Cocreating a Frontier Region in the Northern Song: The State and Local Strongmen in Hewai



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Cocreating a Frontier Region in the Northern Song: The State and Local Strongmen in Hewai

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In early 1127, the invading Jin armies marched into Kaifeng, the capital of the Northern Song dynasty (960–1126), and captured the emperors, members of the royal clans, officials, and countless commoners. About a year later, while what remained of the Song court had fled south, the war was still going on in north China. Jin forces had been attacking the territories covering present-day northeastern Shaanxi until She Keqiu 折可求 (d. 1139) surrendered to them the three prefectures of Linzhou 麟州, Fuzhou 府州, and Fengzhou 豐州, the region informally called Hewai 河外 (Beyond the Yellow River) in Song sources, which all but ended the Song's fighting chance against the invaders.[1]

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1. This article builds on my preliminary study of the Song's management of Hewai. See Chang Woei Ong, "The Hewai Region and the Founding of the Northern Song (960–1126)," in *Renwen xuesheng* 人文學衡 (*Chinese Humanities*), ed. Peng Guoxiang 彭國翔, vol. 1, (Hangzhou: Zhejiang daxue chubanshe, 2019), 211–34. That article takes issue with a prevalent view that attributes the success of the Song in eliminating regional military powers to the court's ability to replace military men with civil officials at the border regions. It argues that by tracing the management of non-Han communities in the northwestern region from Tang to Song beginning with Tang's system of provincial governors (*jiedushi* 節度使), we are able to appreciate that the Song's success was not the result of regional separatist powers being defeated or incorporated by its founding rulers, but rather that it was the outcome of a long historical process through which regional powers were reconfigured over the course of the ninth and tenth centuries. Consequently, these new power arrangements set the stage for the development of a new set of central-regional

The three prefectures were administratively under the Hedong 河東 Circuit. She Keqiu was then the Prefect of Fuzhou, and he came from a long line of Shes who had served in the post since the beginning of the dynasty. Historical sources identify the Shes as Tanguts, but they were the archenemy of another Tangut clan—given the surname Li 李 by the Tang emperors—who dominated Xiazhou 夏州 (in present-day Jingbian 靖邊 County of Shaanxi) and later founded the Xi Xia dynasty (1038–1227). The Shes mainly helped the Song in its conflicts with Xi Xia, and also with the Khitan Liao (916–1125) and Jurchen Jin (1115–1234).[2]

This article is an attempt to write a social history of Song territorial administration in the northern border region by focusing on powerful clans such as the Shes—often denoted by the term "local strongmen" (*tuhao* 土豪) in historical sources. It moves away from the assumption that any meaningful study of powerful clans like the Shes must begin with acknowledging that their historical experiences were predominantly, if not exclusively, shaped by their relationship with the Song state. Song frontier policies indeed profoundly

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relations that formed the foundation of Song's ascendancy. The current article elaborates on the roles of local strongmen in shaping territorial administration at the frontier regions.

2. A nonexhaustive list of works on the She clan includes: Dai Yingxing 戴應星, *Sheshi jiazu shilüe* 折氏家族史略 (Xi'an: Sanqin chubanshe, 1989). This is the first book-length study on the She clan, which includes several valuable tomb inscriptions excavated at the site of the Shes' clan graveyard. Hatachi Masanori 畑地正憲, "Godai. Hoku-Sō ni okeru Fushū Setsushi ni tsuite" 五代。北宋における府州折氏について, *Shien* 史淵 110 (1973): 137–73. (This is translated into Chinese by Zheng Liangsheng 鄭樑生, "Wudai, Beisong de Fuzhou Sheshi," 五代, 北宋的府州折氏, *Shihuo yuekan (fukan)* 食貨月刊 (復刊) 5:5 (1975): 29–49). Gao Jianguo 高建國, *Xianbei zuyi Fuzhou Sheshi yanjiu* 鮮卑族裔府州折氏研究 (Ph.D. diss., Inner Mongolia University, 2014); Li Yumin 李裕民, "Sheshi jiazu yanjiu,"折氏家族研究, *Shaanxi Shifan daxue xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban)* 陝西師範大學學報 (哲學社會科學版) 27.2 (1998): 55–68. Chen Junkai 陳君愷, "Bei Song difang shixi zhengquan Fuzhou Sheshi yu zhongyang zhengfu guanxi chutan" 北宋地方世襲政權府州折氏與中央政府關係初探, in Zhonghua minguoshi zhuanti diwu jie taolunhui mishuchu bian 中華民國史專題第五屆討論會秘書處編, *Zhonghua minguoshi zhuanti lunwenji: diwu jie taolunhui* 中華民國史專題論文集: 第五屆討論會 (Taipei: Guoshiguan, 2000), 583–622. Because of the She clan's peculiar identity, most scholars have devoted much effort to uncovering their ethnic origins and biographical details about individual members. Others have delineated the clan's relationship with the Song, Liao, Xi Xia, and Jin. Another topic that attracts considerable interest is how the clan transformed from a military clan into one that embraced literati culture over the course of the eleventh century. Collectively, these studies have greatly advanced our understanding of the clan; however, an important topic that remains underexplored is the social ecology within which the Shes operated.

impacted the choices the local people made, but it is also important to recognize that the Song state was only one of the players in a region where the movement of communities and shifting alliances were common. In essence, this article challenges the prevailing practice of adopting a purely statist, court-centered perspective and argues for a more nuanced approach for delineating the development of Song management of the frontier regions that takes into account the roles that the local inhabitants played in the process.

Apart from its relationship with the Song, another dominant narrative about Hewai in both official historical sources and modern studies has focused on the role it played in the Song's conflicts with its northern neighbors, especially the Xi Xia. While participating in large-scale warfare was indeed an important aspect of the historical experiences of Hewai's residents, it should be noted that during the tenth to early twelfth centuries, the period of peace was longer than that of war. Therefore, the story of interstate warfare would not be complete without considering the activities of local communities beyond the battleground during relatively peaceful times.

Why Hewai?

A study of a frontier region such as Hewai can potentially do several things. First, it can add another case for challenging the conventional view about the Song being militarily weak because it had opted to pursue a strategy of undermining the power of military men and reducing the military presence at the border. According to this view, the Song army was weakened to the point where it was helpless against foreign aggression. It is therefore not surprising that the Song would eventually collapse, first under the Jurchen invasion in 1126 and later under the Mongol invasion in 1279. Past scholarship on Song military history often referenced the military institution section in the *History of the Song* (*Song shi* 宋史) to show how the Song court centralized military command at the expense of the regions outside the capital. According to the *Song shi* account, after witnessing how previous regimes fell prey to powerful regional military commanders, the Song founders labored to locate the most elite squad under their direct command. Under this vision, the armies were divided into three different types: 1) the imperial army (*jinjun* 禁軍) commanded by the court, which was responsible for defending the capital and carrying out large-scale military missions; 2) auxiliary forces (*xiangjun* 廂軍) commanded by prefectural governments, which provided protection for

the prefecture and labor for local projects; and 3) local militias (*xiangbing* 鄉兵), whose soldiers, responsible for safeguarding the local community, were, in theory, natives who were hired or enlisted through conscription based on household registry. A special form of local militia was that of the "barbarian armies" (*fanbing* 蕃兵), formed in border regions by incorporating friendly non-Han tribes.[3] In this three-tier system, the imperial army under the direct control of the court thus formed the military backbone of the Song state, while troops of inferior quality were deployed to regions farther away from the political center, resulting in their ineffectiveness in defending against foreign invasions.[4]

In reality, the court's management of regional military commands was far more flexible and sensitive toward changing circumstances than the *Song shi* account would allow.[5] And as we shall see, how the Song worked with the Shes also provides a compelling case to prove the conventional view about Song military incompetency wrong at every turn. Yet while this view has remained prevalent in both popular understanding and scholarly writing about the Song, the field has advanced far enough that no serious historian today would uncritically subscribe to this misconception. It would therefore be less interesting if we were to simply approach this study with a sort of "last nail in the coffin" mindset.[6]

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3. Tuo'tuo et al., *Song shi* 宋史 (hereafter SS) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974), 187.4569.

