




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X. "Again in Action: The "Three-day Case" and "Infernal Solitaire""

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## X.

### AGAIN IN ACTION: THE “THREE-DAY CASE” AND “INFERNAL SOLITAIRE”

*“It would have been much more useful to be persecuted and to sit in prison than at the editorial office of the Lexicon of World Literature, since at either of the former, I could have inspired many. I never chose a bourgeois and peaceful life. Now, this lexicon is like an herbarium, I collect and identify long dead, pressed authors. And all the while, there are immense opportunities for me to join the great American rebellion.”<sup>1</sup>*

#### 1.

Following his repatriation, Nagy began working at Akadémiai Kiadó, a publishing house, editing the Lexicon of World Literature. Parallel to this, he continued writing and frequented events held at many South American embassies, among them, the Argentine representation in Budapest. He established good contacts, which were used partly to obtain additional income, but also to inform Hungarian authorities. In the summer of 1970, he met Fernández, chargé d'affaires at the Argentine Embassy, who eventually asked him to compile a press review for Argentina. Nagy accepted after clearing the offer with Subdepartment III/II-1/b (South American affairs). His embassy contacts developed promisingly, partly due to the fortunate circumstance that Alfredo Cipriano Pons Benítez, the Argentine Ambassador accredited to Budapest in 1971, knew Nagy from university

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1 *Building and developing Latin American contacts*. Budapest, April 20, 1970. ÁBTL 3.2.3. Mt-975/1. 196.

circles in Buenos Aires.<sup>2</sup> In writing about his family, he said “They completely accepted us as ‘Argentinos.’”<sup>3</sup>

Nagy also built fruitful contacts at the Peruvian and the Venezuelan representations, which made his person even more valuable to the authorities, since it provided an opportunity to monitor and influence the activities of those embassies.<sup>4</sup> For a brief period, it seemed as though he had reached his goal: To attain an intellectual position in his civilian life while engaging in satisfying secondary work in accordance with his sense of mission.

Through Fernández, Nagy learned that an Argentine cultural delegation led by Fr Mariano N. Castex SJ was to come to Hungary. As Nagy discovered, Fr Castex had been President General Onganía’s confessor.<sup>5</sup> Of course, Nagy informed the authorities of this in dramatic language, stating how “Onganía clung to his arms when he left Casa Rosada, as he was overthrown during the last coup.”<sup>6</sup> Nagy accompanied Fr Castex and the embassy staff throughout the former’s visit to Hungary, informing him about the situation in Hungary, including that of the Catholic Church, during their conversations. According to the 37-page report produced about these events, the authorities found his developing relationship to Fr Castex very important, since it opened the door for Nagy to utilize his South American ecclesiastical contacts. In fact, on more than one occasion, he himself proposed that he be used in precisely this fashion.

Kerkai had drawn Nagy’s attention to ecclesiastical developments in Latin America for a reason. However, the latter saw it as part of his state security work, and, having gathered enough information, submitted a draft entitled *Building and Developing Latin American Contacts*.<sup>7</sup> In it, he proposed a Hungarian operation utilizing the South American churches, “An especially ecclesiastical, priestly Communism! It doesn’t even sound

2 *Summary report on South American embassies*. Budapest, April 4, 1976. ÁBTL 3.1.2. M-37054/1. 84–85. On Benítez: *Alfredo Cipriano Pons Benítez*. Budapest, April 3, 1973. ÁBTL 3.1.2. M-37054. 82–88.

3 *The Argentine Embassy*. Budapest, July 26, 1971. ÁBTL 3.2.3. Mt-975/2. 133.

4 *Summary report*. Budapest, April 14, 1972. ÁBTL 3.2.1. Bt-1584/5. 6–11.

5 *Summary report*. Budapest, April 14, 1972. ÁBTL 3.2.1. Bt-1584/5. 9.

6 *The visit to Hungary of Fr Castex and his Argentine companions*. Budapest, October 22, 1970. ÁBTL 3.2.1. Bt-1584/3. 16–54.

