Drone Operations in Conflict Zones

Navigation Without GNSS: The New Operational Standard in Drone Warfare The war in Ukraine has proven that the era of UAVs relying solely on GNSS is over. The battlespace is saturated with electronic warfare systems that disrupt satellite signals across multiple frequencies. In this environment, even advanced CRPA antennas with eight elements have become ineffective. Jamming now comes from multiple directions with overwhelming power, rendering traditional spatial filtering obsolete. A recent case on the Sumy axis illustrates the shift. After a Superkam (Skat) UAV was shot down, investigators found a high-precision altimeter and an onboard microcomputer. This indicates the use of terrain-referenced navigation—specifically, digital elevation models (DEMs) that allow a UAV to determine its position by comparing terrain profiles rather than relying on external signals. Once reserved for cruise missiles (like TERCOM), this technology has now been adapted for tactical drones. This is no longer experimental. UAVs like the V2U have been operating with terrain-matching capabilities for over a year. In parallel, visual navigation using EO or IR cameras with SLAM algorithms is gaining traction. These systems allow drones to localize themselves by comparing live camera feeds to reference imagery, even in complete GNSS denial. Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) provide short-term positional awareness using internal sensors. Though they suffer from drift, they are highly valuable when fused with other data sources—terrain, visual, or barometric. Advanced UAVs now rely on multi-sensor fusion: combining INS, altimeters, EO/IR imagery, and map data to create resilient, redundant navigation systems. A growing trend is local radio-based navigation using pseudo-satellites, RF beacons, or LTE/5G triangulation. In combat zones, however, reliance on national infrastructure is impractical. Instead, tactical forces must create their own positioning grid, using UAVs or ground-based transmitters. This evolution demands a new mindset. Enhancing GNSS resilience is no longer enough. The very architecture of navigation must be rethought. Resilience must come from independence, not reinforcement. Key implications: All medium- and long-range UAVs must support GNSS-free navigation. Terrain and visual databases are now strategic assets. INS and onboard computing are essential, not optional. Command systems must assume operations in GNSS-denied environments as the norm, not the exception. In modern warfare, the winner won’t be the one with the strongest signal—but the one who no longer needs it. Autonomous navigation in signal-denied environments will define next-generation UAV effectiveness. If you’re designing a drone today, the first question should be: How will it navigate when nothing works? Because that is the new baseline.

Three years into the war in Ukraine, the role of unmanned aerial systems continues to evolve—technologically and tactically. At Quantum Systems, we’ve been directly engaged since early 2022 and have delivered over 700 Vector reconnaissance drones to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Just as important as the system itself is the feedback from those who use it under real combat conditions. In a recent article by hartpunkt, I shared observations on how tactical employment has shifted from ad-hoc target engagement to systematic pattern recognition. Instead of attacking the first identified threat, units today conduct multi-day surveillance to reveal supply structures, timing patterns, and command dependencies—enabling synchronized strikes with lasting effect. This tactical evolution goes hand in hand with technological demands: extended endurance, reduced susceptibility to EW, automated workflows, and interoperable Software solutions like MOSAIC UXS. And it comes at a time when Ukraine is consolidating its drone portfolio, prioritizing operational maturity and scalability over experimental variety. This logic extends to partners like ARX Robotics, whose unmanned ground system Gereon is deployed alongside Vector units in contested logistics corridors—e.g., to resupply positions in the so-called “Greyzone” under constant FPV threat. Both companies follow a strong localization strategy in Ukraine, with shared infrastructure and direct adaptation based on combat experience. Ukraine is now moving to consolidate its drone ecosystem—reducing the number of systems in use from over 240 to around 25. That trend favors platforms with operational maturity, industrial depth, and proven battlefield integration. For those working at the intersection of defense, technology, and capability development, these insights offer a glimpse into how tactical UAVs are becoming strategic tools.

