4 Marriage Migration as Spatio-Temporal Fix in Pohang's Post-Industrial Urban Development through Saemaul

4 Marriage Migration as Spatio-Temporal Fix in Pohang's Post-Industrial Urban Development through Saemaul

HYESEON JEONG

"Asia as Method" for New Knowledge

Through an empirically grounded case study of a core location in Pohang, South Korea, this chapter demonstrates how "Asia as method" and Marxist theories can mutually expand each other. In applying David Harvey's spatio-temporal fix alongside Baik Yeong-seo's twofold-peripheral perspective to an analysis of Pohang's post-industrial urban development, I show that Asia as method does not dismiss Western theories in Asian studies but critically engages with them to create new knowledge about the world that does not marginalize Asia.

Theories are the building blocks from which our understanding of the world is constructed. Most theories, however, have been inspired by the experiences of the West and build a world modelled after it. The resulting geographical hierarchies in academia marginalize the non-West and dismiss area studies for their supposed particularism. It was expected that postcolonial studies would address the lived experiences of the non-West; however, given its obsession with the object of its critique (i.e., the West), postcolonial studies fails to transcend the academic geographical hierarchies between the West and the non-West (Chen 2010, 2). Area studies also falls short in this respect because it represents the knowledge produced by the West about the non-West more than that produced from within non-Western areas. It is with these issues in mind that Kuan-Hsing Chen asserts the need to critically deimperialize theory. One way to do so is to recognize the West as one cultural resource among many others, rather than as one of universal value, and to promote the production of knowledge that contributes to a relational understanding of culture. For scholars of Asian studies working in Asia, the alternative Chen suggests is "using the idea of Asia as an imaginary anchoring point, [through which] societies in Asia can

become each other's points of reference, so that the understanding of the self may be transformed, and subjectivity rebuilt" (Chen 2010, 212). Imagining Asia as an anchoring point is certainly not a call to privilege Asia or to reinforce regional boundaries. It is a practical point of departure for Asian studies scholars to broaden their horizons of knowledge by mobilizing the diverse and yet shared histories and practices of their region. In particular, Chen suggests Asia as method as an attempt to overcome the legacies of colonialism, imperialism, and the Cold War through co-referencing among Asian societies as to how they deal with the specific forms of these legacies in their respective societies.

Building on the insights of Chen and other scholars engaged with the idea of Asia as method, Baik Yeong-seo promotes research from a twofold-peripheral perspective, which could contribute to creating "an autonomous space through which we can move beyond the trinity of the post-colonial, post–Cold War and post-hegemonic order, both theoretically and practically" (Baik 2013b, 145). The perspective of the twofold periphery, Baik argues, can be acquired from places marginalized by both global and national hierarchies. Some examples of such places that Baik uses include Dokdo, where territorial rivalry is taking place between South Korea and Japan; Okinawa, a Japanese island occupied by the US military; and Kinmen, the military front-line between Taiwan and China. These are places that are contested by geopolitical powers and are instrumentalized by their own national governments for their strategic interests. Throughout the twentieth century, the ideologies and practices of the core – including colonialism, imperialism, statism, militarism, as well as anticommunism – have largely dictated the fates of these peripheral places. Baik thus argues that these sorts of places are embedded in multiple layers of marginality, revealing the contradictions of the logic of the core and imbuing the possibility for resistance to its logic (Baik 2013a, 31). He labels these places "core locations" of research, which allow scholars to explore alternative ways of producing knowledge (Baik 2013b, 148). While Chen sheds light on Asia for the possibility of co-referencing in search of new politics, Baik focuses on East Asia for its geopolitical imperatives and potentials for critical regionalism. The interconnected history of the geopolitical and geoeconomic contradictions in the core locations of East Asia, ironically, opens up the possibility of constructing an alternative community that overcomes ethnic nationalism and closed regionalism (Baik 2013b). Although Baik's examples of core locations are all found in geopolitical frontiers, he also argues that, in the search for new knowledge, a core location can be found in any place in the world where we can acquire a perspective of the twofold periphery (Baik 2013a).

Inspired by Baik's insight and at the same time critically examining the limitations of the notion of core location, I exercise the twofold-peripheral perspective in Pohang, South Korea to critically investigate the margins of this industrial city. Admittedly, Pohang has little geopolitical or geo-economic stature and demonstrates no resistance to the order of colonialism, imperialism, or the Cold War. Quite to the contrary, Pohang – or, more accurately, urban areas of Pohang – was a beneficiary of the geopolitical and geo-economic order of the core when South Korea relied on the city's steel production for rapid industrialization during the 1970s and 1980s. After the industrial boom had swept the city, however, it was left with no further momentum for growth. Finding itself in the midst of fierce competition with other cities for global status, Pohang attempted to forge a post-industrial urban identity through a variety of programs. This chapter investigates one of these programs, Global Saemaul, which conflated Pohang's rural experience of an anti-poverty campaign with its urban experience of steel-oriented industrialization in order to create an international development aid program. Ironically, the program revealed and amplified the marginalities of Vietnamese women who had migrated to Pohang to marry when it made the women's natal families in Vietnam its targeted beneficiaries. After analysing the data collected through interviews and archival research conducted in 2016 and 2017, I argue that the ironies of Global Saemaul reveal not only the paternalistic and patrilocal logic of developmentalism that is embedded in Pohang's international development aid program, but also the regional, national, and global complexities of the socio-economic consequences of uneven development.

Marriage Migration as Spatio-Temporal Fix

Transnational migration has been predominantly understood as an issue of territoriality. Migrant workers, unless they are highly qualified, are often viewed as a threat that could potentially burden a destination country economically, politically, and socially. A competent government should have firm control over its borders and clear policies regulating migration. A proactive government would make an effort to address the push factors of migration in origin countries, as did many European governments with foreign aid in the 1990s. Recently, migrant remittances have grown substantially larger than foreign aid and more stably than private capital flows, revealing the high potential of migration for promoting development in origin countries (World Bank 2016). Migration facilitates not only financial transfers but also knowledge sharing and human capital exchange, creating new opportunities and

possibilities. Migrants are now recognized as an important "resource" for promoting economic development (Nyberg-Sorensen, Van Hear, and Engberg-Pedersen 2002). The migration-development nexus thesis highlights migrants as transnational subjects who promote the "co-development" of both origin and destination countries (Faist 2008; Bailey 2010; Fauser 2014).

Hein de Haas (2010) cautiously points out that this economic optimism toward migration replaces the structural discourses of world-systems analysis. The migration-development nexus thesis abstracts transnational migration from broader transformations caused by globalization, thereby obscuring the relationship between the causes and effects of migration and neoliberal policies implemented in the name of development. By extension, the causes of migration (underdevelopment) are artificially separated from the effects of migration (development). In other words, the positive perspectives on migration taken by the migration-development nexus thesis are symptomatic of developmentalism. Although this literature sheds new light on the agency of migrants, it focuses narrowly on the forms of migration that are functional for economic growth. Parvati Raghuram (2009) brings our attention to the power of developmentalism and how the circulation of migrants keeps the idea in motion. Various paradigms of development have come and gone, but developmentalism has yet to be seriously challenged, especially by migrants themselves. Rather, migrants are expected to realize their potential and moral responsibility to overcome the limitations of foreign aid and the states of their origin countries in promoting development: "The mobile governable subject of migration-development … is both required to move in order to strategise their human capital, but also to act morally for the collective good of a distant place/community" (Raghuram 2009, 110). For migrants, development is a matter of both agency and morality.