7 *Building and developing Latin American contacts*. Budapest, April 20, 1970. ÁBTL 3.2.3. Mt-975/1. 182–97.

bad. They’ll write libraries against us, maybe wage war.”<sup>8</sup> In analyzing the course of events in South America, he reached the following conclusion,

[f]rom the point of view of the rebellion, there are two liberation movements today in South America: a classical Communist one and an ecclesiastical flavored left-wing one. The first isn’t entirely ‘classic’, because it’s deeply interwoven with a national uprising in the strict sense: the international can hardly be separated from the anti-North American, emphatically national, even nationalistic liberation struggle. [...] The other left-wing movement is ecclesiastical in nature: it’s much younger than the other, but it’s already much stronger, with more promise for the future, more unity, more supranational, more continental, and so, paradoxically, closer to the international spirit. My first practical statement is this: if they, the people of the two directions can join hands for a common goal today, then we can do so as well, but since we are a very stigmatized and isolated left, we cannot overtly do this. They wouldn’t believe us separately. Help for expressly Communist parties is not my competence. So, I’m sticking to revolutionary movements of an ecclesiastical nature.<sup>9</sup>

Nagy proposed the creation of a news agency which he would supply with pamphlets, to be followed by the formation of an intellectual circle that would act as a “cultural association.” Hungarian state security could determine content and control the operation from behind. He also promised a longer study on the subject, and submitted an outline a month after proposing his initial plan.<sup>10</sup>

In the course of joint planning, however, it became clear that the interest of the Hungarian People’s Republic in such activities was not in the South American countries in and of themselves, but, rather, as tools to be leveraged against the United States by exploiting and inflaming anti-US sentiment. The level of investment and risks to Hungary had to be assessed in this context. Nagy’s plans were later revised to reflect this:

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8 *Building and developing Latin American contacts*, 182–83.

9 *Building and developing Latin American contacts*, 189.

10 *Outline of a Major Study on Latin America*. Budapest, May 25, 1970. ÁBTL 3.2.3. Mt-975/1. 198–207.

“He is aware that our goals aren’t directed against the Latin American countries, but, together with them, against the USA.”<sup>11</sup> Accordingly, in his detailed analysis, Nagy framed his ideas so that they would be conducive to the geopolitical goals of state security. He saw the Achilles heel of the United States, not in the Vietnam War, or even Southeast Asia, but rather, in Latin America, where they “would attack the already weakening American life at its roots.”<sup>12</sup>

The Church’s social and political involvement, attributable to “liberation theology,” and which Nagy had personally encountered in South America, was also appreciated by Kerkai, who offered an opportunity for the Socialist bloc to ideologically penetrate South America and exploit the continent against the USA. Nagy argued that

[t]he Church stands with the aggressive, bomb-throwing American army, why can’t it stand with the South American guerillas? Is there any difference between state-produced bombs and home-made ones? If the American army blows up a bridge, a Catholic priest can stand among the people blowing it up as an Army chaplain—he may even help his compatriots!—because they’re on a mission; but a Catholic priest can’t stand around when guerillas blow up a bridge because it’s terrorism? [...] This double standard is the pinnacle of deceitful pharisaism [hypocrisy/self-righteousness – É.P.].<sup>13</sup>

From then on, Nagy dived into planning with fanatical devotion, as his case officer noted: “Believe me, I am aware of the importance of our joint effort, the ‘loosening policy’ which we direct towards a continent, I am happy to be a humble part of this. If you want proof of my devotion, tell me to kill Nyisztor, I’ll do it tomorrow. More people are killed in Vietnam with the Pope’s blessing. Or send me back to the ‘Society of Jesus’ with a mission. I’ll do it! Just wait until my wife dies. She hasn’t got much time left.”<sup>14</sup>

11 *Assessment report*. Budapest, November 28, 1972. ÁBTL 3.2.1. Bt-1584/5. 42.

12 *Outline of a Major Study on Latin America*. Budapest, May 25, 1970. ÁBTL 3.2.3. Mt-975/1. 198.

13 *Outline of a Major Study on Latin America*, 202.

14 *Assessment report*. Budapest, November 28, 1972. ÁBTL 3.2.1. Bt-1584/4. 45.