𝗢𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝗗𝗲𝗽𝘁𝗵 𝗜𝘀 𝗡𝗼 𝗟𝗼𝗻𝗴𝗲𝗿 𝗦𝗮𝗳𝗲 Operators of Ukraine’s 3rd Special Operations Regiment are reportedly using middle-strike drones to hit Russian forces and logistics in operational depth. That phrase matters because it describes one of the most important changes in the war. The drone fight is no longer limited to trenches, tree lines and vehicles close to the contact line. Ukrainian units are increasingly using longer-range tactical drones to reach the spaces where Russia tries to move, supply, repair, command and protect its forces beyond the immediate front. For #DroneWarfare, this is the middle layer between FPV strikes at the tactical edge and strategic deep strikes against refineries, air bases, bridges and depots. It is the zone where logistics vehicles, air-defence systems, command posts, EW assets, artillery support vehicles and movement routes become vulnerable without requiring a full strategic strike package. ⚙️ That is why middle-strike drones are so dangerous for Russia. They do not need to destroy every vehicle to change behaviour. They only need to make movement predictable, force detours, slow convoys, push assets farther back, increase camouflage demands and turn routine logistics into a combat operation. The 3rd SSO Regiment’s reported activity fits this wider pattern. Ukrainian drone operators are not only hunting targets of opportunity; they are attacking the connective tissue of Russian operations. Roads, support vehicles, hidden equipment, resupply routes and rear-area staging points are becoming part of the same kill chain. For #ModernWarfare, the lesson is that operational depth is shrinking. A force may still believe it is behind the front, but if it can be seen, tracked and reached by drones, then it is already inside the battlespace. Distance still matters, but it no longer guarantees safety. 🧠 This changes how armies must think about protection. It is not enough to defend the front line while assuming the rear can function normally. The rear now needs dispersion, deception, mobility, air defence, EW, concealment and constant movement discipline, because the enemy is no longer waiting for logistics to arrive at the front. Ukraine’s middle-strike drone layer is therefore not only destroying targets. It is attacking Russian freedom of movement. 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘯𝘦𝘸 𝘳𝘦𝘢𝘳 𝘢𝘳𝘦𝘢 𝘪𝘴 𝘯𝘰𝘵 𝘸𝘩𝘦𝘳𝘦 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘦𝘯𝘦𝘮𝘺 𝘤𝘢𝘯𝘯𝘰𝘵 𝘴𝘦𝘦 𝘺𝘰𝘶, 𝘣𝘶𝘵 𝘸𝘩𝘦𝘳𝘦 𝘩𝘦 𝘤𝘢𝘯𝘯𝘰𝘵 𝘧𝘪𝘯𝘥, 𝘧𝘪𝘹 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘳𝘦𝘢𝘤𝘩 𝘺𝘰𝘶 𝘧𝘢𝘴𝘵 𝘦𝘯𝘰𝘶𝘨𝘩.

The Russia-Ukraine War: A New Character of Combat Operations By Maj. Gen. (Res.) Dr. Yakiv Benjo and Communications Specialist Guy N. from Elbit Systems Originally published on May 19, 2025, in the ATI journal “Maarachot” Translated from Hebrew and summarized by Igal Levin ⸻ The FPV Revolution • FPV (First Person View) drones are not just a new tactical innovation — they represent a revolution in military affairs. • NATO generals still need to grasp the full scope of this transformation. • The impact of FPVs cannot be addressed with piecemeal solutions or ignored (at the cost of mounting losses), as they fundamentally alter the basis of tactical doctrine. Why FPVs Are Game-Changing • Their phenomenal effectiveness stems from a rare combination of factors: extremely low cost, high precision, and operational range of dozens of kilometers. • FPVs allow concentration of firepower through swarming tactics, while preserving force decentralization. • Fiber-optic guided FPVs, in particular, are nearly unstoppable — the only way to neutralize them is to eliminate the operator. • Operators are typically well-protected and hard to detect, offering unique battlefield safety at scale. Disrupting Traditional Military Thinking • FPVs and small drones have broken the cornerstone of classical military doctrine: the ability to concentrate force and mass at decisive points. • Defenders can no longer rely on heavily fortified zones or static strongpoints. • Offensive tactics are shifting toward small tactical units infiltrating deep into enemy formations, pulling out defenders (“decoys” — called “pisiuny” in Ukrainian military slang). • Modern offensives now rely on concentration of firepower, not troop mass or maneuver. Logistical and Tactical Implications • Forward logistics hubs and command posts have become deadly traps due to their size and detectability. • Solutions: • Logistics: decentralization • Command: go underground, rely on wired and satellite communications • The very architecture of the frontline has changed: it is now a 40-kilometer-wide “death crater”, where exposure in open areas for more than 15 minutes results in near-certain death. Integrated Warfare and Future Developments • Success will come from combined arms operations: synchronizing aviation, artillery, FPV swarms, and ground forces. • Even air superiority must now be redefined. • The day is approaching when we’ll see fully operational FPV swarms with fiber optics and AI-based battle management. Human–Machine Fusion and Urgency • These developments raise fundamental questions about the human role in the future of war and human-machine teaming. • The authors stress the urgent need for defense industries and armed forces to fully integrate FPVs across all units. • Complacency and underestimating this technology will result in paying double the price later. Diagrams: 1. Battlefield & threat vectors 2. The 40-kilometer “death zone”