Arguably, one of the most gendered and ethnically laden forms of migration is marriage migration. An increasing number of Southeast Asian women are migrating to East Asia for marriage, and their remittances are an important source of income for their families back home. One of the popular narratives explaining women's decision to pursue transnational marriage migration is to improve their economic status and to help their natal families. Women make remittances not only because they feel pressure from their natal families to be filial daughters, but also for many other reasons, such as maintaining and strengthening family ties across borders and signalling their successful marriages (Thai 2008; Yeoh et al. 2013). Nonetheless, marriage migrants are largely absent from the migration-development nexus literature,

because they are not considered to be workers and, by extension, agents of development. The androcentric economism of the migration-development nexus literature has highlighted the European experiences of labour migration and refugees and has overlooked the Asian experiences of transnational marriage and its exploitation of women's unofficial labour.

The feminization of intra-Asian marriage migration differs from the general feminization of migration, which is influenced by women's labour participation and the commodification of care work and emotional labour. Intra-Asian marriage migration is primarily a rural-to-rural migration process from Southeast Asia to East Asia through introduction services that were catalysed by the male marriage squeeze in East Asia as well as by patrilocal practices and women's hypergamy (Wang and Chang 2002; Belanger and Wang 2012; Liu, Brown, and Feldman 2014).[1] In a sense, the intra-Asian marriage migration of women is similar to the older Western phenomenon of mail-order brides: both are instances of transnational hypergamy mediated by introduction services. The two are different, however, in the sense that the former is promoted by East Asian states as a solution to their low fertility rates (Yang and Lu 2010, 17). Indeed, popular destination countries of marriage migration in East Asia are countries with the lowest total fertility rates in the world: Japan (with a fertility rate of 1.41%), South Korea (1.26%), Hong Kong (1.19%), and Taiwan (1.13%).[2] Transnational marriages in Japan have been on the rise since the 1970s, particularly through the marriage migration of Chinese and Filipina women. Taiwan witnessed the most rapid increase of transnational marriages in the world between the 1980s and the 2000s through the migration of mainly Indonesian, Vietnamese, and Chinese women. Hong Kong and South Korea followed in their footsteps soon thereafter.

Considering that this trend has been catalysed by state action, I argue that intra-Asian marriage migration represents a spatio-temporal fix aimed at social stability and reproduction. David Harvey's concept of spatio-temporal fix refers to solutions to capitalist crises through temporal deferral and geographical expansion (Harvey 2003, 115; 2006, 427). When profit rates fall, surplus capital is invested in long-term

1 "Marriage squeeze" refers to a disproportionate ratio between the number of males and females at the prime age of marriage; "hypergamy" is the practice of marrying into a group with a higher economic and social status.

2 The World Factbook, "Total Fertility Rate (2017 Estimates)," accessed 1 May 2018, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2127rank.html

projects of geographical expansion and spatial reorganization to avoid devaluations. Bridges, roads, dams, and ports are popular examples of spatio-temporal fixes that provisionally solve crises of over-accumulation while providing new momentum for growth. In the age of global capital, the export and import of surplus capital, commodities, and labour power also work as spatio-temporal fixes that temporarily defer the crises beyond territorial boundaries (Jessop 2006, 162). The state would occasionally permit flows of migration in response to capital's need for cheap labour, but at other times would restrict them to assuage public fears of possible migrant-induced social problems (Scott 2013, 1092). The specific forms of spatio-temporal fixes through migration are influenced not only by geopolitical economy but also by migrants' intersectional factors such as gender, age, class, and ethnicity. As I demonstrate below through the case of Vietnamese women's marriage migration to South Korea, marriage migration and the subsequent mobilization of their care work can also act as a spatio-temporal fix for social problems in the destination country, such as population decline.

The South Korean state has promoted transnational marriage migration to address the problems of uneven development and population crisis. The country's urban-biased industrialization of the 1960s and 1970s resulted in substantial urban migration, which led to the ageing of rural communities as well as a female deficit in rural areas that was exacerbated by a traditional (prenatal) preferences for sons. Consequently, a chronic marriage squeeze occurred in rural areas. Rather than address the fundamental problems that rural communities faced, the state has encouraged rural Korean men to marry ethnic Korean women from China by lowering the territorial barriers to marriage migrant women and sponsoring the men's expenses associated with transnational marriage arrangements. This suggests that transnational marriage in South Korea is located more in the realm of governance than in the private sphere (H.M. Kim 2006). It is a spatio-temporal fix for the social consequences of urban-biased uneven development. At its peak in 2005, over 35 per cent of marriages registered in rural communities were transnational.[3]

The state did not consider the marriage squeeze to be a class issue or a rural problem, but rather a national population crisis (H. Lee 2012). The country's total fertility rate had been near the lowest in the

3 Statistics Korea, *In-gu donghyang josa* [Demographical Changes], 2005. Urban lower-class men are increasingly getting married to foreign women through introduction services, supporting the class-specific pattern of transnational marriage.

world since the late 1990s. Declining marriage rates were interpreted as a cause of the population crisis, and transnational marriage migration was promoted as a solution. Policies on marriage migration were reconceptualized as policies for "multicultural families" (*damunhwa gajok*). Marriage migrant women are colloquially referred to as "foreign daughters-in-law" (*oegugin myeoneuri*), implicitly highlighting their functionality within the marital family as care providers. While the government euphemistically calls them "multicultural women" (*damunhwa yeoseong*), its exclusive application of the idea of multiculturalism to marriage migrants, and not to other types of migrants in South Korea, suggests that the statist discourse of multiculturalism is not about social diversity but about marriage migrants' reproductive functionality (Oh 2007; Yoon 2008). (See also Eom's chapter in this volume for a discussion of how the Chinese residents in South Korea are marginalized by the statist discourse of multiculturalism.) In its present incarnation, Korean "multiculturalism" is a population policy because, in the name of promoting multiculturalism, the government controls the flow of transnational marriage migrants and Koreanizes transnational families (H.M. Kim 2014, 198).

The stop-gap fix of marriage migration contains within it many problems. Outcomes of state-sponsored transnational marriage migration have included a rapid increase in the number of commercial introduction service agencies. These agencies often infringe on women's human rights and limit their access to correct information about life in South Korea, as they prioritize the interest of their paying customers – that is, South Korean men (So 2009; Kwan and Kang 2016). Many marriage migrant women enter into marriage based on incorrect or false information about their spouses.