4. For an otherwise illuminating recent study on Song political ideologies and their implementations that subscribes to the conventional narrative in explaining the Song's eventual collapse, see Chen Feng 陳峰 et al., *Songdai zhiguo linian jiqi shijian yanjiu* 宋代治國理念及其實踐研究, (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2015).

5. For instance, Paul Smith has shown that it was only after the signing of the Treaty of Chanyuan (澶淵之盟) between the Song and the Liao that the effort to build a literati state began to take shape. But the wars with Xi Xia in the 1040s propelled reform-minded officials to advocate for remilitarization and enhancing the defense in the north by empowering military commanders assigned to the borders. See Paul Jakov Smith, "A Crisis in the Literati State: The Sino-Tangut War and the Qingli-Era Reforms of Fan Zhongyan, 1040–1045," *JSYS*, 45 (2015): 59–137.

6. For an overview of the Song military in English, see Wang Tseng-yü, "A History of the Sung Military," trans. David C. Wright, in *The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 5, Part 2: Sung China, 960–1279*, ed. Denis Crispin Twitchett and Paul Jakov Smith (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 214–49. For the importance of the military in the founding of the Song, see Peter Lorge, *The Reunification of China: Peace through War Under the Song Dynasty* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015); and Edmund H. Worthy, "The Founding of Sung China, 950–1000: Integrative Changes in Military and Political Institutions" (Ph.D.

Second, the identities of these *tuhao*, the peculiar positions that they found themselves in, and the political choices that some members made can all push us to rethink notions about the interplay between sovereignty, ethnicity, and loyalty, and whether the Song's worldview represented a kind of "nationalism."[7] Categories that Song writers employed to depict the *tuhao* within the contexts of foreign engagements reveal a great deal about how they conceptualized ethnic Others. While I have benefited from this new line of inquiry, in this study the main question is not whether the Song qualified as an alternative form of nationhood. Rather, my main objective is to demonstrate that the Song ways of managing frontier regions cannot be properly understood if we fail to consider the political and social dynamics within the communities in the region.

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diss., Princeton University, 1976). For civil-military relations during the founding of the Song, see Cheng-hua Fang, *Power Structures and Cultural Identities in Imperial China: Civil and Military Power From Late Tang to Early Song Dynasties (A.D. 875–1063)* (Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2009). For how the Song court responded to military mutiny, see Peyton H. Canary, "State and Mutiny in the Northern Song, 1000–1050" (Ph.D. diss., University of Washington, Seattle, 2017). For studies that challenge the conventional notion that the Song was militarily weak, see John Labadie, "Rulers and Soldiers: Perception and Management of the Military in Northern Song China (960-ca. 1060)" (Ph.D. diss., University of Washington, 1981); and Paul Forage, "The Sino-Tangut War of 1081–1085," *Journal of Asian History*, 25 (1991): 1–28. For the prevalence of a military sub-culture in north China during the Northern Song, see Paul Jakov Smith, "'Shuihu zhuan' and the Military Subculture of the Northern Song, 960–1127," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* [hereafter *HJAS*], 66 (2006): 363–422. For an account of the institutional and social conditions that lower-class military personnel were operating in, see Elad Alyagon, "Inked: Song Soldiers, Military Tattoos, and the Remaking of the Chinese Lower Class, 960–1279" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Davis, 2016).

7. In his classic study on the discourse of race in modern China, Frank Dikötter devoted a chapter to delineating various notions of "barbarians" in premodern China. He cautions about the tendency to project our modern division of race and culture onto traditional Chinese discourse on the Chinese-barbarian dichotomy. Moreover, it is also clear from Dikötter's survey of China's long imperial history that there was never a uniform "Chinese" view or attitude toward non-Chinese people. Expressions of ethnic consciousness were dependent on their specific historical contexts. See Frank Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*, 2nd edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 1–20. Other recent notable works on related topics include: Naomi Standen, *Unbounded Loyalty: Frontier Crossings in Liao China* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2007); Nicolas Tackett, *The Origins of the Chinese Nation: Song China and the Forging of an East Asian World Order* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Ge Zhaoguang 葛兆光, *Hewei Zhongguo: jiangyu, minzu wenhua yu lishi* 何謂中國: 疆域、民族文化與歷史 (Hong Kong: Niujin daxue chubanshe, 2014); and Shao-yun Yang, *The Way of the Barbarian: Redrawing Ethnic Boundaries in Tang and Song China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2019).

Previous scholarship on Song regional administration has mostly focused on the dichotomies between either centralization and decentralization or civilianization and militarization.[8] This is essentially institutional history written top-down from the perspective of the state. A detailed recent—and in many ways pathbreaking—study of Song territorial administration by Ruth Mostern also proceeded on a similar premise. Mostern strives to show that the success of the Song was the result of this reassertion of state power over centrifugal forces. Mostern's research is important because it proposes a way of understanding the spatial organization of the Song state in the context of what she calls "the middle-period spatial cycle," which began after the fall of the Tang in the early tenth century and was completed when the Southern Song state (1126–1279) was able to finally enjoy a period of relative stability from the mid-twelfth century onward. This cycle was characterized by a territorial system that bears the inscription of an activist state whose overall plan was to strengthen its military capability at the borderland (especially in the north) and to extract revenue from the richer regions (especially those in the southeast), all done in such a way that would still ensure the supremacy of the civil branch of government.[9]

Mostern did a terrific job of tracing changes in territorial jurisdiction and providing a general explanation of the central government's perspective in making such changes. But because Mostern retrieved data for her research largely from official Song sources, her perspective is decidedly formal and state orientated.[10] This is clearly important, but by shifting our attention to the local conditions affecting territorial administration at the frontier, this

8. For frontier regions, see Winston W. Lo, "Circuits and Circuit Intendants in the Territorial Administration of Sung China," *Monumenta Serica* 31 (1974–1975): 39–107; Michael C. McGrath, "Military and Regional Administration in Northern Sung China" (960–1126) (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1982); Kim Song-gy 金成奎, *Sōdai no seihoku mondai to iminzoku seisaku* 宋代の西北問題と異民族政策 (Tokyo: Kyūko Shoin, 2000), 230–34; and An Guolou 安國樓, *Songchao zhoubian minzu zhengce yanjiu* 宋朝周邊民族政策研究 (Taipei: Wenjin chubanshe, 1997).

9. Mostern, *Dividing the Realm in Order to Govern: The Spatial Organization of the Song State* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011), 225–26.