FPV drones are the lead munition in Ukraine, and this looks unlikely to change anytime soon. A new tactics guide was just published, and it is a sobering reality check for anyone still thinking in 20th-century, Ranger-School style patrols. FPV drones currently account for up to 70% of personnel casualties and equipment damage on the battlefield. We are seeing $500 assets with a 2.5 kg payload capacity delivering precision lethality behind lines, making the most dangerous zone not the frontline anymore but up to 30km behind the line of contact. The document outlines 19 brutal mission sets that prove how fast the intersection of hardware and strategy is moving: 1. Combined Strikes: FPVs serve as the kinetic opener to immobilize armor, while "bomber" drones drop munitions to finish off personnel during evacuation. 2. FPV Dragon: Using thermite charges—adapted from 120mm incendiary rounds—to incinerate positions and equipment from altitudes of 20-50 meters. 3. The Matyugalnik: A PSYOP tactic using drones equipped with loudspeakers to broadcast surrender demands directly into a soldier's foxhole. The response to this threat isn't just about better EW. It requires a shift in troop density. Large units are being replaced by two-man "foxhole" teams to minimize their signature and avoid attracting a dozen "birds" to a single position. If you aren't behind a "G-shaped" dugout entrance or protected by a literal wall of fishing nets, you are a target of opportunity. This is a must-read for the defense community. It is the difference between "testing" tech in a lab and understanding how it actually performs when the C2 links are screaming under high-intensity jamming. #UAS #FPV #ElectronicWarfare #DefenseTech #InfoOps

Inside Ukraine’s Drone Battalions Striking Deep into Russia Ukraine’s drone warfare strategy has escalated dramatically, with unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) battalions launching strikes deep inside Russian territory, targeting oil refineries, airfields, and military infrastructure. The 14th UAV Regiment, a specialized force of engineers, pilots, and special operations soldiers, has been executing long-range, high-impact attacks to disrupt Russian logistics and fuel supplies. Key Developments in Ukraine’s Drone Campaign • Striking Russian Energy & Military Infrastructure: • Drones are hitting strategic oil refineries and airfields, crippling fuel supply chains for the Russian military. • Ukraine’s Liutyi UAVs, each 13 feet long with a 23-foot wingspan, can carry explosive payloads of up to 50kg. • Coordinated, Long-Range Drone Strikes: • Ukrainian forces are launching dozens of drones simultaneously, overwhelming Russian air defenses. • Targets are hundreds of miles inside Russian territory, including the Tuapse naval port. • Growing Russian Counterstrike Threat: • Russia is intensifying its air defenses, adapting to Ukraine’s increasingly effective UAV tactics. • Moscow has begun deploying electronic warfare systems and drone-hunting fighter aircraft to intercept incoming UAVs. Why This Matters • A New Era of Drone Warfare: • Ukraine’s use of low-cost, long-range drones to strike deep into Russia marks a fundamental shift in modern warfare. • This strategy maximizes impact with minimal risk to personnel, leveraging asymmetrical warfare to counter Russia’s superior numbers. • Strain on Russian Supply Lines: • Attacks on oil plants and refineries could disrupt Russia’s fuel supply for frontline operations, weakening its ability to sustain its war effort. • Escalation Risks & Retaliation: • If Ukraine’s drone campaign continues to expand, Russia may escalate counterstrikes on Ukrainian infrastructure and key cities. • There is also a risk of wider geopolitical fallout, particularly if Western-supplied technologies are linked to these strikes. What’s Next? • Ukraine Expanding Drone Production: • Kyiv is rapidly scaling up domestic UAV production to increase its drone warfare capabilities. • Russia Adapting to Drone Threats: • Moscow may intensify cyber warfare and electronic countermeasures to neutralize Ukraine’s drone strikes. • Increased Western Support for UAV Development: • NATO allies may increase drone technology assistance, providing advanced AI-driven targeting and stealth capabilities. The Bottom Line Ukraine’s drone battalions are revolutionizing modern warfare, proving that long-range UAV strikes can cripple enemy infrastructure without direct confrontation. As Ukraine escalates its deep-strike capabilities, Russia will be forced to adapt or risk continued battlefield losses. The next phase of the war will likely be shaped by UAV innovation and counter-drone defenses.

