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Pourquoi et comment légifirer sur l'usure?

Author

Listed:
  • Thierry Baudassé

    (LEO - Laboratoire d'Économie d'Orleans [UMR6586] - UO - Université d'Orléans - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Anne Lavigne

    (LEO - Laboratoire d'Économie d'Orleans [UMR6586] - UO - Université d'Orléans - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

[fre] Depuis que la France connaît une quasi stabilité des prix, les taux d’intérêt nominaux sont situés à des niveaux historiquement bas. Cette situation n’est pas sans conséquence sur la soutenabilité de la réglementation anti-usuraire. En effet, les établissements de crédit soutiennent que, pour certaines catégories de crédit, la tarification «juste «du risque devient impossible : l’addition du coût du risque aux autres composantes de coûts bancaires fait buter certains taux débiteurs sur le taux de l’usure. Ainsi, les établissements seraient contraints de rationner le crédit, alors même que le fonctionnement libre du marché ne les y inciterait pas. De leur côté, les usagers des services bancaires soulignent la nécessité des lois anti-usuraires afin de protéger les populations économiquement fragiles. Entre la législation interdisant l’usure et celle prohibant la vente à perte, la conciliation entre ces intérêts contradictoires est délicate. Est-il souhaitable et possible de modifier le dispositif anti-usuraire en vigueur en France aujourd’hui ? Cet article propose quelques pistes de réponses, en s’attachant exclusivement à examiner la législation anti-usuraire applicable aux particuliers, et non aux entreprises et débouche sur une proposition concrète de dispositif qui concilie les intérêts des prêteurs et des emprunteurs, quel que soit l’environnement macroéconomique. . Classification JEL : E43, G21, G28 [eng] Legislating on Usury : Why and How ? . The French Economy experiences historically low inflation and interest rates. This situation has some consequences on the sustainability of the new usury law that has been enforced in 1990. Banks argue that a fair pricing on credit is nearly impossible : when the cost of risk is added to the other components of the cost of credit, the lending rates bump against the usury rate. Thus banks are constrained to ration credit even though a free competition would not lead them to do so. Consumers on their side advocate for
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Thierry Baudassé & Anne Lavigne, 2000. "Pourquoi et comment légifirer sur l'usure?," Post-Print halshs-00258502, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00258502
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    Cited by:

    1. Denis H. ACCLASSATO, 2008. "Taux D'Interet Effectif, Viabilite Financiere Et Financement Des Petits Operateurs Economiques Par Les Institutions De Microfinance Au Benin," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 79(1), pages 161-195, March.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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