10. For instance, her *Digital Gazetteer of Song China* is heavily indebted to Hope Wright's *An Alphabetical List of Geographical Names in Sung China* (Paris: Ecole Pratique des Hautes etudes, Centre de Recherches Historiques, 1956). Wright's work is based on the following three Song texts: the *Song History* (*Song Shi* 宋史), *Records of the Universal Realm in the Taiping Era* (*Taiping huanyu ji* 太平寰宇記), and *Treatise on the Nine Territories in the Yuanfeng Reign* (*Yuanfeng jiuyu zhi* 元豐九域志). See Mostern, *Dividing the Realm in order to Govern*, 263–64.

article hopes to show that a closer look at the roles of historical actors such as the Shes can widen our understanding of Song spatial organization beyond the general principles articulated at court.[11]

The Emergence of Tuhao in Hewai in the Long Tenth Century

In his study of tenth-century garrison commanders (*zhenjiang* 鎮將), Hino Kaisaburō observes that in the Tang, the garrison commanders were mostly staffed by key personnel of the provincial governors' (*jiedushi* 節度使) personal armies, who had very few connections with the local communities. The trend continued into the late Tang and Five Dynasties. But during this period another group who possessed more intimate connections with local society emerged and began to challenge the monopoly of the former. These were the *tuhao*. An important development during the tenth century was that the various regimes controlling China proper had tried to limit the power of the governors' personal staffs, allowing individuals with *tuhao* origins to be appointed as garrison commanders. According to Osawa Masaaki, the earliest usage of the term during the Six Dynasties portrays *tuhao* as powerful but lawless figures behaving like local bullies, bandits and rebels. However, this negative connotation subsided over time. In its place there emerged an image of *tuhao* as local strongmen with abilities to mobilize manpower and resources for organizing local militia.[12]

Local strongmen of this sort did exist in the past, but as Osawa has shown, the political influence of *tuhao* had by this historical juncture grown exponentially and they were therefore given recognition by various regimes to assist in governing local societies. It is in this respect that *tuhao* can be considered a new political force that gained traction after a new form of local governance had emerged.[13] The rise of *tuhao* occurred in many places across China, but regional variations are apparent. In Hewai and the larger northwestern

11. In his review of Mostern's book, Robert Hymes points out that Mostern is essentially adopting a regime's-eye view. Hymes further contends that while the regime or the state was important, we would benefit from recognizing that it was only one of the players among many. See Hymes, review of *Dividing the Realm in Order to Govern: The Spatial Organization of the Song State* by Ruth Mostern, *HJAS* 73.2 (2013): 361–77.

12. Osawa Masaaki 大澤正昭, "Tomatsu Godai 'dogo' ron" 唐末五代「土豪」論, *Jochi shigaku* 上智史學, 37 (1992): 139–61.

13. Osawa Masaaki, "Tomatsu Godai 'dogo' ron," 142–45.

frontier zones, the composition of *tuhao* was closely related to the activities of the various ethnic groups and regimes controlling the region.

The Shes emerged in this larger context. The earliest references to the family date back to when She Congruan 折從阮 (891–955), then serving as the Prefect of Fuzhou under the Later Jin regime (936–947), surrendered the territories under his control to the newly founded Later Han regime (947–951), an act for which he was handsomely rewarded. Not only was Fuzhou restructured and "upgraded" to Yong'an Military Province (Yong'an *jun* 永安軍), but the Later Han ruler also appointed She Congruan as the governor and bestowed him with the Prefecture of Shengzhou 勝州 and five other garrisons along the Yellow River. Hino Kaisaburō has noted that this was the only case he found where a governor also had control over other prefectures and garrisons. In other cases, because of the political decline of provincial governors after the fall of the Tang, governors were only permitted to maintain control over the principal prefecture in the province.[14]

The special treatment that She Congruan received has to be understood within the context of the Shes' rise to local prominence. The first She for whom we have a substantial life account was She Congruan's father, She Silun 折嗣倫 (n.d.).[15] She Silun's father, She Zongben 折宗本 (n.d.), was appointed the Supreme Military Commander (*Du bingma shi* 都兵馬使) of five garrisons along the Yellow River in Zhenwu 振武 Province during the last days of the Tang dynasty (618–907) by Li Keyong 李克用 (856–908), a Shatuo 沙陀 Turk Military Governor controlling the region. This formed the pretext for the five garrisons to be transferred to She Congruan decades later.

She Silun was then appointed the Prefect of Linzhou 麟州, the place where the hometown of the Shes, the Fugu garrison 府谷鎮, was located.[16]

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14. Hino Kaisaburō 日野開三郎, "Godai chishō ko" 五代鎮將考, *Tōyō gakuhō* 25.2 (1938): 54–85; and Hino Kaisaburō, "Hanchin taisei to chokuzoku shū" 藩鎮體制と直屬州, *Tōyō gakuhō* 43.4 (1961): 485–520. For the relative strength of the provinces and prefectures, see also Zhang Dazhi 張達志, *Tangdai houqi fanzhen yu zhou zhi guanxi yanjiu* 唐代後期藩鎮與州之關係研究, (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2011), 229.

15. "Cishi She Sizuo bei" 刺史折嗣祚碑, in Wang Chang 王昶 (1725–1806), *Jinshi cuibian* 金石萃編, *Xuxiu siku quanshu* 續修四庫全書 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1995), 890.119:30–32. According to the findings of Dai Yingxing, the name should be Silun instead of Sizuo, and this stele was erected around 905. See Dai, *Sheshi jiazu shilue*, 53–55.

16. Xu Song 徐松, ed., *Song huiyao jigao* 宋會要輯稿, hereafter SHY, Fangyu 方域 21; Dai Yingxing, *Sheshi jiazu shilue*, 13–14; and Hatachi Masanori, "Godai. Hoku-Sō ni okeru Fushū

Fugu was raised to the status of county in 910. It was further separated from Linzhou and became a prefecture (named Fuzhou) in the following year. But it was not Zhu Wen 朱溫 (852–912), the reigning emperor of the Later Liang dynasty, who granted the new status. Fugu at that time was in fact under the control of Li Keyong's son Li Cunxu 李存勗 (886–925), the future emperor of the Later Tang dynasty. She Congruan helped Li recruit a group of Uighurs (*huihe* 回紇), and Li repaid She's service by making him the Prefect of Fuzhou. This marked the beginning of the Shes' domination of Fuzhou.[17] Hatachi Masanori argues that the Shes were useful to Li in two ways: first, the Shes, who were familiar with the local situation, could help with pacifying and recruiting the various tribes active in the region; and second, the Shes could assist Li in fending off the Xiazhou Li. At the time, the Xiazhou Li, also *tuhao* in every sense of the word, took advantage of Li Cunxu's war against the Later Liang regime and tried to push eastward.[18]

The first known contact between the Shes and the Xiazhou Li occurred a few decades later in 953. The situation was extremely complicated, involving several parties wrestling for power in north China. In order to understand the circumstances surrounding the interaction between the Shes and the Xiazhou Lis, a brief digression explaining the political situation in North China at the time is necessary. In 942, when Liu Min 劉旻 (895–954) was the Prefect of Linzhou, Yang Hongxin 楊弘信 (or Yang Xin 楊信, n.d.) had his son Yang Ye 楊業 (923–986) serve Liu. In 951, Guo Wei 郭威 (904–954, r. 951–954) established the Later Zhou dynasty (951–960) through a coup when he dethroned the teenage emperor of the Later Han dynasty (947–951). But Liu Min and some remnants of the Later Han managed to establish an independent state named the Northern Han 北漢 (951–979) under the protection of the

Setsushi ni tsuite," 137–73. A discussion of She Zongben's and She Silun's careers can be found on 144–45.