Hypergamy encourages transnational marriage migration, but transnational marriage migration does not automatically provide women with upward mobility. Rather, it often results in a deterioration of women's social status because these women's educational attainment, linguistic abilities, and racial profile are generally considered inferior to the average in destination countries, something Nicole Constable (2005) calls the paradox of global hypergamy. Marriage migrant women are often in a dependent position and have to negotiate remittances to their natal families with their husbands, though women with greater social capital are more likely to succeed in these negotiations (Belanger, Linh, and Duong 2011). The women are situated in a transnational terrain of patriarchy, attempting simultaneously to live up to the expectations placed on a wife to take care of the marital family and of a filial daughter to support the natal family (Yeoh et al. 2013, 446). Almost 10 per cent

of clients needed help as a result of domestic or sexual violence, while 13.8 per cent consulted an agency about domestic disputes.[4] According to the 2015 National Survey of Multicultural Families, 70 per cent of the marriage migrant respondents considered their marital families to belong to a lower-middle class (33.3 per cent) or a low class (37.5 per cent), and 33.3 per cent were experiencing economic difficulties.[5] Many marriage migrants are burdened with the financial difficulties of both their natal and marital families and seek employment to remedy them. This often causes tension between transnational couples. Most husbands of marriage migrants are much older than their wives, and they fear that their wives might leave them once they become economically independent. In a survey conducted by the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs in 2008, 30.7 per cent of marriage migrants and 32.9 per cent of their Korean spouses identified economic difficulties as the primary cause of domestic disputes (Y. Kim 2008, 183). In 2016, transnational couples accounted for 7.7 per cent of the total marriages and 9.9 per cent of the total divorces.[6] According to the Korea Legal Aid Center for family relations, divorces among couples of transnational marriages are markedly rising, and the increase in transnational marriages and the economic difficulties associated with them are suspected to be the primary cause of this phenomenon (Korea Legal Aid Center for Family Relations 2017).[7]

Pohang's Uneven Development and Saemaul

Pohang is South Korea's major industrial city and home to one of the world's largest steel producers, POSCO. As the majority of the city's population is involved in businesses that cater to the steel producer, Pohang is arguably South Korea's most representative company town. In *Asia's Next Giant* (1989), Alice Amsden depicts POSCO as a primary

4 "Jangnyeon ijuyeoseong sangdam yocheong 10-myeong jung 1-myeong pongnyeok pihae" [One in Ten Migrant Women Experience Violence], *Seoul Shinmun*, 22 March 2018, http://seoul.co.kr/news/newsView.php?id=20180323009004&wlog_sub=svt_023

5 Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, *Jeon-guk damunhwagajok siltaejosa bunseok* [Analysis of the 2015 National Survey of Multicultural Families], 2016, http://www.mogef.go.kr/mp/pcd/mp_pcd_s001d.do?mid=plc503

6 Statistics Korea, *In-gu donghyang josa* [2016 Demographical Changes], 2017, http://kosis.kr/index/index.do

7 For further discussion on marriage migrant women, consult the rich literature on migration and gender in South Korea, including Freeman 2011; Jung 2012; M. Kim 2013; H.M. Kim 2014; D.Y. Kim 2017; H. Lee 2014; Piper and Lee 2016; and Choo 2016.

example of state-capital collaboration for late industrialization. The developmental state of the Park Chung-Hee regime (1961–79) envisioned that an integrated steel mill – that is, steel works that have all the functions necessary for producing, casting, and rolling both iron and steel – would provide a springboard for other industries and facilitate the country's economic growth. This is well captured in POSCO's mission statement that defined steel production as a symbol of national power (*cheolgang-eun gungnyeok*). In addition, Park's military government placed great importance on steel production for South Korea's security in light of the country's armistice with North Korea. For the first three decades, while the state owned the company, the government wholeheartedly supported the company's operations. It financed the inception and expansion of POSCO, subsidized its energy use, and granted it tax discounts. By reinvesting most of its profit in production facilities and personnel, POSCO rapidly increased its productivity and laid the foundation for the country's other heavy industries, such as shipbuilding, automotive, and machinery.

One aspect that Amsden and other developmental state theorists overlooked in their praise of POSCO's and South Korea's rapid growth was that this celebrated growth stemmed from the state's spatial selectivity.[8] During Japanese colonial rule (1910–45), investments in industrialization were concentrated in the Seoul metropolitan area and the Gyeongsang provinces across the Korea Strait from Japan. The Park regime's industrialization strategy continued investments in these already industrialized regions. At the end of the Park regime in 1979, 84.5 per cent of national manufacturing employment was concentrated in these regions (B.-G. Park 2008, 54). In addition, given that the Gyeongsang provinces were the birthplaces of President Park and many of his core staff members, many high-level positions in the state apparatus were filled by members of the Gyeongsang elite, who acted as regional ties to Park and his staff. Indeed, the Gyeongsang provinces have continued to be a stronghold of the Park-family regimes and the conservative party ever since. For example, when Park's daughter Park Geun-hye ran for president in 2012, she won 81 per cent and 63 per cent of the vote in North and South Gyeongsang Provinces, respectively. Pohang, North Gyeongsang (hereafter Gyeongbuk), was one of

8 The spatial selectivity of the developmental state created deep-rooted inequality and antagonism between regions in South Korea, as Oh's chapter in this volume demonstrates. For further discussion on South Korea's spatial strategies and uneven development, see Chung and Kirkby 2002; B.-G. Park 2008; and B.-G. Park and Gimm 2013.

the cities that benefited the most from the Park regime's investments in the 1960s and 1970s.

It is noteworthy that the investments in Pohang were made possible at the expense of providing compensation for the victims of colonial mobilization. The Park regime's pursuit of steel production was in opposition to the post-war world economic order envisioned by the United States. The US government considered the steel mill plan to be too ambitious for South Korea and favoured the country's focusing on labour-intensive, export-oriented light manufacturing (Rhyu 2003). The US opposition obstructed the Park regime's original plan to finance the construction of the steel mill through foreign aid. Instead, the regime decided to utilize Japanese colonial reparations for the creation of POSCO. Unlike the US government, the Japanese government welcomed the investment opportunity, as it opened up a new export market for Japanese machinery as well as the possibility of regionally expanding the operations of Japanese businesses (Ozawa 1979). The investments were made at the expense of the victims of colonial mobilization because the Park regime had removed the right of individuals to claim reparations when negotiating the terms of colonial reparations with Japan in 1965. Instead, the government collected US $800 million from Japan in grant and loans as comprehensive compensation. This was contrary to the government's earlier stance toward the victims of forced labour and military mobilization when it conducted a national survey of colonial victims in preparation for the negotiation of reparations with Japan. The regime's rationale for the government to receive comprehensive compensation on behalf of the victims stemmed from the belief that the colonial reparations should be used to develop the national economy and boost the nation's pride (Han 2014). The victims of colonial labour and military mobilization have been struggling to reclaim their right to individual reparations to this day.