Even if Nagy’s willingness to sacrifice those dear to him who were still living should not be taken entirely seriously, the passion he demonstrated illustrates how he would gladly have exchanged his editorial office job for field work, as the former matched his ambitions less and less. At the same time, his exaggerated statements reveal that he desperately sought to affirm his loyalty to *modus vivendi*, proving his “devotion” not only to the authorities, but also to himself.

All of this may have been a sign that Nagy was becoming increasingly aware of the limits of his situation and career in Hungary, and desired to return to South America, following Kerkai’s recommendation of a few years previous. Of course, his mission there would not have been exactly what his friend, probably unaware of his state security career, had suggested. Nagy’s desire to return to South America is unmistakable in the ideas he proposed to his case officers: They offered no support, and Nagy himself went on to deny any such intentions vehemently and at length.<sup>15</sup> This disappointment made him conscious of the limits of his confinement, while, in reaching the leash’s end, he became aware of its existence. He rephrased Kerkai’s earlier observation: “Maybe it was hasty of me to return, I could have done more for the great common goal back there.” Concluding, mostly to himself, he continues, “But now I’m here, and must reckon with this fact.”<sup>16</sup>

Under the circumstances, Nagy had no one left to turn to or confide in. While he was exceeding every state security expectation and trying to prove his worth, Jenő Kerkai died in Pannonhalma, aged 66.<sup>17</sup> Having lost the chance to return to South America, and, at the same time, Kerkai’s support, Nagy found himself isolated. He sought to escape his grief and to stabilize his situation with a gigantic undertaking, writing “What to do? I am going to make use of every technique of my Jesuit upbringing, and I see clearly that, despite all the glaring facts, this is mainly a spiritual crisis, which can only be overcome by willpower, and I will overcome it. [...] I will sail on willpower and resolution, with intellectual insight shining

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15 *Report*. Budapest, April 22, 1971. ÁBTL 3.2.3. Mt-975/2. 95–98.

16 *A few of my personal issues. A conversation with József Lukács*. Budapest, July 30, 1971. ÁBTL 3.2.1. Bt-1584/3. 57.

17 *Obituary*. Pannonhalma, November 8, 1970. OSZK Kt., f. 216/491. And *Jenő Kerkai’s eulogy*. OSZK Kt., f. 216/492.

a light behind, showing that this is the only way out if I am the only person to trust, and I am left to my own devices by the nature of the matter.”<sup>18</sup>

So, clinging to memorized snippets of Ignatian spiritual exercises, Nagy expanded his field of action to a global scale, exploring ecclesiastical opportunities for exploitation beyond South America, and formulating a grandiose proposal for the authorities to exploit the international position of the Catholic Church.

2.

“Beloved sons and daughters, now that we’ve visited our flock and those who are all dear brothers across several continents, we have gained such experience and learned such things, that make us turn to you, listening to our conscience, wherever you may live and are citizens of this entire world.

We’re used to the fact that, after major natural disasters, people unite, driven by the power of love, and, at a severe financial sacrifice, rush to the aid of those in need. But where is the earthquake, where is the flood, or wildfire that would cause as much damage and unfathomable suffering as modern warfare with its inhumane bombings and systematic destruction? Earthquakes subside, floods recede, but wars putting natural disasters to shame go on for years uninterrupted. Where is the conscience of humanity that it hasn’t rebelled against this? The logical goal of the world is peace; peace is an instrument of progress, the final goal of the great efforts of modern civilization, and the innermost wish of every person. (Const. dogm. de Ecclesia, Lumen Gentium, 36.) The development of humanity should serve general well-being, wars and organized mass murder take hold instead. Theological, ethical, social, legal, and psychological points require, in fact, demand peace, and yet we fail to do everything to bring this peace about. The modern human can achieve almost anything, yet peace seems further and further out of reach. It’s a tragic fact of today’s life that humanity’s fate is determined almost entirely by violence, and they come up with various false pretexts to present completely illogical wars, thousands of kilometers away, as self-defense, and deem every deed heroism, when their real name is barbarism. They make

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18 *Report*. Budapest, February 22, 1971. ÁBTL 3.2.3. Mt-975/2. 62.

humans into wolves, and in the end, they even decorate them with medals, when it's shame that they should be feeling.