17. Yue Shi 樂史, *Taiping huanyu ji* 太平寰宇記, *Yingyin Wenyuange siku quanshu* 影印文淵閣四庫全書 (Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu yinshuguan, 1983), 469:38.18b–19a. The *Old History of the Five Dynasties* has a slightly different version of She Congruan's promotion. It is recorded that Congruan was first promoted to the position of Military Specialist (*yajiang* 牙將) of Hedong and that he concurrently held the appointment of Vice Prefect of Fuzhou. He was then promoted to Prefect during the Tongguang (同光, 923–926) era. The text maintains that Li Cunxu gave him this position because of frequent "border turbulence" (*bianhuan* 邊患) and there is no reference to the Huihe. See Xue Juzheng 薛居正 (912–981), *Jiu Wudai shi* 舊五代史 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1976), 125:1647.

18. Hatachi Masanori, "Godai. Hoku-Sō ni okeru Fushū Setsushi ni tzuite," 144–46.

Khitan Liao. In the same year, Yang Hongxin declared himself the Prefect (*cishi* 刺史) of Linzhou and received official recognition from the Later Zhou. Yet Yang Ye continued to serve Liu Min and the Northern Han. After Yang Hongxin's death, he was succeeded by his other son Yang Chongxun 楊重勛 (d. 975), who opted to surrender to the Northern Han as well. In 953, when the Yangs were attacked by neighboring non-Han groups, Yang Chongxun approached the Shes and the Xiazhou Li for help. On Yang's behalf, the two clans petitioned the Later Zhou emperor, who agreed to help on the condition of Yang's surrender.[19]

Over the course of the tenth century, the Yangs had to negotiate and battle for survival among regimes controlling the territories of north China and beyond. Key members of the Yangs were highly regarded by the Song court for their military talents, but their political connection with Linzhou seems to have diminished not long after the founding of the Song; it is unclear from historical sources how much of a presence the family still maintained there. By the late tenth century, unlike the Shes, the Yangs no longer held the hereditary rights to Linzhou, and from this time forward Linzhou Prefects would be centrally appointed by the court.[20]

In Fengzhou, the Song managed to recruit another powerful clan surnamed Wang 王. The Wangs had been identified as ethnically belonging to the Zangcai 藏才, probably a subgroup within the Tangut. In 969, Wang Jia 王甲 (n.d.), originally serving under the Liao, surrendered Fengzhou to the Song. In return, the Wangs received hereditary rights to the post of Prefect until 1041, when Fengzhou fell to the Xi Xia. A new Fengzhou was later established in 1062 by carving out part of the Fuzhou territory, but the Wangs were unable to reclaim their hereditary rights.[21]

These three *tuhao*-turned-official families were connected through mar-

19. Wang Qinruo 王欽若 et al., *Cefu yuangui* 冊府元龜 (Nanjing: Fenghuang chubanshe, 2008), 2:167.1859.

20. See Nie Chongqi 聶崇岐, "Linzhou Yangshi yiwen liuji" 麟州楊氏遺聞六記, Nie Chongqi, *Songshi congkao* 宋史叢考 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1980), 376–87; and Wang Dong 王東, Yang Fuxue 楊富學, "Wudai Songchu xibei zhengzhi geju zhi zaisikao: yi Bei Han yu Dangxiang guanxi wei zhongxin de kaocha" 五代宋初西北政治格局之再思考: 以北漢與党項關係爲中心的考察, *Lanzhou xuekan* 蘭州學刊 1 (2014): 1–7.

21. Li Ziliang 李子亮, "Bei Song Lin Fu Feng sanzhou shouchen suoyin" 北宋麟府豐三州守臣索隱, *Yan'an daxue xuebao (shehui kexue ban)* 延安大學學報 (社會科學版) 23:1 (2001): 89–92; Zhou Qunhua 周群華, "Song Lin Fu Feng sanzhou jianzhi jiqi zhanlüe diwei" 宋麟府豐三州建置及其戰略地位, *Sichuan wenwu* 四川文物 6 (1995): 59–64.

riage. Yang Ye was married to She Deyi's 折德扆 (917–964) daughter.[22] Wang Jia's son, Wang Chengmei 王承美 (d. 1012), was also married to an anonymous female member of the Shes.[23] Local elite families forging marriage ties to solidify their positions in local society were common, and it seems logical to infer that in highly capricious regions such as Hewai, the state would want to keep the power of these military families in check. That the Yangs and the Wangs would eventually lose their hereditary rights to office seems to fit the conventional narrative about the Song strategy of weakening the power of military men, especially those stationed at the border. But a closer look at the sources reveals a very different story.

Tuhao and the Administration of Hewai in the Song

After its founding, the Song responded to the reality of *tuhao* politics and established a unique form of territorial administration in Hewai. Scholars have noted that during the Northern Song, there were basically two different systems for managing frontier communities. The first was commonly known as "loose rein" (*jimi* 羈縻) administration. A Tang-dynasty invention, the *jimi* system was established in 630 to accommodate the Turks who migrated and sought to resettle in Tang territories after the collapse of the Eastern Turk empire. It ring-fenced certain regions where the Tang government only imposed indirect rules while allowing local chiefs to govern the communities. Official titles were bestowed on these local chiefs, but they were mostly nominal.[24] The Song adopted aspects of this system but implemented it mostly in the southwestern regions. The main objective of this kind of arrangement was co-option. It allowed the Song to expand its territory and absorb the frontier communities that accepted its rule.

The second approach, which was found mostly in the northwestern frontier region, allowed tribal communities to maintain a certain level of autonomy

22. Many believed the woman to be the archetype for the iconic She Saihua 佘賽花 in popular literature. Nie Chongqi, "Linzhou Yangshi yiwen liuji," 376–77.

23. Gao Jianguo, *Xianbei zuyi Fuzhou Sheshi yanjiu*, 76.

24. For a succinct discussion of the *jimi* system in the Tang, see Yihong Pan, *Son of Heaven and Heavenly Qaghan: Sui-Tang China and Its Neighbors*, (Bellingham, Wash.: Western Washington University, 1997), 197–202. Pan translates *jimi fuzhou* 羈縻府州 as "subordinated area commands and prefectures." For a detailed Chinese-language study, see Liu Tong 劉統, *Tangdai jimi fuzhou yanjiu* 唐代羈縻府州研究 (Xi'an: Xibei daxue chubanshe, 1998).

but still put them under the charge of regular regional government. Leaders of these tribes were usually appointed as "foreign officials" (*fanguan* 蕃官) and carried titles such as "Inspector" (*xunjian* 巡檢). The rationale for implementing such an arrangement was to ensure the supply of soldiers and horses in preparation for large-scale warfare against the northern great states.[25]

The territorial administration that the Song implemented in Hewai was highly unique in a couple of ways. First, the Song did not implement the more common northwestern system mentioned in the previous paragraph. Instead, right from the beginning, the three prefectures were designated as regular prefectures (*zhengzhou* 正州) and *tuhao* were appointed as prefects, which gave them much higher authority than that bestowed on their counterparts in other northwestern regions. And unlike regular prefects, these Hewai *tuhao* prefects were granted hereditary rights to the post, very similar to the arrangement found in southwestern *jimi* prefectures, although over time, only the Shes managed to retain such status. Second, in contrast to the loose way it managed the *jimi* prefectures with a long leash, the Song state was far more proactive in making its presence felt in Hewai. This was necessitated by Hewai's strategic position and the Song's capricious relationship with the Liao and Xi Xia.[26]