The unevenness of postcolonial resource distribution could also be witnessed within Pohang itself. That city had not been large enough to sustain POSCO, so the company relied on urban migration. Besides, the company was reluctant to recruit native Pohang residents, as the nature of steel making requires people with education and experience. In the decade following the company's opening in 1968, the old harbour city's population tripled, from less than 70,000 to over 200,000 (S.O. Park 1992). POSCO employees constituted Pohang's new regional elite. The company's social investments were limited to the welfare of its employees. High-end apartment complexes were built and made available only to POSCO employees, who were also offered long-term, low-interest housing loans. Their children were schooled separately

from those of other Pohang residents. While POSCO's profits made Pohang rich, it became a "divided city" between POSCO and the rest of Pohang (Jun 2011; Chang 2013).

Pohang prospered thanks to the steel industry in the 1970s and 1980s, but it encountered economic challenges in the 1990s. POSCO brought in no further investment once the country's second integrated steel mill was built elsewhere, following the government's attempt to address uneven development. The city's population grew older, and the economy started to slacken. Moreover, Pohang was merged with a neighbouring county, Yeong-il, which was predominantly rural and did not have any local economic specialties other than producing semi-dried herring. The merger was made in accordance with the government's administrative reconfiguration. In 1995, the government created so-called urban-rural integrated cities by merging financially disadvantaged rural counties and their neighbouring cities. Following the merger, Pohang's fiscal self-reliance ratio dropped below 40 per cent and has yet to recover.[9] To overcome the economic downturn, Pohang has pursued a form of post-industrial urban development. Investments were solicited to host research and development projects, as well as to create a technology park for innovative businesses and an economic free zone.

Another of the city's post-industrial urban development strategies was to develop heritage tourism by investing in one of the city's main cultural assets, Saemaul Undong. Saemaul Undong (literally translated as New Village Movement, hereafter abbreviated as Saemaul) is a rural development campaign that was spearheaded by the Park Chung-Hee regime from 1971 to 1979 to address the urban-rural development gap triggered by rapid industrialization. Aimed at modernizing rural infrastructure and increasing agricultural productivity, the campaign propagated the value of "self-help" to rural communities and encouraged them to volunteer their labour and provide resources to the community. In the first year of Saemaul, the small rural village of Munseong in Yeong-il county received a presidential award for the best practices of the campaign. The village had renovated old thatched houses, constructed new roads, built irrigation canals to increase rice yields, and raised chickens to generate community income to fund further projects. On 17 September 1971, President Park personally visited Munseong to award it with prize money and immediate electrification, declaring that

9 Gyeongbuk Provincial Government, *Jaejeong gongsi* [Financial Report], 2017, http://www.gb.go.kr/Main/open_contents/section/finace/page.do?mnu_uid=2683&LARGE_CODE=330&MEDIUM_CODE=20&SMALL_CODE=90mnu_order=3

the whole country should follow its example. This event has allowed Munseong to claim to be the birthplace of Saemaul.

In 2009, the Pohang government opened a Saemaul history museum in Munseong in honour of the award the village received in 1971. The museum was designed more to help Pohang become a global tourist destination than to preserve the history of Saemaul, as illustrated by the following statement made by Councillor Lee Sangbeom: "People from all over the country and beyond, particularly from China and Vietnam, are visiting Munseong to learn the Saemaul spirit. But they leave disappointed because there is no formal display of historical records … Pohang needs the momentum to reignite Saemaul for the 21st century. By creating a museum of Saemaul in Munseong, we can make the people of Pohang proud, teach our history to the youth, attract tourists and increase regional income."[10] This statement conveniently conflates Munseong and Pohang and ignores the urban-rural disparities. The first half of the statement focuses on Munseong and the value of its history, but the second half turns its attention to Pohang and its economic development. In addition, the first half suggests that the so-called Saemaul spirit of self-help remains in Munseong, while the second half stresses the need to "reignite" it in Pohang. Understandably, Pohang as an industrial city had a different experience of Saemaul than that of rural villages such as Munseong. Cities participated in Saemaul in the later years of the Park regime, but their Saemaul was focused on disciplining factory workers and increasing productivity and had little to do with the ever-emphasized Saemaul spirit of self-help. In short, there was little ground for Pohang to construct an identity based on Saemaul, had it not been for its merger with Yeong-il county in 1995. Pohang required a new asset on which to capitalize to overcome stagnation and promote post-industrial development, and it appropriated Munseong's experience of Saemaul for this purpose.

The Pohang Saemaul Museum replaces the history of the divided city with that of an imaginary place where Saemaul developed a global city out of rurality. A visit to the museum begins on the first floor with a walk through the "Tunnel of History." The tunnel displays images of people suffering from hunger and poverty during the turbulent times of Japanese colonial rule (1910–45) and the Korean War (1950–53). At the end of the tunnel is a visual illustration of the so-called Saemaul spirit, suggesting that Saemaul put an end to the nation's sufferings. South Korea's economic growth was the result of rapid industrialisation, of

10 Pohang City Council, *Bonhoeui hoeuirok* [Minutes of the General Meeting] (125/2), 4 September 2006.

course, and cannot be single-handedly attributed to Saemaul. Whether Saemaul succeeded in making rural villages prosper after the 1970s is debatable, because urban-rural disparities continued to increase after Saemaul and many rural communities today suffer from escalating debt.

The highlight of the museum is the display of the historic visit of 17 September 1971. A miniature replica of the village illustrates the moment when President Park visited Munseong and listened to the villagers' presentation of their campaign outcomes. Glass display cases show the daily logs that the village leaders kept on their implementation of Saemaul projects along with the award certificate they received from President Park. On the wall display rest pictures from the presidential visit along with the quotation "Make every village in the country a new village after the model of Munseong." The quotation is displayed several times throughout the museum in various forms.

Oddly enough, the museum does not explain whether or not the village continued practising Saemaul afterward, or how the village is situated vis-à-vis other rural villages in the country today. Munseong is represented as one of South Korea's poorest villages in the 1960s and the leading model of Saemaul in 1971 – no later details are provided. The story of the village ends on that historic day in 1971, concealing the fact that many villagers later left Munseong and its population decreased from 409 in 1970 to 220 in 2015.[11] For Pohang's new urban identity production, it did not matter what Munseong had become after Saemaul. The rest of the museum focuses only on the present and future of Pohang with its high-tech industries and state-of-the-art urban infrastructure. Pohang's industrialization and economic growth preceded the city's merger with Yeong-il county and cannot be attributed to Munseong's best practices of Saemaul. And yet, the museum presents a revised chronology that begins with Munseong's Saemaul project and ends with Pohang's global desires, misleadingly suggesting that Pohang had grown from a rural village to an aspiring global city through Saemaul. The revised chronology implies an erroneous causality between the Saemaul spirit and South Korea's economic development and another between Munseong's history of Saemaul and Pohang's prosperous future. In this narrative, Saemaul loses its meaning and becomes an empty signifier for Pohang's global urban identity.