If the political leaders of a country cannot come to the realization that at the present stage of civilization, it isn't wars that make a nation great, but peace, and if the lack of insight is coupled with the lack of humanity, then it's up to us to do everything for peace, then we are God-appointed guardians of morals in this world. Today, a severe, great war cannot be contained to a small area, because its economical, moral impact ripples through the whole of humanity, leaving deep and bitter scars everywhere.

We admit there are big efforts for peace, the constant intervention of international organizations, disarmament conferences, nuclear non-proliferation treaties, arbitration, but unfortunately these are mostly controlled, or most influenced with votes by the ones involved, who shouldn't be negotiating at the table, but sitting in the dock as defendants. Which is why the decrees of these organizations only bind the small and the weak, but the powerful, the real causes of all this trouble, are free to continue their inhumane wars. [...]

Who among us can be said to be innocent? We have all sinned, either by wreaking havoc, or by being silent, or by such little and weak protesting, that its very purpose was for the defendant to not take it seriously, because we're afraid of him, and we lack the moral courage to risk his disapproval of us. The moral responsibility of today's violent ones is even more aggravated by the fact that not long ago, they were the ones who passed judgment on other nations, but since now we're talking about their power goals, a short time was enough to make them forget their ideas of inhumanity and the unusually cruel horrors of war. [...]

Seeing so much immorality, the fear occurs to us that the Lord will call us to account for our silence. So, we have decided [...] to raise our protesting voices on behalf of the whole of humanity and call on every well-meaning person to join us in protest. [...] Our paternal heart is concerned to see that the leaders guilty of wartime cruelty, seeking self-justification, are using the Church for propaganda purposes. Many excellent Catholics and several members of the clergy have been deceived by the oft-repeated statement that one superpower is making huge sacrifices to raise barriers to the conquests of a hostile world view. Nobody should raise barriers against a world view because nobody can; a spiritual, moral, and social



revival is the only effective means of such a fight. This isn't an ideological struggle anyway, this is a new type of world empire, aiming to be built on colonialism, advancing by any means, and it isn't its world view the attacked nation is protecting, but its freedom. [...] The nation that has put its national renown at stake, has attacked with the most modern equipment and a huge army, a people much smaller and ill-equipped than itself. Its failures, more numerous by the day, have thrust it into frightful and inhumane cruelty; this is the mindset of a sore winner. How long can the world's conscience take this inhumane warfare?

[...] If our Mother Church still has a sense of mission to make the peoples into Christians, it cannot be allied with those who still see the greatness and future of their country in conquering other people. God's blessing cannot be on an enterprise connected to so much cruelty.

So we are proclaiming the triumph of peace. We cannot accept that fighting and violence are the way of life for humanity. Peace, as proclaimed by the Gospel, isn't complacency, but activity, progress.

For this reason and so that this appeal of ours doesn't remain as inconsequential as all the previous ones, we call upon the Archbishops and Bishops of the dioceses involved, to withdraw jurisdiction from the chaplains in the war zones, within their own competence, as regulated by the relevant articles of canon law and other provisions, in order to express their protest against the inhumanity of violence. In certain cases where withdrawing jurisdiction is in our direct competence, we hereby withdraw it from those priests. Completely free of mundane interests, following the teachings of the Gospels alone, we distance ourselves from all unjust and inhumane violence.

Con la nostra Apostolica Benedizione,  
Dal Vaticano, .... 1970.

Paulus PP. VI.<sup>219</sup>

The above statement against the Vietnam War, a generously quoted *motu proprio*, will not be found among those given by Pope Paul VI, but only in Nagy's writings, since he, not the Holy Father, was its author.<sup>20</sup>

19 *Draft of a counter-encyclical*. OSZK Kt., f. 216/132.

20 *Draft of a counter-encyclical. Text 2*. [Budapest] September 9, 1970. OSZK Kt., f. 216/132.