But the Song's proactiveness should not be understood simply in terms of a desire to curb the power of the *tuhao*. The nuance of its approach can be discerned from its handling of the internal rifts within the *tuhao* families. When Wang Chengmei died in 1012, the court ordered the Fuzhou Prefect She Weichang 折惟昌 (978–1014) to recommend a descendant of Wang to be the successor. Eventually, under She Weichang's recommendation, Wang Wenyu 王文玉 (d. 1024) was chosen to take over the post of Fengzhou Prefect.[27] When Wang Wenyu died in 1024, several members of the clan fought over the hereditary right, and again the court ordered the Shes to intervene. Before his death, Wang Wenyu recommended his eldest son Wang Yuqing 王餘慶 (d. 1041) to be his successor. The decision was contested by one of Wang Wenyu's younger brothers Wang Huaixin 王懷信 (n.d.). The court then

25. An Guolou, *Songchao zhoubian minzu zhengce yanjiu*, 37–66.

26. An Guolou, *Songchao zhoubian minzu zhengce yanjiu*, 51–54.

27. Wang Wenyu's original name was Huaiyu 懷玉, and he was actually the son of Wang Chengmei's eldest son Wang Wengong (文恭, n.d.). Because Wang Wengong had been away for many years while serving in his official duties, Wang Chengmai adopted Wang Wenyu as his son. This is clearly a non-Han practice.

instructed She Weizhong 折惟忠 (n.d.), She Weichang's brother and now the Prefect of Fuzhou, to investigate the matter. Unexpectedly, he bypassed Wang Yuqing and Wang Huaiyin and recommended Wang Huaijun 王懷均 (n.d.), another younger brother of Wang Wenyu. The recommendation was accepted by the court. Angered by She Weizhong's move, Wang Huaixin petitioned the court and claimed that Wang Huaijun was incompetent and had driven several households of Han and non-Han residents away within the short span of eight months. As a result, the subordinate tribes refused to pay tribute. He further alleged that he was the one who had the support of the tribal leaders, but She Weizhong had threatened and forced these leaders into submission.[28]

We do not know for certain the outcome of this episode. But when the Xi Xia captured Fengzhou in 1041, the Prefect who died during the battle was Wang Yuqing. He was originally recommended to succeed his father Wang Wenyu before Wang Huaixin contested the title.[29] It thus seems that Wang Huaixin was unsuccessful in his bid to reverse the court's decision. Nevertheless, his memorial to the court preserves information about how the appointment of a Fengzhou Prefect was decided and the different players involved: the court, elite members of the Wang clan, the chief of the She clan, and also leaders of the subordinate tribes. While the court made the final decision, the process was clearly one of negotiation rather than forceful top-down imposition.

Indeed, the value of *tuhao* was not lost to prominent Song statesmen. For instance, Fan Zhongyan 范仲淹 (989–1052), tasked with restoring the defense system, submitted a memorial in 1044 discussing steps to rebuild the local society in Hewai. According to his calculation, while the region had mostly been destroyed, about three thousand former residents were still scattered all over the eastern bank of the Yellow River. But the people did not dare to return to the region because no walled settlement or fortresses were there to defend against future Xi Xia attacks. Fan further noted that in the early days of the dynasty, when the She family was still powerful, the court only needed to deploy about two thousand Han soldiers (hanbing 漢兵) to the region. Now Fuzhou was already bankrupt after years of war, and yet the court still needed to maintain a sizeable army of ten thousand Han soldiers to defend the area.

28. *SHY*, Fangyu 21; Li Tao 李燾, *Xu zizhi tongjian changbian* 續資治通鑑長編, hereafter *XCB* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1979), 6:79.1808, 8:102.2365.

29. *XCB* 10:133.3168–69.

The significant military presence caused serious problems in provisioning for the army. Fan thus suggested building fortresses and walled settlements and reassembling both Han and non-Han border dwellers. He believed this could help to augment the size of local militias with local support and downsize professional armies, which would then lessen the financial burden on the court.[30]

In the context of Fan's memorial, the term *hanbing* is most likely a reference to professional imperial armies not native to the region, rather than soldiers of ethnic Han origin. Fan's view was but one in a long series of intense debates about whether the court should send imperial troops from elsewhere or recruit native soldiers to defend the northwest.[31] Apparently, Fan believed that relying on the local communities to supply soldiers and fund military activities was a better option, which would inevitably depend on the cooperation of the *tuhao*.

In the same year, Ouyang Xiu 歐陽修 (1007–1072) was assigned to inspect border defense in Hedong. He submitted a memorial proposing the best course of action for defending Hewai, particularly Linzhou. He began by rebutting some proposals presented to the court to demote Linzhou from a prefecture (*zhou* 州) to a fort (*zhai* 寨/砦), or to abolish or relocate it. He then advanced a counterproposal consisting of several measures, one of which was to appoint a *tuhao* as Prefect:

> My fourth point pertains to enlisting the help of *tuhao*. We face a dilemma in Linzhou at present. If we choose to keep it, it will deplete Hedong's resources; if we abandon it, Hewai will be lost. If we wish to preserve both, there is no better way than enlisting a *tuhao* and tasking him with the responsibility of defending his own homeland. Linzhou is strategically located and hard to access, and can be guarded with a regiment of two thousand men. Moreover, *tuhao* are those who have earned a reputation of being talented and brave and are feared by [our] enemies. They are also familiar with the enemies' conditions and schemes, so when it comes to battles, the strategies that they devise will not be far off [the mark]. If we entrust them with defending the prefecture, they would naturally treat the prefecture as their own house and realize that their fortune is tied to the survival of the prefecture. As such, they will be brave going into battles and the defense will naturally be solid. And since they are natives, they are close to the

30. *XCB* 11:152.3709–10.

31. Koiwai Hiromitsu 小岩井弘光, *Sōdai heiseishi no kenkyū* 宋代兵制史の研究 (Tokyo: Kyuko shoin, 1998) 21–24.

conditions on the ground. Because the people, having to rely on the strength of these *tuhao*, will tend to gather around them, therefore we should entrust them with recruiting both Han and non-Han people. In this way, we could wage wars against external invaders, and internally we could assemble the people to strengthen the border regions. All this could be done effortlessly and with reduced expenditures and armies. This strategy is one hundred times better than appointing a government official to the post since he in turn has to rely on the court to provide everything. If using *tuhao* is necessary, there is no better person for the job than Wang Ji. Wang Ji is currently at the Jianning stockage and there are about three hundred households of both Han and non-Han people living and farming at the periphery of the stockage under Wang's protection. Wang's talent and bravery is well known and, based on his official rank, he is eligible for the post of Prefect. We could then appraise his accomplishments after one to two years, and if he is indeed capable of defending Linzhou, we should make the post hereditary and entrust the clan to help guard the border.[32]

四曰委土豪者，今議麟州者，存之則困河東，棄之則失河外。若欲兩全而不失，莫若擇一土豪，委之自守。麟州堅險，與兵二千，其守足矣。況所謂土豪者，乃其材勇獨出一方，威名既著，敵所畏服，又能諳敵情僞，凡於戰守，不至乖謀。若委以一州，則其當自視州如家，繫己休戚，其戰自勇，其守自堅。又其既是土人，與其風俗情接，人賴其勇，亦喜附之，則蕃、漢之民可使漸自招集。是外能捍賊而戰守，內可輯民以實邊，省費減兵，無所不便，比於命吏而往，凡事仰給於朝廷，利害百倍也。必用土豪，非王吉不可。吉見在建寧寨，蕃、漢依吉而耕於寨側者已三百家，其材勇則素已知名，況其官序，自可知州。一二年間，視其後效，苟能善守，則可世任之，使長爲捍邊之守。

The *tuhao* identified in this memorial was Wang Ji. Unfortunately, we know very little about him and his kinship network.[33] But Ouyang was simply echoing a common strategy the big states of this period adopted to incorporate *tuhao*

32. Ouyang Xiu, "Lun Linzhou shiyi zhazi" 論麟州事宜劄子, in Ouyang Xiu, *Ouyang Xiu quanji* 歐陽修全集 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2001), 1754.