Pohang's strategy of capitalizing on rural experiences for urban development is well captured in its lawsuit against Cheongdo, another

11 Pohang Municipal Government, *Tonggyeyeonbo* [57th Statistical Yearbook], 2017.

county in Gyeongbuk about 100 kilometres away from Pohang. Cheongdo's rural development projects and self-help spirit allegedly inspired President Park to design the Saemaul campaign when he was passing through the county in 1969. In the same manner as Pohang, Cheongdo commemorated the presidential visit by building a Saemaul history museum and developing Saemaul education tour programs. As Cheongdo also claimed to be the birthplace of Saemaul, Pohang sued Cheongdo for defamation in 2009. During the trial, to claim Saemaul as their identity, both parties eagerly presented evidence of Park Chung-Hee's visit to their respective villages and argued over the significance of the visits, instead of showing how actively they have practised Saemaul and developed their rural areas. This incident suggests that the value of being the birthplace of Saemaul for both parties stemmed from its potential for developing a tourist destination. The two museums were built more to anchor the national history of Saemaul in Pohang and Cheongdo, respectively, than to disseminate the Saemaul spirit globally. Pohang's Global Saemaul brought the past of rural areas to light, but it turned a blind eye to their present – that is, to what urban-centred development had bequeathed to them.

The Saemaul fever exemplified by Pohang and Cheongdo needs to be contextualized within the trend of globalizing Saemaul in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis (Jeong 2017). Originally a state-led rural development campaign, Saemaul lost momentum at the end of the Park Chung-Hee regime partly because the campaign was involved in the corruption scandals of the succeeding regime, and partly because democratization put an end to the state apparatuses that had mobilized people's labour and resources for the campaign. When the Asian financial crisis placed the country in jeopardy through the disgrace of bankruptcy, people dusted off Saemaul in their memory and started community service provision in the name of Saemaul. For people who had participated in, or were educated about, Saemaul in the 1970s, community service provision was not only a solution to social problems but a way of contributing to national development (Jeong 2017). Some of the popular activities of the revived Saemaul include kimchi-making for disadvantaged households, giving baths to the elderly, and environmental beautification. Today, Saemaul is a community service movement led by the Korea Saemaul Undong Center, which has approximately two million due-paying members across the country. The revived Saemaul also expanded the geographical scope of its mission toward developing countries. It claims that the Saemaul spirit of self-help contributes to making developing countries self-reliant and independent of international aid. The resulting Saemaul projects abroad are a mixture of

material aid and volunteer service provision that all international charity organizations adopt today, with rural development activities that the original Saemaul promoted in the 1970s. Saemaul volunteers visit rural areas in developing countries to teach new agricultural technologies and the Saemaul spirit of self-help, but they never leave a place without making donations of food, medicine, or electronic appliances. Saemaul's transformation from a self-help rural development campaign to a community service movement and the partial overlap of the two in the Saemaul projects abroad produce an ironically convergent discourse in South Korea. It is a discourse of national development that highlights the country's successful development and asserts the usefulness of its experience for promoting international development (Jeong 2017). The discourse of national development masks Saemaul's contradictory promotion of the ideal of self-help and the practice of service provision, as well as its paternalistic gaze on developing countries.

The Gyeongbuk provincial government spearheaded the trend of globalizing Saemaul. As explained earlier, the province had been a political stronghold of Park Chung-Hee and the conservative party more generally. By embracing Saemaul, one of the legacies of Park, politicians could appeal to conservative voters and benefit from the grass-root networks of Saemaul during elections. For example, Governors Lee Eui-geun (1995–2006) and Kim Kwan-yong (2006–18) enthusiastically promoted Saemaul, which could have contributed to their each being elected three consecutive times to the governorship. Governor Kim was particularly interested in globalizing Saemaul to replace its old image with a more updated one for the global era. One of the popular strategies that local governments implemented after the restoration of local autonomy was to build international networks and to "globalize" their cities and local businesses (J.-S. Lee and Woo 2010). Under the leadership of Governor Kim, the Gyeongbuk government thematized its international networks with Saemaul and provided developing countries with aid to disseminate its ideas. Calling himself "Mr. Saemaul," Governor Kim established the Global Saemaul Foundation to finance his government's Saemaul aid, and he travelled to rural villages in Asia and Africa to demonstrate how to practise Saemaul. Today, Gyeongbuk is by far the largest subnational donor of aid in South Korea (Cho, Park, and Jung 2015, 274). Every year, the Global Saemaul Foundation sends off hundreds of volunteers to developing countries and invites hundreds of trainees from target countries. Most of the trainees visit Pohang to learn about the history of Saemaul at the Pohang Saemaul Museum and tour one of South Korea's largest industrial facilities at POSCO. The national Saemaul wave since the late

1990s and the Gyeongbuk government's global Saemaul initiative provided a perfect opportunity for Pohang to utilize Munseong's historic achievement to claim Saemaul as the city's identity. Pledging to disseminate the Saemaul spirit to countries with difficulties to help eradicate poverty and hunger in the world, the city's mayor Park Seung-ho (2006–14) launched an international development aid program called Pohang Global Saemaul in 2011.[12]

Pohang's Saemaul and Marriage Migration

The encounter between Saemaul and marriage migrants in Pohang came at an unexpected time. When the Pohang Municipal Government (PMG) launched Pohang Global Saemaul, the program aimed at replicating Saemaul as a rural development campaign in developing countries such as Madagascar by transferring agricultural technologies as well as the so-called Saemaul spirit of self-help. Political conflict between the Gyeongbuk governor and Pohang mayor, however, forced the PMG to prematurely terminate the program in 2015. The program's unused budget was entrusted to the Pohang Saemaul Association (PSA), the regional chapter of Saemaul in Pohang that had been assisting the PMG with its Madagascan project. Searching for a way to utilize the remaining budget, the PSA learned that other Saemaul chapters in Gyeongbuk had projects that targeted marriage migrants or their natal families in their origin countries. Vietnamese marriage migrants make up to 39.2 per cent of Gyeongbuk's multicultural families, while, nationwide, they constitute only 21 per cent of multicultural families.[13] These numbers contributed to the PSA decision to turn its eye toward Vietnamese marriage migrant women.

As discussed earlier, many transnational families struggle with financial difficulties. In Pohang, as anywhere else, financial issues often lead to the dissolution of or violence in transnational families. In 2007, for example, a marriage migrant woman in Pohang was choked to death by her husband who had recently lost his job. As the woman became the sole breadwinner, the husband became anxious that she would

12 Pohang Municipal Government, *Geullobeol Pohang Bijeon 2020* [Global Pohang Vision 2020], 2010.

13 "Dayanghan gyeolhon iminjadeul saneun gyeongbukdoneun riteul woldeu" [Gyeongbuk Is a 'Little World' of Multicultural Families], *Kukmin Daily*, 22 January 2013, http://news.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0006828596&code=11131418&sid1=all

leave him. Ultimately, he killed his wife and attempted suicide.[14] In response to these local problems, the PSA decided to use the PMG's Global Saemaul budget and help attenuate the financial burdens of transnational families. The PSA reasoned that transnational marriages often fail because marriage migrants are preoccupied with supporting their natal families in their countries of origin. For a transnational couple to lead a happy married life, it was believed, the migrant woman should be freed from concerns about her natal family's economic situation and feel at home in Pohang. Promoting the "happiness" (*haengbok*) of marriage migrants' natal families in Vietnam was considered the same as promoting the happiness of the migrants and their families-in-law in Pohang.

