RepSec: Post-Breach Data Neutralisation Protocol
draft-ehlers-repsec-01

Internet-Draft                                              R. Ehlers
Intended status: Informational                              PastWipe Ltd
Expires: October 2026                                       April 2026

              RepSec: Post-Breach Data Neutralisation Protocol
                      draft-ehlers-repsec-01

Abstract

   This document introduces RepSec, a post-breach data neutralisation
   protocol designed to reduce the utility of exfiltrated or unauthorised
   data copies. RepSec operates independently of traditional perimeter
   and access-control security models by enforcing conditional data
   usability based on attestation and environmental integrity. The goal
   is to limit downstream exploitation, resale value, and operational
   impact of compromised data without disrupting legitimate use.

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1.  Introduction

   Traditional cybersecurity architectures focus on preventing
   unauthorised access to data. However, once data has been exfiltrated,
   copied, or otherwise exposed, existing controls provide limited
   mechanisms to govern its subsequent use.

   This document defines a conceptual framework for post-breach data
   control, where the objective shifts from access prevention to
   sustained control over data usability after exposure.

   RepSec introduces a protocol model that enables data to become
   conditionally usable based on verifiable environmental and
   contextual factors.

2.  Problem Statement

   Current security models assume that data, once accessed, remains
   inherently usable. This assumption creates a structural gap:

   - Exfiltrated data can be reused indefinitely
   - Data resale markets retain economic value
   - Insider threats bypass perimeter controls
   - Encryption protects transport and storage, not post-theft use

   As a result, organisations face persistent risk even after
   detection, containment, and remediation.

3.  Design Goals

   RepSec is designed with the following objectives:

   - Post-exposure control: Maintain influence over data usability after loss
   - Environmental binding: Restrict data function to approved contexts
   - Low operational overhead: Avoid significant latency or workflow disruption
   - Compatibility: Operate alongside existing security infrastructure
   - Auditability: Provide verifiable evidence of data state and access conditions

4.  Architectural Overview

   RepSec operates as a data-centric control layer that introduces
   conditional execution semantics to protected data objects.

   At a high level, the system includes:

   - Data objects with embedded or associated control logic
   - An attestation mechanism validating execution environment integrity
   - A policy framework governing permitted usage conditions
   - A response mechanism that degrades or invalidates data outside
     approved parameters

   The protocol does not require modification of underlying storage
   systems but instead overlays a control plane governing data usability.

5.  Operational Model

   Under RepSec, data access is evaluated dynamically at the point of use.

   Example flow:

   1. A data object is requested for use
   2. The execution environment is assessed against defined policies
   3. If conditions are satisfied, full functionality is granted
   4. If conditions are not satisfied, data is degraded, restricted,
      or rendered unusable

   This model ensures that possession of data does not guarantee its utility.

6.  Security Considerations

   RepSec addresses several threat vectors:

   - Data exfiltration and resale
   - Insider misuse
   - Unauthorised duplication
   - Long-term exploitation of archived stolen data

   The protocol assumes that adversaries may obtain full data copies
   and focuses on reducing their ability to derive value from them.

   Detailed implementation strategies, including cryptographic methods
   and enforcement mechanisms, are outside the scope of this document.

7.  Performance Considerations

   RepSec is designed to minimise performance impact by:

   - Performing lightweight attestation checks
   - Avoiding full system re-architecture
   - Operating at the data interaction layer rather than network layer

   Specific performance characteristics depend on deployment context.

8.  Interoperability

   RepSec is intended to integrate with:

   - Identity and access management systems
   - Data loss prevention tools
   - Endpoint detection and response platforms
   - Existing encryption and key management systems

   The protocol complements rather than replaces these controls.

9.  IANA Considerations

   This document makes no requests of IANA.

10.  References

   [1]  Zero Trust Architecture, NIST SP 800-207
   [2]  Data-Centric Security Concepts, Various Sources

Author's Address

   Ralph Ehlers
   PastWipe Ltd
   Email: contact@pastwipe.com