. Security Considerations
This section is modeled after the template described in Section 3.7
of [YANG-GUIDE].
The YANG data models in this document define data models that is
designed to be accessed via YANG-based management protocols, such as
NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040]. These protocols have to
use a secure transport layer (e.g., SSH [RFC4252], TLS [RFC8446],
and QUIC [RFC9000]) and have to use mutual authentication.
The Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) [RFC8341]
provides the means to restrict access for particular NETCONF or
RESTCONF users to a preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or
RESTCONF protocol operations and content.
There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that
are writable/creatable/deletable (i.e., config true, which is the
default). These data nodes can be considered sensitive or vulnerable
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in some network environments. Write operations (e.g., edit-config)
to these data nodes without proper protection can have a negative
effect on network operations. Specifically, the following subtrees
and data nodes have particular sensitivities/vulnerabilities:
Some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be
considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It
is thus important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config,
or notification) to these data nodes. Specifically, the following
subtrees and data nodes have particular
sensitivities/vulnerabilities:
There are no particularly sensitive RPC or action operations.
7. IANA Considerations
RFC Ed.: In this section, replace all occurrences of 'XXXX' with the
actual RFC number (and remove this note).
7.1. IETF XML Registry
The IANA is requested to assign the following URI in the "IETF XML
Registry" [RFC3688]:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bgp-origin-as-validation
Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bgp-sec
Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang: ietf-bgp-aspa
Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
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7.2. YANG Module Names Registry
This document registers the following YANG modules in the "YANG
Module Names" registry [RFC6020]:
Name: ietf-bgp-origin-as-validation
Maintained by IANA? N
Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bgp-origin-as-
validation
Prefix: oav
Reference: RFC XXXX
Name: ietf-bgp-sec
Maintained by IANA? N
Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bgp-sec
Prefix: sec
Reference: RFC XXXX
Name: ietf-bgp-aspa
Maintained by IANA? N
Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bgp-aspa
Prefix: aspa
Reference: RFC XXXX
8. References
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9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI
10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810, DOI
10.17487/RFC6810, January 2013, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc6810>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, DOI
10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
[RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8210] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1", RFC
8210, DOI 10.17487/RFC8210, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8210>.
[RFC8342] Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., Shafer, P., Watsen, K.,
and R. Wilton, "Network Management Datastore Architecture
(NMDA)", RFC 8342, DOI 10.17487/RFC8342, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8342>.
[RFC8635] Bush, R., Turner, S., and K. Patel, "Router Keying for
BGPsec", RFC 8635, DOI 10.17487/RFC8635, August 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8635>.
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol,
Version 2", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
sidrops-8210bis-16, 27 September 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-
8210bis-16>.
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[I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification] Azimov, A., Bogomazov, E.,
Bush, R., Patel, K., Snijders, J., and K. Sriram, "BGP
AS_PATH Verification Based on Autonomous System Provider
Authorization (ASPA) Objects", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification-20, 4 January
2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
sidrops-aspa-verification-20>.
[I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-model] Jethanandani, M., Patel, K., Hares, S., and
J. Haas, "YANG Model for Border Gateway Protocol (BGP-4)",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-idr-bgp-
model-18, 21 October 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-idr-bgp-
model-18>.
9.2. Informative References
[RFC8340] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams",
BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>.
[YANG-GUIDE] Bierman, A., Boucadair, M., and Q. Wu, "Guidelines for
Authors and Reviewers of Documents Containing YANG Data
Models", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
netmod-rfc8407bis-28, 5 June 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netmod-
rfc8407bis-28>.
Contributors
Jeffrey Haas
Juniper Networks, Inc.
1133 Innovation Way
Sunnyvale, CA 94089
United States of America
Email: jhaas@juniper.net
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Hongwei Liu
ZTE Corporation
China
Email: liu.hongwei3@zte.com.cn
Mengxiao Chen
H3C
China
Email: chen.mengxiao@h3c.com
Authors' Addresses
Yisong Liu
China Mobile
China
Email: liuyisong@chinamobile.com
Changwang Lin
New H3C Technologies
China
Email: linchangwang.04414@h3c.com
Haibo Wang
Huawei Technologies
China
Email: rainsword.wang@huawei.com
Jishnu Roy
Juniper Networks, Inc.
1133 Innovation Way
Sunnyvale, CA 94089
United States of America
Email: jishnur@juniper.net
Di Ma
ZDNS
Floor 21, Block B, Greenland Center
Chaoyang Beijing, 100102
China
Email: madi@zdns.cn
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