The central activity of the PSA's Vietnam project is housing provision for migrant women's natal families (*chinjeongjib jieojugi*). Constructing new houses or renovating old houses for migrant women's natal families is not unique to Saemaul – it has been performed by many organizations, including the Korean Red Cross and the Korea Land and Housing Corporation, as a form of international charity. For example, when Typhoon Haiyan hit the Philippines in 2013, destroying thousands of houses and killing just as many people, donations were collected across Korea to help rebuild the houses of the natal families of Filipina marriage migrant women. What distinguishes the Saemaul housing project from other housing projects for the natal families of marriage migrants, though, is the connection local Saemaul chapters have with the beneficiary marriage migrants and the relationship between the project and other Saemaul activities. House renovation was a popular activity during the original Saemaul campaign in the 1970s, when the government encouraged replacing straw-thatched roofs with slate roofs. Villagers cooperated to renovate homes one by one until the entire village had new roofs. Today's Saemaul as a community service movement continues to do house renovation for low-income families. Saemaul members volunteer their time and skills to change old floorings, fix leaking roofs, and insulate the thin walls of houses occupied by lone elderly people or those with disabilities. The PSA's Vietnam project is an international extension of such house renovation services for domestic low-income families. The project also includes other activities

14 Dong-u Shin "Joseonjok yeoseong u-uljeung nampyeone mokjollyeo salhae" [Ethnic Korean Chinese Woman Killed by Depressed Husband], *Gyeongbuk Maeil*, 27 December 2007, http://www.kbmaeil.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=37999

such as donating educational equipment to a local school in Vietnam, giving lectures about the Saemaul spirit, and building a chicken farm for income generation. Still, the major activity of the project is housing provision. When launching the project in 2016, the PSA hired a local contractor to be in charge of the half-year-long construction while its members made frequent visits to the project site to evaluate the progress and volunteer their labour and skills for the construction work.

Advertising for the project is assisted by the PMG's Multicultural Family Support Center (hereafter the Multicultural Center). The Multicultural Center is a government agency that provides marriage migrants with Korean language classes, cultural orientations, marriage counselling, parenting lessons, as well as social networking opportunities. At the request of the PSA, the Multicultural Center advertises the housing project on its walls, website, and online networking service (Naver Band) and then collects applications. In addition, it helps the PSA shortlist the candidates.

The PSA interviews each applicant, when possible, together with her husband. Each application is evaluated based on the economic conditions of the natal family and marital family, as well as the marriage life of the couple. In 2016, the PSA shortlisted four candidates whose natal families had significantly poor living conditions, even by Vietnamese standards. The candidates' marital families in Pohang were deemed to have either a middle or middle-low standard of living. After a field visit in Vietnam, the PSA selected two of the four candidates from the same district in Dong Thap province and two more households in the same district to fill the remaining two spaces. Selecting four households from the same district was intended to minimize transportation costs and, at the same time, maximize the visibility of the project. Two of the four houses for renovation were too old and unstable to renovate, so they had to be rebuilt. Besides, the families had specific preferences for what they wanted in their new houses. With the families voluntarily covering the extra costs, the two houses were rebuilt from scratch, and one of the other two was expanded.

The PSA made four trips to Vietnam between August and November 2016. The first trip was a preliminary field survey conducted by two PSA executive members and one PMG official. They collected information on local construction costs and the logistics of operating between Pohang and the district in Vietnam and conducted a needs assessment of a local primary school that the two marriage migrants had attended while growing up. The second trip was made by one PSA executive member to make the final arrangements for the project and to sign contracts with the local construction contractors in the district. The third and fourth trips focused on participating in the construction

process and building a chicken farm. Five male volunteers stayed in the district for eleven days to assist the construction contractors. The final trip included five male volunteers, four female volunteers, and the two marriage migrants. All travel costs were equally shared by the PSA and the participants. One of the volunteers ran a construction business in Pohang, and participated in both trips to offer his expertise.

The two marriage migrant women participated throughout the construction process by facilitating communication between the PSA and the families in Vietnam. Given their fluency in Vietnamese and Korean and familiarity with both cultures, the women played the role of local guide and interpreter during the PSA's fourth trip to Vietnam. The PSA also utilized a popular social network service (Kakaotalk) to communicate with the women's natal families in Vietnam. The families regularly took photos of the construction sites and transmitted them to the PSA via smartphones. The extensive involvement of the marriage migrants and their natal family members ensured that the project reflected the needs and desires of the families in Vietnam. It also helped the PSA develop a sense of community with the marriage migrants and their natal families. Compared to the conventional practices of foreign aid, including the South Korean government's Saemaul projects abroad, which select project sites and activities based on the donor's political and economic interests, the PSA's housing project in Vietnam is recipient-oriented and has the potential of building a lasting relationship of care between the donor and the recipient.

Nevertheless, the donor-oriented and paternalistic nature of the project is hard to overlook. Despite the self-claimed Saemaul spirit of self-help, the PSA's housing project offers few opportunities for the Vietnamese recipients to contemplate their own definition of development; rather, it replicates the practice of temporary relief associated with conventional foreign aid. In addition, the project reveals the patrilocal logic of marriage migration, since it explicitly aims at promoting Pohang's own development, by facilitating the settlement of marriage migrants, instead of that of Vietnam. The formal objective of the project is "to share the burden of marriage migrants to support their natal families and facilitate their resettlement in Pohang," but the choice of housing project implies much more. Renovating or rebuilding houses is a popular way of investing or displaying the wealth accumulated with migrant remittances in Southeast Asia (McKay 2005; Faier 2013; Peluso and Purwanto 2018). Many marriage migrants have the desire to perform their filial duty by "giving their natal parents a nice house," as labour migrants do with their remittances. The PSA chose a program of housing provision not only because the association had the skills and experience to pursue it, but because the activity could visually fulfil the

filial duty of the marriage migrant. A renovated or rebuilt house symbolizes the presumably improved standard of living that the daughter might enjoy overseas, irrespective of the actual living conditions of her marital family. It also publicly showcases the benefit of having a daughter living in a developed country such as South Korea. Knowing that her natal family lives in the best house in her hometown, the daughter might be able to free herself from concerns about her natal family in Vietnam and better assimilate into life in Pohang.