33. Wang Ji was originally an administrative clerk serving in the office of the Linzhou Prefect. When Linzhou was under siege in 1038 by Xi Xia armies, Wang voluntarily disguised himself as an enemy solider and rushed to Fuzhou to call for help. As he was proficient in the Tangut language, he managed to evade interrogation when stopped and eventually made his way to Fuzhou to ask for urgent reinforcements. Linzhou was saved as a result and Wang was promoted to military rank. He subsequently made his way up the bureaucratic ladder. See *XCB* 10:133.3181–82, 11:146.3535, 12:168.4033.

into their state systems when he recommended that Wang Ji be appointed as Prefect. Such a strategy recognized the *tuhao*'s usefulness in successful border management. Ouyang made a very strong case for the state to "co-manage" Hewai with the *tuhao* when he highlighted the importance of appointing individuals who understood local conditions to head local administration and described how this approach could reduce the burden on the court.

One might argue that Fan's and Ouyang's calls to elevate the status of *tuhao* were desperate attempts to salvage the Xi Xia situation and that they would not have had to do so if the court had not earlier weakened the power of *tuhao* to the point where they were no longer strong enough to help hold off invaders. Indeed, due to the predominant narrative concerning the Song's effort to strengthen the center and weaken the periphery, a focal point of historical writings about Hewai has always been the court's effort to curb the power of *tuhao*. For instance, historical sources and modern scholars have opined that the establishment of a Lin-Fu Military Bureau (*Lin-Fu lu junma si* 麟府路軍馬司) in 1002 with its office located in Fuzhou was meant to undermine the power of the *tuhao* prefects of Hewai, especially the Shes.[34] The next section will consider this proposition by examining the roles and functions of the bureau and other military establishments.

Military Establishments

Although Hewai was often referred to as Lin-fu "Circuit" (*lu* 路) in official sources after the institution of the Lin-Fu Military Bureau, it actually functioned more like a special military zone within the larger Hedong Circuit, established in 997 as one of the fifteen circuits empire-wide. A year before, in 996, facing pressure from the Xiazhou Li, the Song court had already started to appoint military supervisors to coordinate large-scale trans-prefectural military operations in Hewai, and this arrangement became formalized with the establishment of the bureau, ending only after the north fell into the hands of the Jurchens in the early twelfth century.

The Lin-Fu Bureau Supervisors were mostly high-ranking military officials serving primarily as Hedong's military administrators (Bing-Dai *qianxia* 并代

34. *SHY*, Fangyu 21. Li Yumin 李裕民, "Sheshi jiazu yanjiu" 折氏家族研究, *Shaanxi shifan daxue xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban)* 陝西師範大學學報 (哲學社會科學版) 27.2 (1998): 55–68; and Chen Junkai, "Bei Song difang shixi zhengquan Fuzhou Sheshi yu zhongyang zhengfu guanxi chutan."

鈐轄).[35] Originally, they reported to Hedong's Fiscal Intendants (*zhuanyun shi* 轉運使). But after Hedong was reorganized into a military circuit in the 1040s, the supervisors reported to a Strategic Management—Pacifying Commissioner (*jinglüe anfu shi* 經略安撫使, sometimes simply called Military Commissioner or Military Intendant in English secondary scholarship), now the most important circuit-level official in Hedong with highly concentrated power.[36]

During wartime, the chain of command put a bureau supervisor above the prefects of the three Hewai prefectures. But we find no evidence to suggest that the bureau interfered with the day-to-day administration of the prefectures, with only one exception involving the Tanglong garrison (*Tanglong zhen* 唐龍鎮). In 1023, the court ordered the bureau to tend to the affairs of Tanglong.[37] On the surface, the court's instruction meant that the Tanglong Commander would now report directly to the Bureau Supervisor instead of the Linzhou Prefect. It can certainly be inferred that such measures would elevate the power of the bureau supervisors at the expense of all Hewai prefects.

A closer examination of the background surrounding this event reveals that the court's order was issued to tackle a very specific problem. Tanglong garrison was originally part of Fuzhou but was transferred to Linzhou in 979. This has led some scholars to speculate that Tanglong was formerly under the control of the Shes and that it was one of the five garrisons bestowed to She Congruan by the Later Han ruler (see above).[38] Whether Tanglong was indeed one of the five garrisons remains to be seen. Regardless, Tanglong's relationship with Fuzhou was complicated. In the same year that the court instructed the Lin-Fu Military Bureau Supervisor to intervene with Tanglong's affairs, it also issued a restraining order forbidding the Fuzhou Prefect, a

35. The term Bing-Dai refers specifically to Bingzhou 并州 (formerly Taiyuan Superior Prefecture [Taiyuan fu 太原府]) and Daizhou 代州, but it was often used in the Song to refer more generally to the Hedong Circuit. Occasionally, the military administrative posts would go to civil officials, eunuchs, or imperial relatives. See Gao Jianguo, *Xianbei zuyi Fuzhou Sheshi yanjiu*, 34–41.

36. For a classic study on Song circuits and circuit intendants, see Winston W. Lo, "Circuits and Circuit Intendants in the Territorial Administration of Sung China," *Monumenta Serica* 31 (1974–1975): 39–107. For a detailed study of the military circuits and *jinglüe anfu shi*, see Michael C. McGrath, "Military and Regional Administration in Northern Sung China (960–1126)" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1982).

37. *SHY* Bing 兵 27.21

38. Xu Weiwei 許偉偉 and Yang Huan 楊浣, "Tanglong zhen kao" 唐龍鎮考, *Ningxia shehui kexue* 寧夏社會科學 1 (2013): 100–105.

member of the Shes by default, from deploying troops to raid the territories under the jurisdiction of Tanglong. Fuzhou's stated reason for conducting such raids was to arrest refugees, both Han and non-Han, who sought shelter in Tanglong. The court assured Fuzhou that if these refugees were indeed found in Tanglong, it would order the Tanglong authorities to send them back to Fuzhou.[39]

Who were the authorities of Tanglong? An entry in the section on Tanguts in the official history of the Song reveals that the leaders of Tanglong were another clan of *tuhao*, given hereditary rights to govern Tanglong by the Song court:

> In 1007, Lai Mei, a local chief of the Qiang people in Tanglong, could not get along with his uncle Lai Lin. Mei eventually requested the Khitan Liao to send troops to destroy Lai Lin while he allied himself with Fuzhou. Neither Lin nor Mei were [leaders of big clans.] They used to serve both sides. Not long after, they also attempted to raid the border regions. When [the court] deployed troops to chase them away, they would flee to the east of the Yellow River, where they were known as the eastern community. When the Khitans sent their troops against them, they would flee to the west of the Yellow River, where they were known as the western community. The areas where they resided were extremely hard to access and could not be reached by armored soldiers or cavalries. It was only then that the emperor, taking pity on their desperateness and their appeals for peace, decided to accept them and treat them well. When the Khitan envoy came, the emperor instructed him to bring the message [back to the Liao ruler] to ask for the return of Lai Mei's and Lai Lin's people and livestock that were seized during previous raids. Not long after, a member of the clan, Lai Huaizheng, and Lai Lin started to fight and rob each other. Their conflicts sent neighboring groups into a state of unrest. The court thus deployed an envoy to summon them, making both take an oath to agree to settle their dispute through their own customs and practices.[40]
>
> (景德)四年，唐龍鎮羌族來美與其叔璘不叶，召契丹破之，來依府州。璘、美非大族，嘗持兩端，頃亦寇鈔近界，發兵趣之，則走河之東曰東壢，契丹加兵，則入河之西曰西壢，地極險阻，介卒騎兵所不能及。至是，上亦憫其窮而款塞，特優容之。會契丹使至，即令諭其事，仍還所掠璘、美人畜。其族人懷正又與璘互相讎劫，側近帳族不寧，詔遣使召而盟之，依本俗法和斷。

39. *XCB* 5:57.1269–70.
40. *SS* 40:491.14146–47.