The Drone on Drone War Is Already Here During my recent work with the Armed Forces of Ukraine, one of the clearest developments has been the growing normalisation of unmanned systems being used specifically to hunt, intercept and destroy other unmanned systems. FPV drone on FPV combat still occurs relatively rarely. The speeds, latency, small visual signatures and short engagement windows make it exceptionally difficult. But other forms of drone on drone combat are becoming more routine. Interceptor drones are now regularly used against Shahed type attack drones. Similarly, interceptors are increasingly deployed against Russian reconnaissance and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms before they can identify targets or correct artillery and missile fire. FPV drones are also being used against unmanned ground vehicles, turning systems intended to reduce human exposure into targets for other remotely operated systems. The first phase of the drone revolution was about replacing or supplementing traditional military capabilities: reconnaissance, strike, logistics and communications. The next phase is about countering the adversary’s unmanned systems at scale. That challenges the economics and structure of the battlefield. A force can no longer assess a drone only by what it can attack. It must also assess whether it can survive in an environment populated by hostile interceptors, autonomous detection systems and increasingly specialised anti drone platforms. The result is the emergence of an unmanned ecosystem with its own equivalents of air superiority, air defence, electronic warfare, reconnaissance and close combat. Ukraine is already operating inside that future. The trend is likely to accelerate as targeting becomes more automated, sensors improve and drones gain greater onboard autonomy. Engagements that currently require exceptional piloting skill will gradually become easier, faster and more frequent. The critical question is no longer whether drones will fight other drones. They already are and this should challenge how we think defending unarmed assets in conflict. Video: Russian FPV's attacking Ukrainians UGV.

While Ukraine's recent devastating strike on Russian airbases destroyed 41 aircraft worth up to $7 billion using conventional drone, the next phase of drone warfare is already emerging. International innovators are developing AI-powered drones that can navigate autonomously using neural networks, even when GPS signals are completely jammed. These next-generation drones represent a new era: they use machine vision to recognize landmarks and compare them with satellite imagery, essentially navigating like an old-school traveler with a map. When electronic warfare systems jam communications, these drones keep flying to their targets independently. This technology addresses a critical challenge—Ukraine loses about 10,000 #drones monthly to jamming. The solution isn't just technical brilliance; it's economic warfare. As one Ukrainian engineer put it: "A million-dollar missile might kill 20 people, but for the same price, you can buy 10,000 drones with four grenades each, and they will kill 1,000 or even 2,000 people or destroy 200 tanks." Russia has countered with fiber-optic connected drones—essentially deadly kites with unbreakable strings—but Ukraine's bet is on full autonomy. By 2025, we may see drones that select their own targets, requiring operators only to designate strike zones. The implications extend globally. Smaller nations see autonomous swarms as their only defense against larger adversaries. When human operators become the limiting factor, #AI fills the gap. We're witnessing the emergence of #warfare where machines make kill decisions—and it's happening faster than anyone expected. #military

