Challenges Facing Trust in European Security Alliances

Today I was back in Brussels for a Rasmussen Global conference on the future of European security. In my speech I was clear: Europe faces an existential threat. The security model that has underpinned peace and prosperity in Europe for decades no longer exists. And it is not coming back. Europe must urgently take greater responsibility for its own security. The question is how—and how quickly—we can rise to this challenge. We need a European Security Plan. A security plan which aims at countering Russia’s aggression, securing a sustainable peace in Ukraine, while keeping the U.S. engaged in the Transatlantic alliance. I believe that should be built on five key elements: First, increase defence spending to Cold War levels, to meet the reality of an aggressive and expansionist Russia. All NATO allies should commit to spending 3% of GDP on defence, with 0.5% dedicated to Ukraine’s defence. Second, Europe should show it is willing to meet the bulk of the cost of its own security and protecting Ukraine, taking on at least 70% of the financial cost. In return, the U.S. should remain committed to providing the 20-30% of military aid that only it can provide – such as advanced airlift or surveillance capabilities. Third, Europe must show it is prepared to take the bulk of political risk to underpin peace in Ukraine. That should start with a coalition of European states deploying military trainers and advisers to Western Ukraine. Fourth, Europe must ramp up economic pressure on Russia and its enablers, including China. Europe should join U.S.-led efforts to reduce Russia’s profits from oil and gas exports and support new sanctions on Chinese companies aiding Moscow’s war effort. Fifth, we must reaffirm our commitment to Ukraine’s membership of both the European Union and NATO. Progress on EU accession must happen quickly but EU leaders must also be unequivocal with Washington - EU membership is not feasible without strong security guarantees for Kyiv. And the strongest security guarantee possible remains Ukraine’s membership of NATO. We have the tools at our disposal to face down Russia and build a new and lasting security architecture for our continent. We now need is the political will to deliver it. Read the full proposals for a European security plan here - https://lnkd.in/gn9Fzg_K

Everyone’s talking about Europe’s defense budgets. But let’s be honest—that’s only half the story. The real issue is combat readiness. It’s not about how much you spend—it’s about whether your military can fight and win today. Can they deploy fast? Are their systems modern and integrated? Are troops trained for real-world scenarios? Europe faces a critical moment. With Russia dug in, the U.S. pivoting to Asia, and EU plans like Readiness 2030 rolling out, it feels like Europe’s prepared. But readiness? That’s where cracks appear.  • 𝗨𝗞: Can deploy fast—2,600 troops to NATO’s flank—but with just 72,000 regulars (smallest army since the 18th century), how long can they last?  • 𝗙𝗿𝗮𝗻𝗰𝗲: Big on autonomy—Rafales, subs—but caught between EU defense integration debates and reliance on U.S. intelligence.  • 𝗚𝗲𝗿𝗺𝗮𝗻𝘆: Hit NATO’s 2% GDP, but its key division won’t be combat-ready until 2027. Recruitment struggles, creative accounting inflate the numbers.  • 𝗣𝗼𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱: Spending 4.7% GDP, aiming for 500,000 troops by 2030, but stitching together kit from the U.S., Korea, and Europe leads to interoperability headaches.  • 𝗧𝘂𝗿𝗸𝗲𝘆: NATO’s second-largest army, drone powerhouse, but trust issues linger over Russian systems and geopolitical zigzags.  • 𝗕𝗮𝗹𝘁𝗶𝗰𝘀 & 𝗥𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗻𝗶𝗮: Nimble, integrated with NATO, but rely on reinforcements. Exercises show speed, but depth is thin.  • 𝗜𝘁𝗮𝗹𝘆, 𝗦𝗽𝗮𝗶𝗻, 𝗚𝗿𝗲𝗲𝗰𝗲: Solid airpower but constrained by inflated defense budgets that count non-military items like climate initiatives and pensions.  • 𝗦𝘄𝗲𝗱𝗲𝗻 & 𝗙𝗶𝗻𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱: Strong reserves, civilian readiness, but small active forces limit staying power. Europe’s problem isn’t just spending. It’s readiness. Can European forces fight tomorrow if they had to? Sustain a high-intensity conflict? Integrate seamlessly with allies? Until those questions are answered, no amount of budget headlines or flashy procurement deals will close the gap.