He had first penned an apostolic brief for the bishops and priests of the US in Paul VI's name, calling for peace, condemning American military activities in Vietnam, and withdrawing jurisdiction from Catholic priests serving in the US army.<sup>21</sup> However, this was not enough, as he went on to forge a general papal document along similar thematic lines. This “counter-encyclical” would comprise part of a disinformation operation Nagy referred to as the “three-day affair.”<sup>22</sup> The operation itself would not take three days, as more than six months were needed for its preparation. Instead, according to Nagy's calculations, it would have taken three days after a successful operation for the encyclical's forgery to be discovered and made known on an international level. As he commented, “I wrote a Papal encyclical on the Vietnam war. I wanted to print it and suddenly send it (from Rome) to the big papers. They would have published it believing it was an original. The Pope would have come clean the next day, but millions would have read by then what the Pope should have done with this dirty business of war.”<sup>23</sup>

Nagy carefully organized the operation, submitting its plans piecemeal (in the form of sub-tasks) to his handlers:

Obtain samples of paper as used by the Vatican. The Hungarian Academy of Theology subscribes to the journal *Acta Sanctae Sedis*,<sup>24</sup> which is, let's say, the Vatican's official gazette. These samples can be analyzed to determine what paper is used and where to obtain it, or, if that proves impossible, to buy the most similar paper. PAPER QUANTITY: I'm planning to send it to ca. 100 daily newspapers, divided between the French, English, German, Italian, Spanish and Dutch languages. [...] The text of the ‘*motu proprio*’ will not be more than three such pages long as this present sheet... The seal of the Papal Secretariat must be prepared, to be obtained

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21 *To the Reverend Bishops and Priests of the United States of America. “Rome, 24 June 1970. On the feast of the brave preacher Saint John the Baptist.”* ÁBTL 3.2.3. Mt-975/1. 208–14. And OSZK Kt., f. 216/133.

22 “*The three-day affair.*” [Budapest] 1970. OSZK Kt., f. 216/128., f. 216/129., f. 216/130., f. 216/131. And f. 216/132.

23 “*The three-day affair.*” OSZK Kt., f. 216/128.

24 *Acta Sanctae Sedis* (ASS) existed between 1865 and 1908. Pope Pius X replaced it in 1908 with *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* (AAS) which continues to function as the Holy See's official gazette. Nagy likely meant the AAS.

from an appointment document of a Bishop, or letters to the Ecclesiastical Office. [...] The approximate time the parcel takes to be delivered to editorial offices must be precisely calculated. [...] Targeted daily newspapers must be selected and their actual addresses obtained.<sup>25</sup>

Nagy continued, writing out instructions by hand, including how to procure Vatican stamps.<sup>26</sup> He trusted that his operation would prove to be “the scandal not just of the year, but the decade. Its main draw lies in the fact that half of the world, progressives, especially overtly rebellious priests will find every word of it true, genuine, and necessary. They will say: ‘If it didn’t come from the Pope, it should have!’ [...] Never again will a chance like this arise to subvert on a massive scale those who are already on the verge of disarray.”<sup>27</sup>

The proposal’s path after its submission cannot be reconstructed from Nagy’s state security materials, preventing us from knowing who read, commented, and discussed the plan, apart from Nagy’s case officer. We do know that it ultimately received no support, with Nagy’s persona instead becoming a far more pressing issue.

3.

By this time, Nagy’s relationship to Hungarian state security had already begun to sour, owing to the realization that his publication plans had been exaggerated.<sup>28</sup> As he remarked,

The fact is that I haven’t become a writer, and it looks like I never will. I write such things that cannot be published here, at this time, according to the understanding (grave mistake) of certain people; or I could write things which can’t be published under my name, in fact, even these can only go out as small pamphlets, which isn’t literature. Whatever we explain it with, the fact is, I’ve been prevented from being a writer at home. It was extremely difficult to stomach, but I did it for the cause. You don’t know what it cost me! ‘Cause’ here refers to oper-

25 *A plan of the operation*. [Budapest] July 17, 1970. OSZK Kt., f. 216/130.

26 *Draft of the appeal for peace*. [Budapest] July 22, 1970. OSZK Kt., f. 216/129.

27 *Draft of the appeal for peace*.