Checked against other sources, this entry contains several inconsistencies. In some sources, Lai Mei (n.d.) was the uncle and Lai Lin (n.d.) the nephew, and they joined forces to take on Lai Huaizhen (n.d.). It was Lai Huaizhen who, in search of revenge, summoned the Khitan troops to attack Lai Mei and Lai Lin. Also, the two sides whom they served were identified as the Khitans and the Xiazhou Li.[41]

Nevertheless, taken together, these sources highlight the complex relationship between the various players active in the region. More significantly, they show that the Song approach to handling these volatile regions was shaped by local *tuhao* politics. For instance, in 1003, the Tanglong leaders complained to the court that their traders were robbed and killed by the people of Fuzhou while trying to trade there. To pacify Tanglong, the court issued an order to instruct Fuzhou to allow the Tanglong traders to conduct business in Fuzhou. In the next year, the court again ordered Fuzhou to stop raiding Tanglong. If we consider these reports, it seems quite clear that when the court decided to let the Lin-Fu Circuit Military Bureau deal directly with Tanglong in 1023, it was to ensure the survival of the Lais against the far more powerful Shes.[42]

Tanglong fell to Xi Xia in the late 1030s when its chief, Lai Shunshou 來順守 (n.d.), switched sides. It again fell to the Liao in 1049.[43] With cases like Tanglong and the Lais, it became abundantly clear to Song statesmen that any sensible strategy for protecting the territories must begin with winning the *tuhao* over and striking a balance between the various groups. The establishment of institutions also needed to reflect such tactical considerations. Therefore, rather than seeing the Lin-Fu Military Bureau as a mechanism devised by the Song court to curb the power of local chiefs such as the Shes, and inferring that such attempts were an integral part of the court's overall "weakening the branches" approach to regional powers, it may be more accurate to see them as the product of the Song's effort to participate in and steer a frontier social ecosystem shaped primarily by *tuhao* activities to its own favor.

In the early years of the Lin-Fu Military Bureau, the supervisors were mostly outsiders. That changed in the late eleventh century when local strongmen started to be appointed. A Zhang 張 family from Fuzhou featured prominently in this later history of the bureau. Several members of the Zhang family served

41. *XCB* 6:67.1505. Zeng Gongliang 曾公亮, et al., *Wujing zongyao* 武經總要, *qianji* 前集, *Yingyin Wenyuange siku quanshu* 影印文淵閣四庫全書, 726.17.18b, 10b.

42. *XCB* 5:54.1193, 57.1269–70.

43. Xu Weiwei, Yang Huan, "Tanglong zhen kao," 101.

as Prefects of the newly established Fengzhou (see above) in the late eleventh century. Unlike the Wangs before them, the Zhangs did not possess hereditary rights to the post, but their familiarity with local conditions was definitely a key factor in their appointments.[44]

These same family members would then move on to serve as Bureau Supervisors. The first in the family to assume this post was Zhang Shiju 張世矩 (n.d.). He was the son of Zhang Jie 張岕 (n.d.), who purchased an appointment as Military Section Commander (*yajiang* 牙將) and earned a reputation for being skillful in battle and courageous during the Sino-Tangut conflicts during the 1040s.[45] Zhang Shiju probably served in the post of Bureau Supervisor in the late 1070s and early 1080s, when Emperor Shenzong 神宗 (r. 1067–1085) was pursuing an expansionist policy against the Song's northern neighbors, especially the Xi Xia. Besides this assignment, Zhang Shiju also held other posts throughout his official career, including Prefect of Fengzhou, Prefect of Huoshan Military Prefecture (*huoshan jun* 火山軍) in Hedong, Prefect of Zhenrong Military Prefecture (*zhenrong jun* 鎮戎軍) in Shaanxi, and also the Deputy Commander of Hedong's First Regiment (*Hedong diyi fujiang* 河東第一副將) under the commander-troop system (*jiangbing fa* 將兵法) implemented during the New Policies era.

But Zhang Shiju's relationship with the court was not always smooth. For instance, in 1082, frustrated with Hedong's lackluster effort in aiding his expansionist vision, Emperor Shenzong issued an edict castigating top Hedong officials. He felt that their lack of progress was the result of their selfishness, and he accused them of hoarding military resources sent from the central government. Shenzong specifically identified Wang Juqing 王居卿 (n.d.), the Prefect of the Capital Prefecture Taiyuan 太原 (thus making Wang Hedong's Strategic Management-Pacifying Commissioner by default), and Zhang Shiju as untrustworthy, even having the latter demoted and transferred.[46]

Zhang Shiju was known for advocating and exercising caution in military operations against the Xi Xia, and that did not put him in the good graces of hawkist emperors and officials.[47] But his value as a *tuhao* was not lost on other policymakers. A draft proclamation preserved in Su Shi's 蘇軾 (1037–1101) literary collection reappointing Zhang Shiju as the Prefect of Zhenrong

44. Li Zhiliang, "Bei Song Lin Fu Feng sanzhou shouchen suoyin."
45. *SS* 30:326.10523–25.
46. *XCB* 22:327.7867.
47. *XCB* 22:319.7716–17.

Military Prefecture acknowledged his familiarity with frontier affairs, which made him a suitable candidate for managing a region where the Han and the "barbarians" coexisted.[48] The proclamation was most likely drafted between 1086 and 1089, when Su was serving as a Drafter of Imperial Proclamations (*zhizhigao* 知制誥). This was the short period when members of the anti-New Policies faction were brought back to power after Shenzong's death, and therefore one might argue that the change in opinion had more to do with court politics than Zhang Shiju's inherent qualities as a *tuhao* leader. While this is certainly possible, it is worth noting that two other members of the Zhangs—Zhang Shiju's brother Zhang Shiyong 世永 (n.d.) and their nephew Zhang Gou 構 (n.d.)—served in the same position consecutively between 1097–1099, a time when the hawkish Emperor Zhezong 哲宗 (r. 1085–1100) was on the throne.[49] Even amidst changes in the general direction of court politics, *tuhao* such as the Zhangs remained relevant.