This morning (dressed in my tennis gear at the court's edge - that was a first), I had the pleasure of speaking with Swedish public service about Trump, NATO, and European defense. During the interview, I tried to make four points: ✔ The strength of an alliance hinges on internal confidence (among allies) and external credibility—specifically, the belief by adversaries such as Russia in the alliance's operational effectiveness. Trump has systematically eroded both these aspects with remarkable precision. ✔ Although a formal US withdrawal from NATO appears very unlikely, Trump has a variety of strategies at his disposal to weaken and sow doubt about the alliance's functionality. Some of these measures are already being conceptualised by conservative think tanks. ✔ In the face of immediate threats, Europeans must consider a Plan B that essentially mirrors what ought to be their Plan A: increase defense spending, offer more support to Ukraine, assume greater responsibility for European security, and thus fortify the European pillar of NATO, in part through measures implemented by the EU. ✔ In the long run, however, should the US reduce its engagement further, Europeans will need to do more than just compensate for the absence of US security measures. They will also need to fill other roles traditionally played by the US, such as fostering consensus among and managing the diverse political and industrial landscape of Europe. Achieving a sufficient level of deterrence at the European level will thus require not only increased spending but also deeper integration. This will impact the EU, NATO, and minilateral efforts alike. Turbulent times ahead for European security no doubt. https://lnkd.in/dj5ZbKsz

An important debate is emerging around Europe’s future defence industrial base and whether European countries should prioritise buying defence equipment from within Europe or continue relying on global procurement. The war in Ukraine has shown that industrial capacity, production speed and resilient supply chains are strategic capabilities. Demand for ammunition, missiles, air defence systems and other equipment increased faster than production could respond, while long lead times and competing national priorities exposed vulnerabilities that had accumulated over decades of underinvestment. The discussion therefore extends far beyond major platforms. Every military capability depends on a much wider ecosystem that includes communications, software, electronic warfare, autonomous systems, maintenance, spare parts, data infrastructure, logistics and industrial support. Procuring equipment is only one stage of the process. It must also be integrated into existing force structures, sustained throughout its service life, upgraded as threats evolve and supported by secure supply chains that remain available during prolonged crises. This is where European industrial capacity becomes increasingly important. If multiple crises occur simultaneously, every nation will understandably prioritise its own operational requirements before export commitments. That is not a question of political goodwill but of operational reality. Europe therefore needs sufficient capacity to manufacture, repair and replenish critical capabilities within reasonable timeframes rather than relying exclusively on production located elsewhere. Also ownership of intellectual property, trusted supply chains, cybersecurity, long-term access to software, engineering expertise and the ability to modify systems independently have become increasingly important considerations. Strategic dependence is rarely created by a single platform but it develops gradually through maintenance arrangements, proprietary technologies, software updates or components that cannot easily be replaced. None of this argues for isolation or protectionism but the objective should instead be resilience through diversification, where a stronger European industrial base complements transatlantic cooperation and reduces vulnerabilities across the Alliance. Overall focus should move to how capabilities are delivered, integrated, sustained, made available when they are actually needed. That requires governments to consider not only procurement, but also industrial capacity, innovation, supply security, interoperability and long-term resilience. Ultimately, deterrence is not measured by the number of contracts signed or platforms ordered but by whether capabilities can be produced, delivered, maintained and employed at the speed required by the operational environment. https://lnkd.in/evugi_E9