28 *Letter to the director of Kossuth Kiadó*. Budapest, June 7, 1971. ÁBTL 3.2.1. Bt-1584/3. 86.

ations, like the ‘three-day affair’, which would have been such a thing, but these were too large-scale for our minuscule possibilities. [...] The Lexicon of World Literature remains as a so-called ‘cover job’...<sup>29</sup>

Nagy, however, also had difficulties with his ‘cover,’ regularly informing his case officer as to how tedious it was and requesting a different job, such as a research position at an institute. It was not without malice or irony that he commented upon this: “My official work is editing the lexicon, which has reached a phase, simply because of the circumstances, that four grades of elementary school education is sufficient (I had to put code numbers on index cards, which required me to distinguish history from zoology). For six months now, we create index cards for foreign language lexicons and supplement the old cards from the Révai [lexicon]. This is work that eighth graders could do ...”<sup>30</sup>

Nagy’s complaints sometimes had a different tenor:

[I] have given up many of the great plans and promises of Buenos, but I’m stopping here. Instead of grandly writing books and monographs, I’m filling out three-word index cards from 8 [in the morning] to half past 4, then putting the many hundreds of cards of the day into alphabetical order, like infernal solitaire... I’m not doing this. It’s killing me. And the question arises, whether I’m being slowly executed here. They’d already started. Even prison is a hundred times better than this. I would just laugh at that, there’s a great struggle about it, killed in action, a kind of heroic death, if it isn’t dealt out for crimes; but these cards: a swamp, a morass of the kind that one slowly gets trampled into.<sup>31</sup>

Despite his incessant complaining, Nagy did not get another job, and continued working at the editorial office for want of a better idea. On occasion, he would discuss his secret service collaboration outside of his cover job, bitterly criticizing the authorities’ methods:

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29 *Report*. Budapest, February 22, 1971. ÁBTL 3.2.3. Mt-975/2. 51.

30 *A few of my personal issues. A conversation with József Lukács*. Budapest, July 30, 1971. ÁBTL 3.2.1. Bt-1584/3. 57–58.

31 *Report*. Budapest, February 22, 1971. ÁBTL 3.2.3. Mt-975/2. 53.

And my other job—I'm getting paid, so I have to do it with integrity as well, let's be brutally honest, is nothing else than I've become an informer and a snitch, who writes reports on his best friends. I've been recruited through colossal psychological effort: psychological warfare, a war of nerves, information control, 'revealing' planted articles and doing certain things this way, I might even call it, serum therapy. There is something to it, although it has failed to live up to the great billing. I drifted almost unnoticeably into circumstances that kill a man possessed of self-esteem and integrity. I swear I believe you that this wasn't on purpose and premeditated, that I drifted into it, because there's nothing else to be had on this line. But I drifted through such subtle steps, that, I admit, it leaves the impression that it was planned all along. I don't believe it, because that would be truly hellish...<sup>32</sup>

Handling Nagy proved a serious challenge to the authorities owing to the problems which constantly arose, although his existential conflict attracted attention only for its psychological aspects, i.e. as an 'indoctrination' task to be solved. Nagy's overseers presumably did not consider his state so severe as to warrant interference or more drastic measures. They scrutinized Nagy's potential, his state, and the likelihood that he could, and would again, prove effective for them. In summarizing their collaboration:

when communicating he regularly requests that he be considered a fighter in the struggle for the victory of the new social order, which, since he knows the enemy, he is able to wage with more than just "an open helmet." In the event that we can convince him that the case given him serves our interests, he is ready to take on even the most complex tasks of state security work without reservation. Due to his intellectual competence, he is especially fond of complex assignments. His Jesuit upbringing equipped him with just the skills and traits for these tasks. There is certainly adventurousness in his character. (He mentioned several times, that he envies the Latin American guerillas, who can fight with a gun in their hand, and if possible, he would hap-

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32 *Report*. Budapest, February 22, 1971. ÁBTL 3.2.3. Mt-975/2. 58–59.

pily volunteer for any armed operation.) Over the course of his handling, it was possible to talk him out of his extreme ideas in ideological matters by employing theoretical arguments. This forms a constant part of indoctrination work concerning the agent.<sup>33</sup>