About AWS, over the past several years, at least 31 African states have acquired thousands of unmanned aerial systems, with more than 15 bilateral drone acquisition agreements concluded annually since 2020. This proliferation is altering Africa’s security landscape. Recent research highlights several critical realities: ▶️In 2024 alone, there were 484 documented drone strikes across 13 African countries, resulting in 1,176 casualties ▶️Sudan and the Sahel accounted for 84% of all recorded strikes ▶️Armed non-state actors in at least 9 countries now operate military-grade drones Middle powers, notably Türkiye, are determining geopolitical influence through drone supply chains, with over 32 agreements across Africa The tactical utility of drones is evident. ✔️Turkish-made TB2 drones played a decisive role in reversing an offensive that had advanced to within 200 kilometers of Addis Ababa, while in Libya, unmanned systems proved critical during the 2020 battle for Tripoli. ✔️These cases show how drones can rapidly shift battlefield momentum. However, drone warfare is frequently misunderstood as a decisive or standalone solution. #️⃣ Unmanned systems cannot hold territory, remain vulnerable to adaptive guerrilla tactics, and often lose strategic effectiveness within proxy warfare environments where adversaries quickly adjust. Without integrated ground forces, intelligence fusion, and political strategy, drone dominance is often temporary. #️⃣ More concerning is the lowering barrier to entry. Militant groups across the Sahel and other conflict zones are increasingly weaponizing commercial off-the-shelf drones, modifying quadcopters to deliver improvised explosive devices. This trend accelerates asymmetric warfare while complicating attribution, deterrence, and accountability. The implication for African peace and security governance is clear: ⚠️Effective responses require both counter-drone capabilities and a sober assessment of the limitations of unmanned systems. ⚠️Overreliance on technology risks strategic miscalculation, civilian harm, and escalation without resolution. ⚠️As drones proliferate, human strategy, political judgment, and context-aware governance remain irreplaceable. ⚠️The challenge for African states and the African Union to show doctrinal clarity, regulatory foresight, and integration within broader conflict prevention and peacebuilding frameworks. #AfricanSecurity #DroneWarfare #PeaceAndSecurity #AUGovernance #DefensePolicy #MilitaryTechnology #ArmedConflict #CounterDrone #Geopolitics #HumanSecurity Image from @African center for strategic studies

🚁 Ukrainian PRYMARY drone operators reportedly struck two 48Ya6-K1 Podlet low-altitude surveillance radars, an S-300V launcher, and a KamAZ support truck in the Donetsk region—an exceptionally costly and operationally meaningful combination. Podlet-K1 is a mobile S-band 3D radar optimized to spot low/very-low altitude threats and cue long-range systems like S-300/400; open sources put unit cost around ~$5M, and its loss degrades the network’s ability to catch nap-of-the-earth drones and cruise missiles. The S-300V launcher anchors Russia’s army air-defense against aircraft, cruise missiles, and even some ballistic threats, with 9M83/9M82 interceptors covering 75–100+ km; taking a launcher offline reduces defended footprint and reload capacity. Meanwhile, KamAZ logistics vehicles are the connective tissue for air-defense mobility, resupply, and repair—hits there slow recovery and repositioning. 🧠 The strike underscores how Ukraine’s drone ecosystem keeps innovating: small, affordable UAS are attriting high-value nodes (sensors, launchers, logistics) that make layered air defenses work. Ukrainian units have deliberately prioritized creating “kill zones” for drones and accelerating specialized training pipelines—turning low-cost platforms into precision tools against premium targets. Western support should now focus on scaling this advantage: more EW-resistant datalinks, long-range/loitering munitions, rapid sensor-to-shooter networks, and sustained stocks of FPV components to keep pressure on Russia’s radar/launcher network. Every destroyed Podlet and S-300V element widens the air-defense gaps that protect Russian logistics and strike assets—and brings a just peace closer. ✊ #SlavaUkraini #StandWithUkraine #ArmUkraineNow #DeOppressoLiber #Drones #AirDefense #OSINT #IrregularWarfare #UAVs