𝗧𝗿𝘂𝘀𝘁 𝗶𝗻 𝗔𝗹𝗹𝗶𝗮𝗻𝗰𝗲𝘀 𝗜𝘀𝗻’𝘁 𝗮 𝗦𝘄𝗶𝘁𝗰𝗵 𝗬𝗼𝘂 𝗖𝗮𝗻 𝗙𝗹𝗶𝗽 Many in Washington now seem surprised that European allies are hesitant to line up behind the Iran war. But from a European perspective, the sequence matters. Over the past years the same allies were: ▪ tariffed   ▪ publicly insulted   ▪ told NATO was obsolete   ▪ pressured over defense spending   ▪ warned that U.S. security guarantees might disappear  At the same time Russia faced far less public pressure from Washington while Ukraine was repeatedly pushed into concessions. Now suddenly the same allies are expected to rally behind a new Middle East war. Strategic trust does not work like that. Alliances are built slowly and damaged quickly. And once that credibility gap opens, it becomes a geopolitical problem — not a messaging problem. 𝘐𝘯 𝘨𝘦𝘰𝘱𝘰𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘴, 𝘤𝘳𝘦𝘥𝘪𝘣𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘪𝘴 𝘩𝘢𝘳𝘥 𝘱𝘰𝘸𝘦𝘳.

NATO’s ISR challenge is no longer about collecting more data; it is about fusing and acting on it at operational speed across a 32-nation alliance. An Atlantic Council brief highlights that despite strong sensing capabilities, intelligence remains fragmented across national systems, limiting responsiveness in a persistent multi-domain threat environment. Ukraine’s Delta system demonstrates what cloud-enabled fusion can achieve, reducing timelines from ~72 hours to minutes. The report argues NATO should move faster by mandating interoperability standards, allocating defence spend to shared cloud infrastructure, accelerating timelines to 2027–2029, adopting verifiable trust frameworks, and prioritising dual-use digital infrastructure. Their recommended priorities include: • Mandatory interoperability standards for all ISR/cloud systems • Defined share of spending on shared digital infrastructure • Verifiable, outcome-based trust frameworks (not geography-led) • Dual-use civilian–military cloud and data infrastructure • Accelerated cloud transition timelines (2027–2029) • Open architectures (APIs, containerisation, standardised data) • Vendor-agnostic, performance-based procurement • Harmonised certification across allies • Common identity and access management • Digital interoperability treated equal to platform interoperability Without this, increased defence spending risks scaling fragmentation rather than capability. Cloud is becoming the connective layer that determines whether NATO can operate at the speed of relevance. #nato #defence #cloud #isr #digitisation

”The European NATO scenario hinges on a dual balance: maintaining the Transatlantic anchor while gradually shifting the Alliance’s governance, capabilities, and military doctrine toward European leadership. It is less about breaking away from the US than achieving credible co-leadership. This model requires a comprehensive overhaul of European security in terms of budget, capabilities, institutions, and strategy. The main tool for achieving this is financial. If Europe is to steer the Alliance, it must break free from its dependence on US military capabilities. A collective push among member states to raise defense spending to 3–3.5 percent of gross domestic product by 2030 is well within reach. This would not only offset the decline in American engagement, but also help Europe reach critical mass in equipment, munitions, and (most critically) war reserves, which are currently insufficient. The lack of tanks and aircraft is not the only chink in Europe’s armor: It also faces gaps in strategic support capabilities—airlift, aerial refueling, satellite intelligence, ballistic missile defense, long-range drones, and precision strikes. Currently, the US covers over 70 percent of these areas.”