Presumably due to similar experience, the importance of indoctrination work was broadly prescribed to case officers in a 1972 directive from the Interior Ministry: “Greater attention must be paid to educate and guide network persons, with special regard to increasing their opportunities to gather intelligence.”<sup>34</sup>

Over the years, state security officers who had come into contact with Nagy all reached similar conclusions: “Handling him is no easy task due to his exaltedness and perpetual need to be active...”<sup>35</sup> However, since “Kömüves’ is, to this day, mentally and physically completely fit,<sup>36</sup> full of ambition, restless, and a typical Jesuit, who still has a great deal of potential, and more for future development,” as they put it, they were reluctant to sever ties. At the time, state security policy stated that “agent handling can only be successful if there is intellectual balance between the case officer and his assets;” however, in Nagy’s case, this posed a formidable challenge to the authorities. None of ‘Gusztis’ successors as Nagy’s liaison could form as solid a relationship, perhaps attributable in part to Bárδος’ academic background in psychology.<sup>37</sup>

Despite his frustration, there does not ever appear to have been any question of Nagy’s trustworthiness: “We have monitored ‘Kirchenbauer’ regularly over the past six years (network, K-monitoring, surveillance) [...] and have found no sign of sharing of classified information or indiscretion in his work.”<sup>38</sup> Because of Nagy’s commitment to his work, he was given a new status, namely that of a secret agent, reaffirming his collaboration with the authorities on a patriotic basis. His elevation in status was part of the 1972 review and reorganization of agent networks following

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33 *Summary report*. Budapest, April 14, 1971. ÁBTL 3.2.1. Bt-1584/5. 9.

34 Order 005. Of April 1972. ÁBTL 4.1. A-3118. 115.

35 *Report*. Budapest, August 21, 1974. ÁBTL 3.2.1. Bt-1584/6. 41. Et passim

36 Nagy was 66 when this was written.

37 On this issue see Mirák, “Az ideális tartótiszt,” 170–94.

38 *Report*. Budapest, April 14, 1971. ÁBTL 3.2.1. Bt-1584/5. 10.

new Interior Ministry regulations.<sup>39</sup> Since Nagy's focus at the time was South America, in the spring of 1972 he was transferred to Department III/II-1.<sup>40</sup> There, he received a new case officer, police Captain Andor Pál (codename: "András Pusztai"), who met Nagy on a biweekly basis in the "Herceg" ("Prince") K-apartment.<sup>41</sup> The name "András Pusztai," like that of his predecessor Bárdos, is found from then on in Nagy's calendars as the emergency contact.<sup>42</sup>

Even though the South American church angle had not been realized with Nagy's participation, and his proposed disinformation operation against the US enjoyed no support, Nagy remained in state security's favor, owing to his proclivity for risk-taking, great intellectual capacity, and usefulness as a secret commissioner. Accordingly, Nagy continued to report on the various South American embassies, but also took an active part in Hungarian state security operations against the Vatican. Following a chance meeting, he also attempted to penetrate Freemasonry. As such, Nagy could, at the very least, no longer complain of being bored to death, apart from his work at the editorial office.

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39 Kónyáné and Petrikné, *Ügynöksorsok*, 224–25. This regulation divided network agents into three categories, depending on the extent of their working relationship with state security, the function of the network, and the basis of cooperation: Secret collaborators, secret commissioners, and agents. Secret collaborators (tmt) were at the top. Secret commissioners, like Nagy, belonged to the middle category. Like tmt's, they collaborated out of principle, that is to say, on a patriotic basis. At the bottom of the network hierarchy were agents. On the issue concerning churches see also: Mirák, "Színe és visszája," 61–205. Proposal to reassign Nagy: ÁBTL 3.2.1. Bt-1584/5. 54–55.

40 *Summary report*. Budapest, April 14, 1972. ÁBTL 3.2.1. Bt-1584/5. 11.

41 *Report*. [no place] [no date] ÁBTL 3.2.1. Bt-1584/5. 14.

42 *Calendars, notebooks*. OSZK Kt., f. 216/11.