Conclusion: Multiple Marginalities of Marriage Migrant Women in Pohang

Chen's Asia as method is a call to overcome the problems of Western-oriented knowledge production through co-referencing within Asian studies in Asia. It is neither a dismissal of Western theories nor an accord on Asia's superiority, as claimed by some Asian societies and governments. Rather, Asia as method is a constant reminder that Asian scholarship should work on revealing and remedying the violent legacies of colonialism, imperialism, and the Cold War. This chapter has shown how Asia as method and Marxist theories can mutually expand each other by employing Baik Yeong-seo's twofold-peripheral perspective. Baik has contributed to the discussion of Asia as method by bringing to our attention the places that are located at the junction of multiple layers of marginalization and that can furnish alternative sources of knowledge production and politics. Baik's methodology underpinned this research, which focuses on Vietnamese transnational marriage migrant women in Pohang who are situated at the transnational intersection of patriarchy and developmentalism. Facing the end of steel-induced development, Pohang tried to build a new urban identity based on the rural areas' history of Saemaul, regardless of the realities of these areas. Pohang's rural areas had been excluded from the city's industrial growth and experienced both a population decline and a marriage squeeze. The state presented transnational marriage migration as a solution to both.

This chapter has argued that such state-sponsored transnational marriage migration is a spatio-temporal fix for socio-economic problems of post-industrial stability and reproduction, which proactively utilizes territorial boundaries. The case of Pohang allows us to investigate not only the stop-gap way in which capital invests in built environments but also a variety of scale-jumping programs that attempt to provisionally remedy the socio-economic consequences of uneven development. More importantly, it enabled us to contemplate the gendered aspects

of spatio-temporal fixes. As urban-rural disparities caused a chronic female deficit in rural areas and the nation's total fertility rate rapidly declined, the South Korean state selectively loosened territorial boundaries for marriage migrant women and provided services for their successful settlement and family raising. Migrants' labour and their moral responsibility to families and compatriots are mobilized and spatially rearranged to address the needs and concerns of both the destination and origin countries and delay crises of uneven development. Particularly, marriage migrant women are subject to the compound moral expectations of taking care of their marital families and sending remittances to their natal families. Pohang's Global Saemaul is an instance of international development aid being used to help marriage migrants meet these expectations while creating a new development momentum for the donor. The Saemaul housing project in Vietnam illustrates how international development aid is implicated in amplifying the marginalities marriage migrant women experience while also challenging them. Its goal of remedying the economic difficulties of the natal families of marriage migrant women was based on the fear they might interfere with Pohang's development. The uneven development that triggers transnational migration, however, is a structural one that cannot be easily ameliorated by cursory attempts such as building houses. The Saemaul housing project is yet another spatio-temporal fix for the challenges posed by the spatio-temporal fix of transnational marriage migration in Pohang.

Baik's twofold-peripheral perspective sheds light on the intersection of multiple marginalities at which Vietnamese marriage migrants in Pohang are situated. At the same time, the case of Pohang challenges Baik's focus on East Asia in his core location discussion. Baik's East Asia thesis is concerned with the historically entangled relations among China, Japan, and South Korea and the unending conflicts and misunderstandings that arise from those relations. Hence, his thesis emphasizes the potential of peace-building scholarship in the region. The imperial (or sub-imperial) projects of economic and military expansion of the three countries, however, increasingly challenge the validity of East Asia for practising Baik's twofold-peripheral perspective. While the East Asia thesis does not intend to promote regionalism, it inadvertently privileges what takes place within East Asia over events in other regions or between other regions and East Asia. Nevertheless, as illustrated in the case of Pohang and Vietnam, the twofold-peripheral perspective is effective in uncovering the new sorts of contradictions that globalization has produced beyond the familiar regional boundaries.

REFERENCES

Amsden, Alice Hoffenberg. 1989. *Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Baik, Young-Seo. 2013a. *Haeksimhyeonjang-eseo Dong-asiareul Dasi Mutda: Gongsaengsahoereul Wihan Silcheon-gwaje* [Rethinking East Asia in Core Locations: A Task for a Co-Habitation]. Paju, KR: Changbi.

Baik, Young-Seo. 2013b. "An Interconnected East Asia and the Korean Peninsula as a Problematic: 20 Years of Discourse and Solidarity Movements." *Concepts and Contexts in East Asia* 2: 133–66.

Bailey, Adrian J. 2010. "Population Geographies, Gender, and the Migration-Development Nexus." *Progress in Human Geography* 34 (3): 375–86.

Belanger, Daniele, Tran Giang Linh, and Le Bach Duong. 2011. "Marriage Migrants as Emigrants: Remittances of Marriage Migrant Women from Vietnam to Their Natal Families." *Asian Population Studies* 7 (2): 89–105.

Belanger, Daniele, and Hong-zen Wang. 2012. "Transnationalism from Below: Evidence from Vietnam-Taiwan Cross-Border Marriages." *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* 21 (3): 291–316.

Chang, Sehoon. 2013. "Pohang: Gieobdosiui Sahoesaengtaehak" [Pohang: Socioecology of an Industrial City]. In *Gukgawa Jiyeok* [National State and Regions], edited by Bae-Gyoon Park and Dong-Wan Gimm, 198–227. Seoul: Alto.

Chen, Kuan-Hsing. 2010. *Asia as Method: Toward Deimperialization*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Cho, Hyun Joo, Geon Woo Park, and Heon Joo Jung. 2015. "Han-guk Jibangjeongbuui ODA" [ODA Offered by South Korean Regional Governments]. *Jibanghaengjeongyeon-gu* [Regional Administration Research] 29 (1): 261–89.

Choo, Hae Yeon. 2016. *Decentering Citizenship: Gender, Labor, and Migrant Rights in South Korea*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Chung, Jae-Yong, and Richard Kirkby. 2002. *The Political Economy of Development and Environment in Korea*. London: Routledge.

Constable, Nicole, ed. 2005. *Cross-Border Marriages: Gender and Mobility in Transnational Asia*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

de Haas, Hein. 2010. "Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective." *International Migration Review* 44 (1): 227–64.

Faier, Lieba. 2013. "Affective Investments in the Manila Region: Filipina Migrants in Rural Japan and Transnational Urban Development in the Philippines." *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 38 (3): 376–90.

Faist, Thomas. 2008. "Migrants as Transnational Development Agents: An Inquiry into the Newest Round of the Migration-Development Nexus." *Population, Space and Place* 14 (1): 21–42.

Fauser, Margit. 2014. "Co-Development as Transnational Governance: An Analysis of the Engagement of Local Authorities and Migrant Organisations in Madrid." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 40 (7): 1060–78.

Freeman, Caren. 2011. *Making and Faking Kinship: Marriage and Labor Migration between China and South Korea*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Han, Hye-in. 2014. "Hanil Cheonggugwon Hyeobjeong Chegyeol Jeonhu Gangjedongwon Pihaeui Beomwiwa Bosangnolli Byeonhwa" [Changes in Estimating the Extent of Forced Mobilization and Legitimizing Reparations]. *Sahagyeon-gu* [Historical Research] 113: 237–83.

Harvey, David. 2003. *The New Imperialism*. London: Oxford University Press.