The importance of these *tuhao* consistently propelled the court to take them into consideration when devising new institutions. The Hedong First Regiment of which Zhang Shiju once served as Deputy Commander was a New Policies–era invention that had far-reaching implications for regional administration. As a general rule, imperial troops stationed outside the capital were put under the command of the prefects before the New Policies era. But when Emperor Shenzong and his reform-minded officials pushed to realize their expansionist vision, the system was thought to be ineffective in building a strong army for conducting offensive warfare. The *jiangbing* system was then implemented to rectify the problem. Under the new system, the prefects no longer had control over the troops stationed in their jurisdiction. Instead, new military regiments were created and put under the charge of centrally appointed "commanders" (*jiang* 將). The main objective of this new system was to strengthen the tie between a commander and his regiment, hence enhancing the overall efficiency of military operations.[50]

Yet in a region where *tuhao* played a critical role in determining the political alliances of local communities, the *jiangbing* system had to be adjusted. We have already seen that Zhang Shiju held the post of Deputy Commander of

48. Su Shi, "Zhang Shiju zairen Zhengrong jun" 張世矩再任鎮戎軍, in Su Shi, *Su Shi wenji* 蘇軾文集 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 1986), 39.1099.

49. *XCB* 33:501.11937.

50. For a succinct discussion of this system, see Wang Zengyu, *Songchao bingzhi chutan*, 95–102.

Hedong's First Regiment. What we do not know is what the composition of this regiment was. In comparison, we have more information on the Twelfth Regiment (*Di shi'er jiang* 第十二將) whose Commander was She Kexing 折克行 (1043–1108), the Prefect of Fuzhou and the leader of the She clan of that generation. More importantly, historical sources report that the regiment was entirely constituted of She's personal non-Han armies (*fanbu* 蕃部).[51]

She Kexing was not the only member of the clan who was appointed as the commander of a regiment. Biographical information from the tomb inscriptions belonging to different members of the clan reveal that many had either served as the commanders or deputy commanders of different regiments in Hedong.[52] Recent studies on the regiment system in Shaanxi have shown that by the late Northern Song, the system had evolved from a purely military establishment to a unit of territorial administration.[53] It seems quite possible that the same development was taking place in Hedong. Thus, even when the general approach was to transfer the command of armies from the local government to the newly established military office, often in a drastic way to facilitate the mobilization of troops, the court still found it necessary to tweak the system to incorporate the long-standing social arrangements of the region into its territorial administration.

In the final years of the Northern Song, She Keqiu, whom we introduced at the beginning of this article, served concurrently as Fuzhou's Prefect, the Supervisor of Lin-Fu Military Bureau, and the Commander of the Twelfth Regiment. This instance of appointing the same person to head the three offices was highly unique and may have been a desperate move by the Song court to salvage the Jurchen situation. On the other hand, the importance of She Keqiu to the Song and the success of the She clan was part of a larger

51. *XCB* 26:385.9379–80.

52. For instance, She Kejian 折克儉 (1048–1098) had served as the Commander of the Hedong Eighth Regiment. She Kexi 折克禧 (1057–1115) had served as the Acting Commander of the Hedong Fifth Regiment, while his son She Kebao 折可褒, had served in the Hedong Ninth Regiment. She Kecun 折可存 (1096–1126) had served as the commander of the Hedong Second Regiment. See Gao Jianguo, *Xianbei zuyi Fuzhou Sheshi yanjiu*, 134–38, 141–42, 145–47. We also have several cases where female members of the Shes took regiment commanders as their husbands.

53. Ito Kazuma 伊藤一馬 "HokuSō Sensei chiiki no shōhei-sei to chihō tōchi taisei" 北宋陝西地域の将兵制と地方統治体制, *Machikaneyama ronsō. Shigaku-hen* 待兼山論叢史学篇 46 (2012):1–25; Chang Woei Ong, "The Limits of 'Civilianization': The New Policies and Shaanxi's Territorial Administration in the Late Northern Song," *T'oung Pao* 106 (2020): 171–260.

historical development characterized by the rise of *tuhao*. Although this new class of militarized local strongmen could be found in many places, *tuhao* in Hewai took on some distinctive attributes peculiar to the region, which was home to constant, massive interstate warfare, complex networks of cross-border trade, mass migration, frequent resettlement of various communities, and shifting alliances.[54]

Conclusion

In Northern Song Hewai, the peculiar prefectural system, the Lin-Fu Military Bureau, and later the regiment system during the New Policies era were all created to achieve two related objectives: preparation for large-scale conflicts with northern neighbors and securing the support of mobile frontier communities that often switched sides. The state certainly played a major role in designing Hewai's territorial administration. But the current study argues that we cannot truly appreciate the Song's institutional innovation—both at the point of creation and in its subsequent evolution—if we simply see it as a top-down, one-way approach of state control for achieving centralization.

Traces of the *tuhao*'s activities and their negotiations among themselves and with the state can be found in every stage of institutional development. This system was unlike the *jimi* system found mainly in the southwest and the approach practiced in other northwestern regions, where tribal leaders were appointed as "foreign officials" but put under the charge of the regular regional government. Instead, administrative arrangements regarding the three prefectures were originally built on deals struck over the course of the first half of the tenth century between the *tuhao* and the various regimes controlling the region. Through such agreements, *tuhao* were absorbed into the regular bureaucracy. Although the Yangs in Linzhou and the Wangs in Fengzhou would eventually lose their hereditary rights to the post of Prefect, that the Shes in Fuzhou continued to enjoy such privilege suggests that the removal of a *tuhao* clan's hereditary rights was probably due to the declining influence of the clan over the local population—or a total loss of territory as

54. Hatachi Masanori 畑地正憲,"Sōdai ni okeru RinFu ro ni tzuite" 宋代における麟府路について, *Tōyōshi kenkyū* 東洋史研究 51.3 (1992): 413–43. See also Hatachi Masanori, "Sōdai ni okeru seihoku enbō to docyaku shūgō sei ryoku ni tsuite" 宋代における西北辺防と土着酋豪勢力について, *Hagi kokusai daigaku ronshū* 萩國際大學論集 7–8.1 (2006): 57–81.

in the Wangs' case—rather than to the court's concerted plan to curb *tuhao* power. In fact, policymakers both at court and in the regional government often saw the decline of *tuhao* as lamentable, as it would force the state to channel more resources to the region to maintain a sizeable army.

Similarly, the creation of the Lin-Fu Military Bureau was not intended to suppress the power of the Shes. It worked primarily as an agency for coordinating military actions against the Song's northern neighbors. The only instance where we find the court instructing the bureau to interfere with the day-to-day affairs of the prefectures was when the Lai clan controlling the Tanglong garrison was tormented by the more powerful Shes. Apparently, the decision had more to do with ensuring a balance of power among the powerful clans and less to do with augmenting the authority of the state at the expense of the *tuhao*.

Of course, the creation of any regional military establishment must have had an impact on the existing territorial administrative structure. Sources available to us do not reveal much about the Military Bureau's effect on the organization and function of the regional government. What we do know, however, is that by the late eleventh century when the Song court adopted an aggressive approach to foreign relations, we begin to see elite members of powerful local clans such as the Zhangs and the Shes being appointed as supervisors of the Bureau. Likewise, commanders of the regiment system implemented during the New Policies era also often came from the same groups of *tuhao*. In other words, the actual configuration of these military institutions was the product of negotiation between the various stakeholders active in the region; they were never a straightforward manifestation of the state's power in managing the territories under its jurisdiction.

Through this case study of Hewai, I am not interested in proving that the conventional understanding of the Song's approach to strengthening the center at the expense of the periphery is misguided. This has already been established by many excellent studies that have come before. Rather, my point is that we cannot properly understand state institutions and their evolution if we ignore the complex social conditions on which these institutions were founded. This article is not an attempt to write a history of Song institutions entirely from the bottom up, as it is important to recognize that the court did play an indispensable role. Instead, my contention is that we have to move beyond the fixation on seeing everything from the perspective of the center when we try to make sense of changes in state institutions and territorial administration.