From my recent column: Anyone who still believes in the American security guarantee must be an incurable optimist. In recent weeks, I have discussed the current security crisis in Europe in Delphi, Vilnius, Tallinn, and Prague. The picture is partly disheartening. The debate is dominated by politicians who are afraid to stand up to Trump and say that he is dismantling NATO. Moreover, they fear making the wrong decisions for which they may later be held accountable. They are supported by bureaucrats whose knowledge and solutions are not applicable to the current Russian threat. Rules and procurement procedures are maddening. Following procedures has now become more important than achieving results. That is why it takes years before anything gets off the ground. In many countries, it's even easier to give money to Ukraine so that drones can be purchased in, for example, the Netherlands, than it is to buy those same drones for their own armed forces. The debate is further dominated by former generals who too often fall back on now irrelevant knowledge and want to fight the previous war. There are dissenting voices. They come from thinktanks that the establishment finds irritating. There are, however, some bright spots. The European Union has taken the lead in the rearmament of Europe. Many priorities make sense, from drones to air defense, and from long-range weapons to cyber defense. There is enough money available. At the same time, old thinking still prevails. The war in Ukraine shows that technological developments are moving rapidly and that the acquisition of heavy weapons systems such as tanks, fighter aircraft, and even warships is no longer the priority. In Ukraine, everything revolves around drones — at least until countermeasures are developed against them as well. The same applies to NATO: the first line of defense consists of drones, missiles, and air defense systems. Speed is essential, but the obstacles are enormous, while the signals coming from intelligence agencies are alarming. A report presented in Prague by GLOBSEC identified shortages of qualified personnel and found that most funding goes to large companies producing traditional weapons systems, whose delivery times are becoming shockingly long while prices are exploding. European startups with innovative solutions — which, as in Ukraine, play an essential role in defense and can deliver quickly — are being underfunded. Yet politicians across Europe continue to insist that we cannot do without America. They are hitting the brakes at a moment when speed is urgently needed. Because we have a problem now, and it must be solved now. Putin knows that too. *** Read the full column at HCSS - The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies here: https://lnkd.in/eAdR3bMU

At the Munich Security Conference, Europe was labelled a "sleeping giant." It is a region with latent potential to become a more formidable and self-reliant defence actor. Our research shows that Europe’s NATO defence budget for 2024 was €414 billion, ranking third behind the United States and China. As NATO pledges to nearly double military spending, we have worked with the Milken Institute and Jacques Delors Institute to examine the readiness challenges ahead. Increasing budgets alone won’t solve critical issues: limited industrial capacity, fragmented procurement, labour shortages, and overreliance on imports—especially from China—threaten Europe’s defence resilience. Defence dynamics will continue to evolve rapidly and critically it’s important to transform budgets into scalable capacity and innovation to ensure Europe is ready not just to respond but to lead, and this is the focus of this detailed report: https://owy.mn/4681CQe

Microsoft's example shows that the company can cut off Europeans' access to critical operating systems ‼️ 👉 Microsoft’s decision to block access to the email account of International Criminal Court (ICC) Chief Prosecutor due to sanctions imposed by the US government shows us that the EU cannot trust US operating system providers. The US applied sanctions in February to ICC staff in response to their investigations into Israeli politicians. This challenges the trust of all users of Microsoft's cloud technologies in Europe. ☝️Microsoft just held a major lobbying event in Europe, claiming that European services are safe and detached from the US government’s unpredictable decision-making. This was now proven to be just a poor pitch. Naturally, US companies must comply with US law. For Europeans, this means we cannot trust the reliability and security of US companies' operating systems. A large part of our public sectors’ services rely on Microsoft’s products. This is a major cause of uncertainty. ☝️With this decision, Microsoft is raising awareness in Europe on how totally reliant and vulnerable we are in our dependence on US technology companies. We must finally put our companies first and build European alternatives. Europe cannot rely on mercy of the US or Chinese governments’ decisions. This requires also protective actions. 👉 We no longer have the same trust with the Trump administration - meaning, that we need to review our data transfer agreement with the US. Europe must wake up and understand we can only rely on ourselves. This is a significant factor for both European competitiveness and comprehensive security. European data should no longer be given to the Americans for their development work free of charge. #data #security #sovereignty https://lnkd.in/d7b4RNdU