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Mentalism Versus Behaviourism In Economics: A Philosophy-Of-Science Perspective

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  • Dietrich, Franz
  • List, Christian

Abstract

Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs and other mental states in social-scientific theories are nothing but constructs re-describing people’s behaviour. Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, on a par with the unobservables in science, such as electrons and electromagnetic fields. While behaviourism has gone out of fashion in psychology, it remains influential in economics, especially in ‘revealed preference’ theory. We defend mentalism in economics, construed as a positive science, and show that it fits best scientific practice. We distinguish mentalism from, and reject, the radical neuroeconomic view that behaviour should be explained in terms of brain processes, as distinct from mental states.

Suggested Citation

  • Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2016. "Mentalism Versus Behaviourism In Economics: A Philosophy-Of-Science Perspective," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(2), pages 249-281, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:32:y:2016:i:02:p:249-281_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Francesco GUALA, 2017. "Preferences: Neither Behavioural nor Mental," Departmental Working Papers 2017-05, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    2. Martin Kolmar & Andreas Wagener, 2019. "Group Identities in Conflicts," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 165-192, December.
    3. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01249514 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Miles Kimball, 2015. "Cognitive Economics," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 167-181, June.
    5. Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2016. "Reason-Based Choice And Context-Dependence: An Explanatory Framework," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(2), pages 175-229, July.
    6. Fumagalli, Roberto, 2021. "Rationality, preference satisfaction and anomalous intentions: why rational choice theory is not self-defeating," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 112446, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Dietrich, Franz, 2018. "Savage's theorem under changing awareness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 1-54.
    8. Lauren Larrouy & Guilhem Lecouteux, 2018. "Choosing in a Large World: The Role of Focal Points as a Mindshaping Device," Working Papers halshs-01923244, HAL.
    9. Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2013. "Reason-Based Rationalization," MPRA Paper 51776, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. David Lipka, 2014. "Do economists need virtues?," ICER Working Papers 06-2014, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    11. Moscati, Ivan, 2021. "On the recent philosophy of decision theory," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 115039, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    12. Ivan Moscati, 2022. "Behavioral and heuristic models are as-if models too — and that’s ok," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 22177, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    13. Shintaro Tamate, 2015. "External Norms and Systematically Observed Norms," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 247-259, June.
    14. Roberto Fumagalli, 2021. "Rationality, preference satisfaction and anomalous intentions: why rational choice theory is not self-defeating," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 91(3), pages 337-356, October.
    15. Truls Pedersen & Sjur Dyrkolbotn & Thomas Ågotnes, 2015. "Reasoning about reasons behind preferences using modal logic," Information Systems Frontiers, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 713-724, August.
    16. Vaios Koliofotis, 2021. "Applying evolutionary methods in economics: progress or pitfall?," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 203-223, July.

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    JEL classification:

    • J1 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics

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