Harvey, David. 2006. *The Limits to Capital (1982)*. London: Verso.

Jeong, Hyeseon. 2017. "Globalizing a Rural Past: The Conjunction of International Development Aid and South Korea's Dictatorial Legacy." *Geoforum* 86: 160–68.

Jessop, Bob. 2006. "Spatial Fixes, Temporal Fixes and Spatio-Temporal Fixes." In *David Harvey: A Critical Reader*, edited by Noel Castree and Derek Gregory, 142–66. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Jun, Sang-In. 2011. "Oesaengjeok Gieobdosieseo Hyeomnyeokjeok Gieobdosiro" [From an Exogenous City to a Cooperative City]. *Hangukjiyeokgaebal* [Korean Regional Development] 23 (2): 1–18.

Jung, Hyunjoo. 2012. "Constructing Scales and Renegotiating Identities: Women Marriage Migrants in South Korea." *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* 21 (2): 193–215.

Kim, Daisy Y. 2017. "Resisting Migrant Precarity: A Critique of Human Rights Advocacy for Marriage Migrants in South Korea." *Critical Asian Studies* 49 (1): 1–17.

Kim, Hyun Mee. 2006. "Gukjegyeolhonui Jeonjigujeok Jendeo Jeongchihak" [Gender Politics of Transnational Marriage]. *Gyeongjewasahoe* [Economy and Society] 70: 10–37.

Kim, Hyun Mee. 2014. *Urineun Modu Jibeul Tteonanda* [We All Leave Home]. Seoul: Dolbegae.

Kim, Minjeong. 2013. "Weaving Women's Agency into Representations of Marriage Migrants: Narrative Strategies with Reflective Practice." *Asian Journal of Women's Studies* 19 (3): 7–41.

Kim, Yugyeong. 2008. *Damunhwasidaereul Daebihan Bokjijeongchaekbang-an Yeon-gu* [Welfare Policies for a Multicultural Society]. Seoul: Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs.

Korea Legal Aid Center for Family Relations. 2017. "Damunhwagajeong Ihonsangdam Tonggye" [Statistics on Interracial Divorce]. 25 April.

Kwan, Han-Woon, and Byeongro Kang. 2016. "Asia Damunhwa Yeoseong-ui Gukjegyeolhon Junggaegwajeong Munjewa In-gwonboho" [Asian Women's

Transnational Marriage and Human Rights]. *Ataeyeon-gu* [Asian Pacific Research] 23 (1): 31–60.
Lee, Hyunok. 2012. "Political Economy of Cross-Border Marriage: Economic Development and Social Reproduction in Korea." *Feminist Economics* 18 (2): 177–200.
Lee, Hyunok. 2014. "Trafficking in Women? Or Multicultural Family? The Contextual Difference of Commodification of Intimacy." *Gender Place and Culture* 21 (10): 1249–66.
Lee, Jeong-Seok, and Yang-Ho Woo. 2010. "Jibangjeongbu Gukjegyolyuui Yeonghyang-yoin" [International Exchange among Regional Governments]. *Jibanghaengjeongyeon-gu* [Regional Administration Research] 24 (4): 393–421.
Liu, Lige, Xiaoyi Jin, Melissa J. Brown, and Marcus W. Feldman. 2014. "Male Marriage Squeeze and Inter-Provincial Marriage in Central China: Evidence from Anhui." *Journal of Contemporary China* 23 (86): 351–71.
McKay, Deirdre. 2005. "Reading Remittance Landscapes: Female Migration and Agricultural Transition in the Philippines." *Geografisk Tidsskrift / Danish Journal of Geography* 105 (1): 89–99.
Nyberg-Sorensen, Ninna, Nicholas Van Hear, and Poul Engberg-Pedersen. 2002. "The Migration-Development Nexus: Evidence and Policy Options State-of-the-art Overview." *International Migration* 40 (5): 3–47.
Oh, Kyung Seok, ed. 2007. *Hangugeseoui Damunhwajuui* [South Korea's Multiculturalism]. Seoul: Hanul.
Ozawa, Terutomo. 1979. *Multinationalism, Japanese Style: The Political Economy of Outward Dependency*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Park, Bae-Gyoon. 2008. "Uneven Development, Inter-Scalar Tensions, and the Politics of Decentralization in South Korea." *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 32 (1): 40–59.
Park, Bae-Gyoon, and Dong-Wan Gimm, eds. 2013. *Gukgawa Jiyeok* [National State and Regions]. Seoul: Alto.
Park, Sam Ock. 1992. "Jecheolsaneobdosi Pohangui Baljeon-gwa Jeongchaekgwaje" [Pohang's Development and Its Future]. *Dosimunje* [Urban Question] 27: 45–57.
Peluso, Nancy Lee, and Agus Budi Purwanto. 2018. "The Remittance Forest: Turning Mobile Labor into Agrarian Capital." *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography* 39 (1): 6–36.
Piper, Nicola, and Sohoon Lee. 2016. "Marriage Migration, Migrant Precarity, and Social Reproduction in Asia: An Overview." *Critical Asian Studies* 48 (4): 473–93.
Raghuram, Parvati. 2009. "Which Migration, What Development? Unsettling the Edifice of Migration and Development." *Population, Space and Place* 15 (2): 103–17.

Rhyu, Sang-Young. 2003. "Between International Constraints and Domestic Policy Choice: Korea's Economic Development in the 1960s." *Korean Political Science Review* 37 (4): 139–66.

Scott, Sam. 2013. "Labour, Migration and the Spatial Fix: Evidence from the UK Food Industry." *Antipode* 45 (5): 1090–109.

So, Rami. 2009. "Gyeolhon Ijuyeoseong-ui In-gwon Siltaewa Han-guk Beobjedo Hyeonhwang-e Daehan Geomto" [Marriage Migrant Women's Human Rights and South Korea's Legal System]. *Beobhangnonchong* [Law Journal] 16 (2): 1–32.

Thai, Hung Cam. 2008. *For Better or for Worse: Vietnamese International Marriages in the New Global Economy*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Wang, H.Z., and S.M. Chang. 2002. "The Commodification of International Marriages: Cross-Border Marriage Business in Taiwan and Vietnam." *International Migration* 40 (6): 93–116.

World Bank. 2016. *Migration and Remittances Factbook*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Yang, Wen-Shan, and Melody Chia-Wen Lu, eds. 2010. *Asian Cross-Border Marriage Migration: Demographic Patterns and Social Issues*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Yeoh, Brenda S.A., Chee Heng Leng, Vu Thi Kieu Dung, and Cheng Yi'en. 2013. "Between Two Families: The Social Meaning of Remittances for Vietnamese Marriage Migrants in Singapore." *Global Networks* 13 (4): 441–58.

Yoon, In-Jin. 2008. "Han-gukjeok Damunhwajuuiui Jeon-gaewa Teukseong" [Characteristics of South Korean Multiculturalism]. *Han-guksahoehak* [Korean Sociology] 42 (2): 72–103.